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Abstract: The Russian and Ukrainian constitutions—like those in many other post-Soviet 
states—have concentrated political power in exclusive “super” presidencies. However, 
the concentration of power has persisted in only one of the two cases. Russian 
presidential authority was resilient in the face of attempts to increase legislative strength 
in the 1990s, even when severe economic and political crises undermined the presidency 
of Boris Yeltsin. In contrast, Ukrainian presidential power fluctuated over time, with 
“Orange Revolution” constitutional reforms shifting power to the parliament in 2004 and 
their annulment returning power to the president in 2010. What explains the different 
trajectories of Russia’s and Ukraine’s presidential systems? Using process-tracing to 
parse out the actions of elites during the 1990s and 2000s in combination with analyses of 
the electoral foundations of elite competition in the two cases, this dissertation develops 
an argument about the origins of super-presidential systems and the prospects for 
constitutional change in such systems. Concentrated executive power in Russia and 
Ukraine: (1) depended on elites’ preferences for more or less concentrated political 
authority; (2) these preferences depended on how elites perceived their political prospects 
for capturing and holding presidential power; (3) elites’ perceptions of their prospects for 
gaining and holding presidential power were conditioned by the relative balance of power 
 vii 
between major political forces; and (4) this balance of power was very vulnerable to 
pressure from social forces. It was this final factor that distinguished the Ukrainian and 
Russian cases. Ukraine had more balanced political competition because of its coherent 
ethno-linguistic cleavage, and consequently more uncertainty about rival elites’ political 
fortunes, which produced challenges to super-presidentialism. Russia’s experience with 
regional politics, by contrast, has not produced a similarly stable balance of power 
between rival forces, because the country’s minority groups were too diverse and 
dispersed to form a unified constituency that could challenge the political dominance of 
the center. The structural underpinnings of elite competition help to explain why the 
preferences of self-interested politicians to concentrate or disperse political power 
changed over time in ways that promoted unstable super-presidentialism in Ukraine 
compared to much more durable super-presidentialism in Russia.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
What causes states to maintain or change their constitutional orders? This 
question is fundamental to new democracies because constitutions—particularly 
executive-legislative power relations—can be a key reason their political systems become 
more or less democratic and competitive over time (for e.g., Stepan and Skach 1993; Linz 
1994; Przeworksi et al. 1996; Fish 2006). The Russian and Ukrainian constitutions—like 
those in many other post-Soviet states—have tended to concentrate political power in 
exclusive “super” presidencies. However, the durability of this concentration of executive 
power has persisted in only one of the two cases. Russian presidential authority was 
resilient in the face of attempts to increase legislative strength in the 1990s, even when 
severe economic and political crises undermined the presidency of Boris Yeltsin. In 
contrast, Ukrainian presidential power fluctuated over time, with constitutional reforms 
shifting power to the parliament in 2004 in the aftermath of the "Orange Revolution" only 
to see the annulment of these reforms and a return of concentrated power to the president 
in 2010. What explains the different trajectories of Russia’s and Ukraine’s presidential 
systems? In this dissertation, I evaluate the tendency toward “super-presidentialism” in 
these two cases by focusing on the origins of their post-communist constitutions and the 
conditions promoting constitutional durability and change over time. The goal of the 
study is to understand why political elites in both countries initially adopted constitutions 
with super-presidential characteristics and why the concentration of presidential authority 
has persisted in Russia but not in Ukraine. The study, therefore, evaluates two central 
research questions: (a) under what conditions are elite actors more likely to choose an 
exclusive constitutional framework with concentrated political authority, or, conversely, 
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an inclusive constitutional framework with a more balanced distribution of power among 
the branches of government; and (b) under what conditions are elite actors able to 
maintain concentrated power relations within a presidential system in the face of 
challenges for more equal distribution of power with the legislative branch? 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND CHANGE IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 
The political science literature has examined at length the effects of different 
constitutional frameworks on the quality and durability of democracy. I review this 
literature in the following chapter but, by way of introduction, it includes the debates over 
the numerous disadvantages and advantages of presidentialism compared to 
parliamentarism (for e.g., Linz 1990; Shugart and Carey 1992; Linz and Valenzuela 
1994; Stepan and Skach 1993; Linz and Stepan 1996; Przeworski et al., 1996; 
Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Samuels and Shugart 2010) and the consequences of 
vesting greater or lesser power in legislatures (Fish 2006). While conclusions across these 
studies have sometimes differed, they all have assumed that countries’ institutional 
features matter for the functioning of democracy. In general, countries with parliamentary 
systems, as well as presidential and semi-presidential systems with stronger legislatures, 
tend to be associated with greater democratic stability. The stakes involved in a new 
democracy’s choice of constitution are therefore expected to be very high; constitutions 
will shape political competition over the long term in ways that are more or less 
conducive or detrimental to the consolidation of democracy.  
However, constitutional choices do not always “stick” as countries move through 
the process of transitioning from authoritarian rule—which was the case in post-Soviet 
Ukraine, where changes in levels of societal mobilization caused elites to reassess the 
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costs and benefits associated with maintaining a strong presidential system. The 
constitutional change that resulted in Ukraine is an example of how a shift in the political 
and social environment can cause dramatic changes in elites’ constitutional preferences. 
This raises additional questions about the relationship between constitutional design and 
democratic stability: What conditions made political elites more or less likely to choose 
relatively exclusive or inclusive constitutions in the first place? And when do these 
conditions have more or less constant or more or less variable effects across time?  
The argument developed in this dissertation complements studies that have dealt 
with the origins of constitutional systems (for e.g., Fry 1997; Easter 1997; Cheibub 
2007). It does so by explicitly incorporating one of the major criticisms of the 
“institutionalist” literature into the argument: that institutions cannot be treated as fixed 
because they are themselves responsive to external conditions. In other words, it 
“endogenizes” constitutions to help understand the origins of constitutional change. The 
overarching framework applied to the two cases in the study is Elinor Ostrom’s (2005) 
multi-layered model of institutional change: Key actors operate within “action arenas” 
where they face a set of variables affecting their preferred institutional outcomes and 
their strategies for achieving their goals. The institutional choice is endogenous. 
However, the variables at this level are nested within broader institutional and structural 
layers that moderate their effects; therefore, whenever the higher-level exogenous (or 
contextual) institutional and/or structural parameters change, actors within the action 
arenas will reassess the costs and benefits associated with a particular institutional choice 
at any given institutional layer. The choice of a constitution is especially fundamental 
because it becomes the broader institutional framework within which lower institutional 
levels are nested. Therefore, the causes of the constitutional choice—the “endogenous 
constitution”—in addition to the effects of the constitutional choice—the “exogenous 
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constitution”—are both integral parts of institutional explanations of regime transitions. 
In some cases the external parameters that shape the constitutional “action arenas” are 
less liable to change, and in other cases they are more liable to change; the former reflects 
the Russian case and the latter reflects the Ukrainian case. This indicates the need for a 
study that grapples with the conditions that generate constitutional change over time, 
because the debate over constitutional design tends to treat the effects of constitutions as 
rather more homogenous and independent across time and national contexts (for 
exceptions see for e.g. Mainwaring and Shugart 1997).  Within the Ostrom framework, 
the origins of completely new constitutions—in the wake of major events such as the 
collapse of communism or the toppling of an authoritarian regime through revolution—
and the causes of any subsequent changes to the constitutions—as a result of changes in 
the external parameters affecting the costs and benefits associated with the initial 
constitutional choice—are conceptually identical. I use this lens in the current study to 
grapple both with the conditions that affected the initial constitutional choices in the case 
of the two particular countries and with the reasons underlying structures took on greater 
explanatory power in the dynamics of political competition and constitutional outcomes 
over a period of time.  
The goals are within a “New Institutional Economics” (NIE) vein, in which 
constitutions (Buchanan 1990; Voigt 1999; Robinson and Torvik 2008) and institutions 
more generally (Ostrom 2005) are endogenized in order to evaluate their diversity. 
Following the NIE tradition, a fundamental assumption in this study of the Russian and 
Ukrainian constitutional choices is that strategically motivated elites competed over 
constitutional designs that would maximize (their perceptions of) their own political or 
 5 
economic gains.
1
 Put differently, constitutions are assumed to be zero-sum redistributive 
institutions (Tsebelis 1990: 104-118), in which power awarded to one party can only 
come at the expense of another party, and therefore result from struggles among self-
interested parties pursuing their own objectives. As indicated above, the NIE framework 
also explicitly links the effects of strategic bargaining processes to the effects of the 
particular institutional and structural contexts within which they took place. This type of 
approach can therefore explain constitutional choice more fully than the more purely 
macro-level historical institutionalist or micro-level strategic accounts that undergird 
many arguments in political science.  
 
THE CASES AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
The choice of the Russian and Ukrainian cases is based on John Stuart Mill’s 
Method of Difference, or a “most similar cases” research design. Potential causes can be 
inferred from the few ways in which the cases differ, compared to the many more ways in 
which they resemble each other. Russia’s and Ukraine’s many similar characteristics can 
basically “control for” a variety of possible alternative explanations for the continual 
reinforcement of concentrated political authority in Russia and the variations in the extent 
to which political power has been concentrated in Ukraine.  
The countries are different in the key sense that Ukraine gained its independence 
from Russia and Russia lost its territorial control over Ukraine, but decades of shared 
Soviet experience meant that very similar bureaucratic and institutional foundations 
                                                 
1 It is not possible to assume that the actors behaved fully rationally in this uncertain and murky 
institutional environment; that assumption would only be realistic in clearly defined institutional situations 
(Tsebelis 1990). For this reason, the study relies on evidence about how the actors actually behaved during 
the constitutional negotiation processes. This assumption of “bounded rationality” (Jones 1999) sacrifices 
some of the study’s applicability to situations outside the Ukrainian and Russian contexts, but it is more 
realistic and does not undermine the argument that actors were motivated by self-serving goals.  
 6 
structured the transition from Soviet rule across the two countries. Additionally, not long 
before the Soviet Union’s disintegration, amendments to the constitutions of both the 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic (UkrSSR) provided for elected assemblies with formally powerful speakers: the 
Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD) in Russia and the Supreme Council (Verkhovna 
Rada) in Ukraine. Both countries had also recently established popularly elected 
presidencies with limited (and quite ambiguous) powers relative to the legislatures. Both 
countries, moreover, were multiethnic states, and both initially had similar levels of 
economic development, with comparably low GDPs per capita at 565 and 480 U.S. 
dollars, respectively, in 1991.
2
  
By accounting a priori for these broad similarities, it is easier to focus on how 
differences at the structural and institutional levels moderated the micro-level 
constitutional bargaining processes, which makes it easier to grapple with the reasons for 
the different constitutional trajectories in the two countries. At the structural level, for 
example, the differences in natural resource wealth could have affected incumbents’ 
ability to co-opt support through patronage (Ross 2001), and the differences in ethnic 
cleavage structures may have had an impact on elite bargaining dynamics. At the 
institutional level, the wording of the constitutions could have affected later attempts to 
amend the constitutions (Roberts 2009), and the institutional differences between the 
countries can also help underscore when and how existing rules and regulations became 
more important during elite bargaining processes throughout the “critical juncture” (see 
Collier and Collier 1991) of the transition from the Soviet era. 
                                                 
2 These figures are from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
 7 
Pairing these cases also helps control for arguments that would attribute actors’ 
choices to reasons other than rational self-motivation, in particular to ideology—that is, 
whether powerful elite factions were more or less democratic or had insider or outsider 
status in the former regime (Easter 1997; McFaul 2004). Yeltsin and the 
neoliberal/democratic reformers in Russia opted for an illiberal, super-presidential 
constitution, but the rather less “democratic” Kuchma/Yanukovych camp in Ukraine 
introduced a substantial number of “checks and balances,” a hallmark of liberal 
democracy, into the Ukrainian constitution. This paradoxical behavior at least partially 
supports the study’s basic assumption about the utility-maximizing objectives of political 
actors: 
 
to incur the fewest costs and gain the most political (and/or financial) benefits 
from constitutional outcomes. 
In addition to the analytical leverage from the “most similar cases” comparison 
between Russia and Ukraine, on which the juxtaposition of the structural components of 
the argument in Chapter 5 capitalizes, the causal arguments in this dissertation rely on 
inferences from the “process-tracing” narratives of each country case in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Specifically, these narratives are designed as theory-guided process-tracing (TGPT) 
accounts, resembling Hall’s (2003) “Systematic Process Analysis” and Bates et al.’s 
(1998) “Analytical Narratives,” which work deductively from hypotheses to uncover the 
best explanation for an outcome. Because different theories would produce different 
expectations about events, they can be tested on the basis of the many detailed and 
diverse observations within the case, including the many specific events that occurred, 
the sequencing of these events, the various positions of the factions involved in decision-
making processes, the different incentives and constraints they faced, and the changes to 
these variables over time, among the many other parts of the causal chains.  
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 After building the argument over the course of the process-tracing and 
comparative chapters, a sixth, concluding chapter evaluates whether the basic 
components of the argument are consistent with the conditions under which elites opted 
for more or less concentrated presidential authority throughout the post-communist 
region. This chapter assesses the constitutional outcomes and the nature of elite 
competition at the moment of constitutional choice across the remaining countries in the 
post-communist region. The study’s causal claims therefore rely on (1) similarities and 
differences between Russia and Ukraine, (2) in-depth analysis of causal processes within 
each of the cases, and (3) a more general evaluation of how well the argument fares 
throughout the post-communist region. 
 
BUILDING THE ARGUMENT 
The starting point for the argument developed in the empirical chapters of the 
dissertation is that elite actors were more likely to make less exclusive constitutional 
choices when they were operating under substantial uncertainty about the balance of 
power among elite factions. Under this “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971), each faction in 
the negotiation process would have the incentive to create a constitution from which it 
could still benefit, even if its opponents ended up with substantial control over the 
political process. The argument proposed in this dissertation veers from normative 
theories about how actors should act in order to achieve just (Rawls 1971) or efficient 
outcomes (see also Buchanan 1977); instead, it looks at the conditions under which 
inclusive constitutions would in fact maximize the “utility” of strategic actors who want 
to minimize potential losses and maximize potential gains. At this basic level of the 
analysis, the argument is that elite actors’ constitutional preferences are primarily based 
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on their perceptions of the balance of power among elite forces—specifically, who is 
more likely to gain and hold onto power
3—and so any normative commitments to more 
or less democratic and inclusive principles are expected to play a secondary role at best. 
As Figure 1 shows, when each of the major political camps had a relatively good chance 
of winning the presidency—i.e., when the balance of power was more equal—the 
uncertainty about election outcomes caused elites of diverse political stripes to prefer a 
more inclusive constitution. Likewise, elite factions, regardless of their respective 
ideologies, tended to prefer a strong presidential system when they were more confident 
about their prospects of gaining and holding on to power; their “utility” would be 
maximized if they limited the costs of compromise and consensus-building that would be 
required in a more inclusive political system. 
  
  
                                                 
3 Easter (1997) and Frye (1997) have separately made arguments that follow a similar logic for explaining 
the choice of presidentialism or parliamentarism in former communist countries. According to Easter, when 
old regime elites remained sufficiently consolidated and unchallenged by much weaker opposition forces 
throughout the transition, they opted for presidentialism, because it allowed them to monopolize their claim 
on state power. Conversely, when old regime elites were fractured and faced substantial challenges from 
opposition groups, they chose parliamentarism in order to ensure that a single party or faction would not 
dominate politics. Similarly, according to Frye, the choice of stronger presidencies occurred when the more 
powerful elite groups were assured, given their substantial relative strength, that they would control the 
powerful new office. The argument in this dissertation differs from these earlier arguments in three key 
ways. First, it applies to all elite factions regardless of their ideology or whether or not they belonged to the 
old regime. Second, it is concerned with the degree of executive power rather than the dichotomous choice 
of presidentialism compared to parliamentarism. And third, it goes beyond the conventional “balances of 
power” (see also O’Donnell and Schmitter 1989) or “imbalances of power” logic by incorporating the 
higher level institutional and structural levels of analysis within which the actor-centered, basic analytical 
level is nested; these broader contextual variables shaped (elites’ perceptions of) the balance of power in 
various ways both across the cases and also across time within the cases as voters became more or less 
mobilized, which can help explain prospects (or the lack thereof) for constitutional change over time.  
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Figure 1: Basic Conditions of the Argument 
State-society 
relations 
 
Levels of uncertainty 
re: the balance of 
power among elite 
groups 
 
Constitutional 
bargain 
Elite autonomy high → 
Uncertainty low 
(relative bargaining 
strength less equal) 
→ 
Inclusivity low (super-
presidentialism) 
     
Elite autonomy low → 
Uncertainty high 
(relative bargaining 
strength more equal) 
→ Inclusivity high  
 
The factors that determined elites’ perceptions of the balance of power are the 
next major consideration in the argument. When elections determine the composition of 
government, the different interests represented by voters across social groups should 
serve as the basis of elite competition. However, in these newly democratizing states 
these interests were not sufficiently mobilized in support of or in opposition to candidates 
and/or political parties. For example, the groups of voters who were suffering from the 
economic hardships associated with “shock therapy” reforms were too diverse and 
dispersed to overcome the classical hindrances to “collective action” (Olson 1965) to 
challenge the Russian and Ukrainian incumbent presidents during the 1990s. As a result, 
incumbent elites remained quite insulated from societal forces and were therefore willing 
to maintain a system with super-presidential characteristics, because of the advantages it 
gave them over the opposition. Moreover, with their access to patronage resources, they 
had the ability to “buy” political support, which was a key mechanism for sustaining the 
imbalance of power among incumbent and opposition forces. Under these conditions, as 
Figure 1 shows, incumbent elites had greater incentive to concentrate political power in 
the presidency: The higher the levels of elite autonomy were, the less equal the relative 
balance of power among elite factions was, which reduced levels of uncertainty and 
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promoted exclusive constitutional bargains. Conversely, when elites were more 
susceptible to social forces—which was the case in Ukraine at a later point in time—
incumbents were less privileged, in spite of their access to patronage resources, because 
opposition forces had a stronger basis of voter support. Under these conditions, the 
balance of power was defined by issues and ideologies with active underlying voter 
constituencies to a much greater extent than it was by patronage. The greater ensuing 
uncertainty about the interests that would end up in control of the powerful presidency 
promoted the renegotiation of a more inclusive constitutional bargain. 
When do “the masses” begin to matter after elections are introduced in fledgling 
democracies? In other words, when does the balance of power among elites at the helm of 
the transition from authoritarian rule start to more accurately reflect the balance of 
interests in society? The factors that “activated” social cleavages in a way that changed 
elites’ perceptions about the relative balance of power, and ergo their constitutional 
preferences, are the next major consideration in the argument. The case studies show that 
in the months and years following the initial constitutional bargains—in 1993 in Russia 
and 1996 in Ukraine—the different elite factions continuously attempted to increase their 
bargaining capacity. These attempts were affected by the newly promulgated 
constitutions as well as an emergent civil society that had begun to encroach on the high 
degree of insularity elites had enjoyed. Within these contexts, party leaders consciously 
strove to mobilize the social groups they perceived as potentially strong and cohesive 
electoral bases. The parties in the opposition were the most active in this respect, but 
incumbents also benefited from their own mobilization efforts or societal reactions 
against the growing strength of opposition groups.4 The incumbent presidents Yeltsin and 
                                                 
4 For instance, Yeltsin’s 1996 electoral victory against Ziuganov has often been attributed in the press to 
anti-Communist sentiment rather than to widespread support for his neoliberal reform agenda. 
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Kuchma also continually leveraged the institutional advantages of their offices, including 
dispensing patronage in exchange for support, to offset attempts by the opposition to 
bolster their bargaining positions. The nearly successful impeachment of Yeltsin in 
1998—despite incredibly high institutional barriers—was avoided partly because of his 
ability to use the powers of his office to impede the process in the Duma, in addition to 
his ability to co-opt the support of parliamentary deputies in exchange for patronage. 
Similar efforts on the part of Kuchma, however, were undercut by vast voter mobilization 
during the “Orange Revolution,” which dramatically changed the levels of uncertainty 
about rival elites’ political fortunes; both opposition and incumbent had sufficient doubts 
about who would gain and hold power in the future, and so they reached a new, more 
inclusive constitutional bargain. Russian elites by contrast never reached a similar point 
where all parties would be willing to renegotiate the first constitutional bargain. 
The part of the argument that the balance of power was very vulnerable to 
pressure from social forces when they were “activated” distinguished the Ukrainian and 
Russian cases. Early electoral patterns demonstrate that social interests were not clearly 
mobilized in either country, as candidates and parties drew votes across largely undefined 
and haphazard electoral landscapes. The most divisive and powerful issues that later 
emerged in these countries’ electoral arenas were regional and ethnic rather than 
socioeconomic. In contrast to the West European experience, where economic interests 
and socioeconomic divisions have shaped electoral systems (e.g., Lipset and Rokkan 
1967; Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007), the early post-Soviet electoral landscape 
seemed to lack a clear basis for class politics. Some research has suggested that the 
widespread economic hardships in these countries served to unify voters “in shared 
suffering” rather than polarize them (Hesli et al., 1998, p. 244). Studies have also 
confirmed that regional interests surpassed other cleavages, including ethnic and 
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socioeconomic, as the most divisive post-Soviet political issues (Hesli et al., 1998; Birch 
2000). Ukraine is unique because of its geographically coherent and cohesive rift over 
whether the country belongs with Russia or the West. This has arguably promoted much 
greater symmetry in the balance of power among the country’s elite factions. Russia’s 
experience with regional politics, by contrast, has been much less consistent. A powerful 
faction in the 1990s that favored the regions against the center (i.e., Moscow and St. 
Petersburg) failed to marshal similar voter appeal because the country’s oblasts and 
minority groups were too diverse and dispersed to form a unified constituency. As a 
result, political discourse in Russia during this period remained primarily defined by the 
electorally weaker socioeconomic divide, in which candidates were primarily 
distinguished on the basis of their support for, or opposition to, large-scale economic 
reforms. In Ukraine, politicians and parties with similar platforms overwhelmingly lost 
ground to the candidates and parties that managed to activate support among voters 
united on the basis of regional and ethno-linguistic identity.  The Ukrainian experience 
has, in fact, born out both sides of the importance of voter mobilization in maintaining a 
proportionate balance of elite power; as voters became increasingly dissatisfied with the 
“Orange” government, societal mobilization decreased, incumbents made use of their 
“authoritarian toolkit,” and the constitution returned to the status quo ex ante of very 
strong formal presidential authority. However, if the argument in this dissertation is 
largely correct, authoritarianism would be a less likely eventual outcome in Ukraine if a 
coherent and unified opposition coalition could reconnect with a similarly coherent and 
mobilized voter base.5  
                                                 
5 Indeed, at the time of this writing, the Yanukovych camp is facing a re-mobilized west-oriented 
opposition movement despite the arsenal of methods it has used to harass key opposition figures and 
undermine their cohesiveness.   
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With its focus on the underpinnings of elite competition, the argument goes 
beyond the effect the “balance of the power” is expected to have on the incentives for 
elites to prefer particular constitutional outcomes. It deals with the causes of their 
expectations about their ability to gain and hold power. At a basic level the argument is 
about human agency, i.e., it comprises the actions and interactions of elite actors, but it is 
nested within a specific macro-structural environment that—depending on a variety of 
factors, including the “activation” of specific groups of voters—shaped their expectations 
about the relative power of elite groups. At this broader level I look at several factors, 
including the constitutions themselves: To what extent did they influence future 
renegotiation efforts? I then look at the structural environment, in which elites attempted 
to bolster their strength, by analyzing electoral results across multiple election cycles. 
Initial elections provided very limited information about the underlying support structure 
of the different camps. The result was that certain camps were emboldened with regard to 
their electoral prospects. Whether or not these actors made accurate judgments is a 
secondary consideration; information only matters insofar as it affects elites’ perceptions 
of balance. Perhaps “learning effects” made future calculations more rational, but it is 
impossible to assume that actors ever had full information, which is the reason this study 
focuses on evidence of how the actors actually behaved during the constitutional 
negotiation processes—an assumption of “bounded” rationality (Jones 1999).  
Figure 2 brings the argument together. Powerful incumbents were initially 
sufficiently insulated from social forces that they did not anticipate losing control over a 
powerful presidency to the opposition. However, during and after the initial constitutional 
negotiation processes, both opposition and incumbent elites actively sought to maintain 
or increase their political power. These efforts were moderated by the electoral contexts 
 15 
in which they took place and by existing laws and constitutions, leading to constitutional 
change in Ukraine and constitutional stability in Russia.  
 
Figure 2: The Argument 
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points in time. Time1 is the period just after the Soviet Union collapsed. The actors 
included parliamentary deputies and presidents elected under Gorbachev’s 
demokratizatsiia policy, who were operating within highly ambiguous post-perestroika 
institutions. As a result, in both cases, the transitional and rather chaotic state of political 
affairs, combined with the lack of clear, strong social influences on political processes, 
provided elites with substantial autonomy. Broadly speaking, the Soviet Union’s collapse 
had opened up a critical juncture in which human agency was substantially less 
constrained by institutional and structural conditions. The consequence was that the first 
constitutions, in 1993 for Russia and in 1996 for Ukraine, failed to reflect the diverse 
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systems. The fundamental difference at this point—in the case of Ukraine that 
experienced change—was that political competition had aligned along ethno-linguistic 
cleavage lines which, because of their coherence and cohesiveness, were less constrained 
by impediments to “collective action” than the politics of class that had defined previous 
elections. Finally, at Time3, the Ukrainian constitutional trajectory realigned with 
Russia’s continuous re-enforcement of super-presidentialism, after the factors promoting 
greater inclusiveness dissipated; this trend, however, is arguably unsustainable so long as 
relatively competitive elections continue to serve as the basis for selecting leaders. 
 
Table 1: Values on the Main Variables over Time 
  Time1 Time2 Time3 
Russia 
Elite Autonomy High Medium High 
Uncertainty Low Medium Low 
Inclusivity Low Low Low 
     
Ukraine 
Elite Autonomy High Low High 
Uncertainty Low High Low 
Inclusivity Low High Low 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
The dissertation contains six chapters. The chapter that follows this introduction 
of the argument discusses the main variables and surveys the theoretical landscape on the 
consequences of constitutions and constitutions as consequences. The four subsequent 
chapters are empirical. They analyze, first, the cases of Ukraine and Russia in Chapters 3 
and 4, respectively, using theory-guided process-tracing. These detailed narratives are 
based on primary archival and interview materials as well as secondary source accounts 
to ascertain political elites’ preferences and the constraints on their actions throughout 
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multiple stages of the constitutional processes in the two countries. Second, Chapter 5 
contains a comparison of the structural underpinnings of elite competition across the two 
countries. This chapter includes statistical analyses of electoral, ethnic, and economic 
data to ascertain the most powerful predictors of vote choice over time and in each of the 
cases. It also looks at parties’ campaign materials to determine the groups of voters that 
they were most actively mobilizing. Finally, a concluding sixth chapter evaluates the 
applicability of the argument to the other countries in the post-Communist region.  
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Chapter 2:  From Exogenous to Endogenous Constitutions 
 
The argument developed in this dissertation is meant to explain the specific 
reasons for the constitutional choices in two former Soviet countries, but it also addresses 
an under-studied area in the literature about how and why specific constitutional 
frameworks originate. I draw on theories from New Institutional Economics (NIE) to 
help piece together the ways in which the different parts of the Russian and Ukrainian 
political and economic systems fit and worked together to produce their constitutional 
outcomes. The NIE approach is especially compatible with a study about institutional 
origins, because it explicitly considers the broader structural systems in which institutions 
are embedded and often reflect. The analytical goals are similar to quantitative multilevel 
modeling: to test both the direct effects of variables at various levels of analysis and the 
cross-level interactions among variables. The first analytical level in this study is 
comprised of the choices made by human actors, but these choices are nested in a second 
institutional level that has distinct characteristics across the two cases, and that is, in turn, 
nested in a third structural level that has its own particular features depending on the 
country. The goal of the study is to parse out the direct effects at each of these analytical 
levels, in addition to the interactive effects between human choices and the institutional 
and structural levels. To what extent were the particular constitutional outcomes in 
Russia and Ukraine products of choice as opposed to products of institutional and 
structural circumstances? How and to what degree did the two countries’ structural and 
institutional features diminish or intensify the causal effects of human choices?  
This chapter looks at the literature on comparative constitutions, beginning with a 
brief review of the extensive research that has focused on their consequences—i.e., in 
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which constitutions are exogenous—and concluding with the theories dealing with their 
origins—i.e., in which constitutions are endogenous. The goals are to survey the 
theoretical terrain and derive a set of alternative hypotheses to test in the empirical 
chapters of the dissertation. The first segment of the chapter is definitional; it discusses 
the major governing frameworks with a focus on the system in place in Russia and 
Ukraine: semi-presidentialism. The section also grapples with conceptualizing the term 
“super-presidentialism” with particular attention to how it relates to semi-presidential 
regimes. The second part of the chapter reviews the arguments about the most conducive 
choice of governing framework for democratic consolidation and discusses the 
implications of these studies for the dissertation’s country cases and the post-Communist 
region. The third component of the chapter turns to theories about institutional choice and 
presents the hypotheses to weigh against the Russian and Ukrainian experiences with 
adopting and later attempting to change their respective constitutions. 
 
DEFINING KEY TERMS: PARLIAMENTARISM, PRESIDENTIALISM, SEMI-
PRESIDENTIALISM, AND SUPER-PRESIDENTIALISM 
One of the most basic questions in the design of a new constitution is how to 
organize the state. Beyond the two basic ways to structure the relationship between the 
executive and legislative branches, parliamentarism and presidentialism, the semi-
presidential form of government, or dual-executive system, in existence in both Russia 
and Ukraine, was until recently mostly considered in the literature as either presidential 
or parliamentary, depending on the extent of presidential and parliamentary power. 
Duverger is a notable exception; he used the term “régime semi-présidentiel” in the early 
1970s to describe the Fifth French Republic and later provided a conceptualization to 
account for its varieties (Duverger 1980). Prior to the 1990s, this choice of governing 
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framework existed in only a handful of countries, including (and exhaustively) Austria, 
Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, and Sri Lanka, as well as formerly in the 
Weimar Republic. In the last two decades, however, this hybrid choice of government has 
become increasingly common and scholars have begun to assess its unique effects (for 
e.g., Skach 2006). In all, the current global count is fifty-three countries with hybrid 
systems, the majority of which are Portuguese and French-speaking African countries and 
the ex-Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.6  
The primary differences between the pure forms of parliamentarism and 
presidentialism are: whether or not the chief executive is (1) elected by voters or 
legislators and whether or not he or she (2) serves a fixed term. These defining 
characteristics, which are portrayed in Table 2, highlight the basic distinction between the 
two forms of government: a pure parliamentary system is a system of “mutual 
dependence” between the executive and legislature, and a pure presidential system is a 
system of “mutual independence” between the two branches (Stepan and Skach 1993: 
17). In the case of the former, the chief executive (prime minister) can dissolve the 
legislature and call new elections, but he or she also has to maintain the confidence of a 
legislative majority. In contrast, in the case of the latter, both the chief executive 
(president) and the legislature have their own electoral mandates for fixed terms, and so 
neither branch of government has the authority to dismiss the other except in rare cases 
when legislative assemblies impeach presidents. 
 
  
                                                 
6 Source: Robert Elgie, “Up-to-date list of semi-presidential countries with dates,” 
http://www.semipresidentialism.com/?cat=125, accessed February 2013. 
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Table 2: Defining Presidentialism and Parliamentarism 
Chief executive 
selected by 
Chief executive serves fixed term 
Yes 
No 
Voters Presidential 
 
Legislators  Parliamentary 
Source: Lijpart 1984:70; adapted by Mainwaring and Shugart 1996:16. 
 
Semi-presidential systems incorporate features from both of these systems. A 
useful definition excludes cases that are at the parliamentary extreme, where any 
presidential authority is negligible in comparison to the other executive, such as the 
current German presidency. According to Duverger (1980), “a political regime is 
considered as semi-presidential if the constitution which established it combines three 
elements: (1) the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage; (2) he 
possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime minister 
and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in office only 
if the parliament does not show its opposition to them (p. 166).” As with pure 
presidentialism, the extent of the “checks” on presidential powers from the legislature 
varies considerably among the regimes that fit this definition. Terms such as “president-
parliamentarism” and “premier-presidential” (Shugart and Carey 1992) or “presidential-
parliamentary” and “parliamentary-presidential” reflect different levels of presidential 
compared to parliamentary authority in semi-presidential systems. The distinctions 
between the different labels usually depend on the extent to which the president or the 
parliament controls the cabinet. However, in addition to control over the cabinet, 
presidents’ powers vary substantially in their level of control over the legislative agenda 
(see Table 3). The dependent variable in this dissertation—the degree to which 
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presidential authority is concentrated—reflects the various non-legislative and legislative 
dimensions of presidential power.  
The dependent variable is based on Shugart and Carey’s (1992) measure of formal 
presidential power, which includes six legislative presidential powers: the authority to 
veto legislation (both as a package and partially), issue decrees, introduce legislation 
(exclusively), propose referenda, and control the budget; and four non-legislative 
presidential powers: the authority to form and dismiss cabinets, dissolve legislatures, and 
the extent to which the president’s cabinet members are immune to legislative censure (p. 
150). Their measure ranges from zero to four, in which four is the highest level of 
authority a president can have for a given power, and zero is the lowest. I modified some 
of the entries to better fit the constitutions that concern this study. These minor 
adaptations are indicated by italics in Table 3, which summarizes the basic legislative and 
non-legislative components of presidential power.  
Super-presidentialism can be conceptualized by very high scores in both the 
legislative and non-legislative categories. Mid-range scores for semi-presidential systems 
reflect greater “separation of powers,” and low scores reflect a greater emphasis on 
parliamentarism. More “presidential” semi-presidential systems tend to have presidencies 
with fewer legislative but substantial non-legislative powers, and more “parliamentary” 
semi-presidential systems tend to have presidencies with fewer non-legislative but 
considerable legislative powers. “Super” semi-presidential systems are mere façades of 
either presidentialism or parliamentarism; there is neither an effective “separation of 
powers” nor responsibility between prime ministers and their parliaments. 
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Table 3: Formal Powers of Presidents in Presidential and Semi-presidential Systems 
LEGISLATIVE POWERS 
 Package Veto/Override   Partial Veto/Override  
4 Veto with no override 4 No override 
3 Veto with override requiring majority greater than 2/3 
(of quorum) 
3 Override by extraordinary majority 
2 Override by absolute majority (full membership) 
2 Veto with override requiring 2/3 1 Override by simple majority of quorum 
1 Veto with override requiring absolute majority of 
assembly or extraordinary majority less than 2/3 
0 No partial veto 
  
0 No veto; or veto requires only simple majority override   
  
   Exclusive Introduction of Legislation (Reserved 
Policy Areas)  Decree  
4 Reserved powers, no rescission 4 No amendment by assembly 
2 President has temporary decree authority with few 
restrictions; or (most) decrees require counter signature 
of Prime Minister 
2 Restricted amendment by assembly 
1 Unrestricted amendment by assembly 
1 Authority to enact decrees limited 0 No exclusive powers 
0 No decree powers; or only as delegated by assembly   
  
 Budgetary Powers  Proposal of Referenda 
4 President prepares budget; no amendments permitted   4 Unrestricted  
2 Restricted 
3 Assembly may reduce but not increase amount of 
budgetary items 
0 No presidential authority to propose referenda 
  
2 President sets upper limit on total spending, within 
which assembly may amend;  or president prepares 
budget; subject to approval and amendments in 
assembly 
  
  
1 Assembly may increase expenditures only if it 
designates new revenues 
  
  
0 Unrestricted authority of assembly to prepare or amend 
budget 
  
  
NONLEGISLATIVE POWERS 
 Cabinet Formation    Cabinet Dismissal  
4 President names cabinet without need for confirmation 
or investiture   
4 President dismisses cabinet ministers at will 
2 Restricted powers of dismissal  
3 President names cabinet ministers subject to 
confirmation or investiture by assembly  
1 President may dismiss only upon acceptance by 
assembly of alternative minister or cabinet 
1 President names premier, subject to investiture, who then 
names other ministers  
0 Cabinet or ministers may be censured and removed by 
assembly 
0 President cannot name ministers except upon 
recommendation of assembly (with the exception of the 
ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs) 
 
  
  
 Censure  Dissolution of Assembly 
4 Assembly may not censure and remove (president’s) 
cabinet or ministers; President may censure and remove 
assembly’s cabinet (with few restrictions) 
4 Unrestricted 
3 Restricted by frequency or point within term 
2 Requires new presidential election; or results from 
assembly inaction (with no limits on frequency) 
2 Assembly may censure (president’s cabinet), but 
president may respond by dissolving assembly; or 
assembly has no “constructive” vote;  or president may 
censure and remove assembly’s cabinet (with 
considerable restrictions) 
1 Restricted; as response to censure or assembly inaction 
(with limits on frequency; and/or requiring the consent 
of the prime minister) 
0 No provision 
  
1 Assembly has “constructive” vote of no confidence in 
president’s cabinet  (assembly majority must present 
alternative cabinet) 
0 Assembly has unrestricted censure of president’s cabinet; 
or president may not censure and remove assembly’s 
cabinet 
Source: Shugart and Carey 1992: 150; italics indicate author’s modifications. 
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 The above dimensions of Russia’s and Ukraine’s Presidential Powers for the 
different constitutions in effect since the Soviet Union dissolved are depicted in Table 4 
and Figure 3. As a point of comparison, I included the powers of the French president, 
which Duverger referred to more than 30 years ago as an instance of a very strong 
presidency (1980). Russia and Ukraine’s scores are a staggering 21 in comparison to 
France’s score of just five. Ukraine’s score came slightly closer to the French model with 
the Orange Revolution reforms, but the changes did not last; Yushchenko suffered a 
humiliating loss in his re-election bid, finishing a distant fifth with only 5.45 percent of 
the vote during the first round of the presidential elections in January 2010. His Orange 
Revolution rival, Yanukovych, won the election and moved quickly to consolidate power. 
The new president’s  Party of Regions took control of government within one month of 
his election, when six deputies from former president Yushchenko’s coalition—Our 
Ukraine and Yuliia Tymoshenko’s Bloc (BYuT)—defected to the pro-Yanukovych 
coalition consisting of the Party of Regions, the Communist Party, and Speaker Lytvyn’s 
Bloc. This was unconstitutional7 according to the still extant 2005 constitution and a 
symptom of political alliances forming on the basis of patronage rather than ideology.8 
Subsequently, electoral manipulations and various forms of patronage became the means 
to maintain a “consolidated majority” (see Skach 2006) government. It also was not long 
before the (stacked) Ukrainian Constitutional Court revoked the 2004 amendments and 
returned presidential powers to pre-Orange Revolution levels. 
 
  
                                                 
7 The amended article 83 stated that deputy factions (not individuals) would form the majority coalition 
that would nominate the prime minister and cabinet members.   
8 The deputies had been elected on closed party lists for the parties from which they defected. 
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Table 4: Measuring Super-presidentialism: Formal Dimensions  
LEGISLATIVE POWERS 
 
Package 
Veto 
Partial 
Veto 
Decree 
Exclusive 
Intro 
Budgetary 
Powers 
Referenda Total 
France9 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Russia (1993) 2 0 4 0 2 2 10 
Ukraine (1996, 2010) 2 0 4 0 2 2 10 
Ukraine (2005) 2 0 3 0 2 2 9 
NON-LEGISLATIVE POWERS 
 
Cabinet 
Formation 
Cabinet 
Dismissal 
Dissolution Censure   Total 
France 1 0 3 0   4 
Russia (1993) 3 4 2 2   11 
Ukraine (1996, 2010) 3 4 2 2   11 
Ukraine (2005) 0 0 1 2   3 
 
Figure 3: Comparative Presidential Powers 
 
 
In addition to the formal de jure components of presidential power, informal 
sources of power, such as presidents’ co-partisan strength in the legislature, can 
                                                 
9 Scores from Shugart and Carey 1992: 155. 
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dramatically bolster their power and Influence. Skach (2006) conceptualized three regime 
types for semi-presidential systems that deal with presidents’ partisan strength: 
consolidated majority government, divided majority government, and divided minority 
government (see Table 5). The first is an instance where both the president and the prime 
minister are in the same legislative majority, which would facilitate presidents’ efforts to 
monopolize the policy agendas. In the middle category, the prime minister has a majority 
but the president does not. This is the “cohabitation” situation that often fosters gridlock 
and conflict as the two executives attempt to pursue conflicting legislative agendas. In the 
third category, neither executive has a legislative majority, which, according to Skach, is 
the most problematic, conflict-prone setting in which neither the president nor the prime 
minister can effectively govern (Skach 2006: 15-22).  
 
Table 5: Partisan Powers of Presidents in Semi-presidential Systems 
A Consolidated 
Majority Government 
A Divided Majority 
Government 
A Divided Minority 
Government 
President and prime 
minister have the same 
majority in the 
legislature 
Prime minister has the 
majority in the 
legislature and the 
president does not 
Neither the prime 
minister nor the 
president has a 
majority in the 
legislature 
Source: Cindy Skach 2006: 15. 
 
 According to Skach, situations of divided majority and especially divided 
minority government can cause democracy to fail if presidents (constitutionally or 
unconstitutionally) rely on emergency powers in the attempt to sidestep opposing or 
immobilized legislatures, as Hindenburg did in the waning years of the Weimar Republic 
(Skach 2006: 46, 54). Skach also argues that consolidated majority governments are the 
least prone to democratic breakdown, largely because such governments are better 
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equipped to address crises. However, while consolidated majority governments are likely 
to be more effective, they can also undermine democratization in certain contexts. The 
case studies in this dissertation illustrate that consolidated majorities in newly 
democratizing countries tend to be based on undemocratic patronage-based alliances 
rather than ideological cohesion or fundamental policy agreements. Some cases of 
“consolidated patronage majorities” are more formal, such as when Putin and 
Yanukovych’s a-ideological parties of power—United Russia and The Party of 
Regions—predominated in their respective legislatures, and others are less formal, such 
as Kuchma’s “artificial majority” (Whitmore 2004) in Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada in the 
late 1990s. In these cases, super-presidentialism was at an extreme on the presidential 
powers continuum and coincided temporally with greater competitive (even full-fledged) 
authoritarianism. In fact, in such cases the “super-presidential” designation is no longer 
meaningful because the regime is basically autocratic. 
Tables 6 and 7 provide a glimpse of the government types in Russia and Ukraine 
since the collapse of communism. After Russia’s constitutional crisis in 1993, Yeltsin had 
super-presidential powers, but he was frequently ineffectual because he did not have a 
working majority in the State Duma (see Table 6). When Prime Minister Primakov came 
close to forming a legislative majority in the late 1990s, Yeltsin fired him (presumably) 
to preserve the left-leaning parliament’s toothless “divided minority” status. In contrast to 
Yeltsin, Putin seamlessly took control of the policy agenda, which included the ambitious 
task of re-centralizing political authority in Moscow. However, he had the advantage of a 
consolidated majority government from the onset of his presidency, which began as a 
pro-president coalition primarily among the Unity and Fatherland—All Russia parties, 
and which later combined to form the dominant United Russia party. The consequence 
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was that Russia went from being a super-semi-presidential democratizing regime to a 
consolidated competitive (or even full-fledged) authoritarian regime. 
 
Table 6: Partisan Powers of Russian Presidents  
President Yeltsin Putin Medvedev 
Legislature 
Election Year 
1990 1993 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
Prime Minister 
(Chairman) 
Gaidar/ 
Chernomyrdin 
(Khasbulatov) 
Chernomyrdin 
Chernomyrdin 
Kirienko 
Primakov 
Stepashin 
Putin 
Kras'ianov 
Fradkov 
Zubkov 
Putin 
Putin 
Government 
Type 
Divided 
Majority 
Government 
Divided 
Minority 
Government 
Divided 
Minority 
Government 
Consolidated 
Majority 
Government 
Consolidated 
Majority 
Government 
Consolidated 
Majority 
Government 
Consolidated 
Majority 
Government 
  
The concurrence of Ukraine’s recent consolidated majority government (see 
Table 7) with a trend toward more authoritarianism resembles the Russian experience. 
The recent consolidated majority government has proven unsustainable without resorting 
to patronage, harassment of the opposition, and electoral manipulation. The jailing of the 
leader of the main opposition group and the widespread reports of potential fraud in the 
latest parliamentary elections are two prominent examples of this de-democratizing trend. 
Whether or not the trend from super-presidentialism to consolidated-majority-super-
presidentialism to authoritarianism will be as sustainable as it was in Russia is 
questionable, because electoral patterns continue to reveal the very deep east-west 
societal divide that has undermined the dominance of particular interests at various points 
since the country’s independence.10  
 
  
                                                 
10 See chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
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Table 7: Partisan Powers of Ukrainian Presidents  
President Kravchuk Kuchma Yushchenko Yanukovych 
Legislature 
Election Year 
1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 
2007 
(early) 
2012 
Prime Minister 
(Speaker) 
Fokin 
Kuchma 
(Kravchuk) 
(Moroz) 
Masol 
Marchuk 
(Moroz) 
Lazarenko 
Pustovoitenko 
Yushchenko 
Kinakh 
Yanukovych 
Tymoshenko 
Yekhanurov 
Yanukovych 
Tymoshenko 
Azarov 
Azarov 
Government 
Type 
Divided 
Majority/ 
Minority 
Government 
Divided 
Minority 
Government 
“Artificial” 
Consolidated 
Majority/Divi
ded Minority 
Divided 
Minority 
Government 
Divided 
Majority 
Government 
Consolidated 
Majority 
Government 
(both 
presidents) 
Consolidated 
Majority 
Government 
 
Super-presidentialism does not have to rely on a consolidated majority 
government, because legislatures would already have scant constitutional powers to 
check presidential authority. However, consolidated majority governments in semi-
presidential systems with constitutionally strong presidents will effectively abolish any 
remaining effects from the separation of powers—i.e., the “checks and balances”—on 
which liberal presidential democracy is based,11 and thereby undermine the process of 
democratization. Using an alternative way to assess presidential power—the strength of 
legislatures in semi-presidential (and presidential) systems (Fish and Kroenig 2009)—
Figure 4 ranks the parliamentary powers in all of Europe’s semi-presidential regimes 
from the weakest to the strongest legislature. The scores range from zero to one, in which 
zero is the lower amount of parliamentary strength and one is the highest. The 
constitutions of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine (under its 1996 constitution) are at the top 
of the list with the lowest parliamentary powers’ scores out of all of Europe’s semi-
presidential systems. With the exception of Belarus, Russia’s 1993 constitution provides 
for the weakest of all the semi-presidential post-Communist parliaments; and both the 
Russian and (1996/current) Ukrainian constitutions provide for parliaments that are 
                                                 
11 In the case studies this dissertation investigates, the courts were not a reliable check on presidents, 
largely due to judges’ inexperience, court-stacking, or other forms of presidential control of the judiciary. 
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weaker than Duverger’s example of the especially strong French semi-presidential 
presidency. It is also striking to note that the post-Communist cases with much weaker 
legislatures have struggled most with democratization compared to other semi-
presidential post-Communist countries; the potential reasons for this trend are addressed 
in the next section of this chapter.  
 
Figure 4: Powers of Parliaments in European Semi-Presidential Systems 
 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: CONDITIONS THAT PROMOTE SUCCESS OR FAILURE 
Most of the early literature on constitutional design supports parliamentarism over 
presidentialism as the more conducive framework for fostering democracy.
12 
Most 
notably, Linz (1990, 1994) argues that the “dual democratic legitimacy” and 
characteristic rigidity that define presidentialism, along with the tendency toward the 
personification of the office and the winner-takes-all nature of presidential elections, 
                                                 
12 As I indicate above, most of this literature considers the semi-presidential systems to be either 
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foster unstable democratic governments. The first of these “perils”13 arises because 
presidential systems, unlike parliamentary systems, have two democratically legitimate 
governing institutions, and the inherent ambiguity over whether the legislature or the 
president more legitimately represents the people can lead to irreconcilable conflict. 
Second, the rigid fixed terms that presidents serve are liable to immobilize governments 
in cases of ineffective, unpopular, weak, or lame duck executives. Parliamentary systems, 
by contrast, are much more flexible because of the mutual dependence between the 
executive and the legislature that can, for example, oust ineffectual leaders by means of 
no-confidence votes and thereby adjust to changing circumstances. Third, the 
personalismo that presidentialism encourages can be detrimental to democracy, because, 
in such cases, particular leaders matter far more to voters and the functioning of 
government than policies, ideology, political parties, and even constitutions. Lastly, Linz 
argues that the winner-takes-all nature of presidential elections means that 
presidentialism may not be very representative of society, especially when presidents win 
elections with just a small plurality of the vote. 
Linz’s and other early arguments about the failures of presidentialism are largely 
supported by the struggles with democracy in Latin America and Africa during the 1960s 
and 1970s (Linz et al. 1994). In a number of broader assessments of the effect of regime 
type on democratic stability, Stepan and Skach (1993), for example, find that not one of 
the (non-OECD) countries with presidential systems that became independent in the 
decades following World War II was continuously democratic between 1980 and 1989. 
In contrast, 15 out of 41 of the countries with parliamentary systems maintained 
democracy throughout that decade. Likewise, Przeworski and his co-authors (1996) find 
                                                 
13 From the title of Juan Linz’s seminal article “The Perils of Presidentialism,” Journal of Democracy 1, no. 
1 (1990): 51-69. 
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additional general empirical support for the argument that presidentialism is less 
conducive for democracy than parliamentarism. These authors show that, in the countries 
included in their study, democracy failed in 52 percent of the 46 countries with 
presidential systems, compared to just 28 percent of the 50 countries with parliamentary 
systems between 1950 (or the year of the country’s independence) and 1990. The authors 
also find that the democratic lifespan of countries with parliamentary systems is far 
longer than in countries with presidential systems. 
The other side of the debate has some compelling arguments about the conditions 
that make presidentialism successful in certain national contexts. Mainwaring and 
Shugart’s (1997) edited volume addresses the many variations in presidential systems and 
stresses the role of electoral systems in presidentialism’s success or failure. More 
specifically, these authors argue that understanding the nature of countries’ political 
parties and party systems is essential for understanding the success or failure of 
presidential democracies across Latin America, because it affected presidents’ ability to 
pursue legislative agendas. Much like Skach (2006), the argument is effectively for 
stronger executives, where systems in which presidents who have more power to initiate 
policies in line with their interests or block policies that go against their interests are 
better able to manage conflict, and are therefore less susceptible to the perils Linz and 
other scholars elucidate. When presidents have the support of sizeable, disciplined, and 
stable legislative coalitions, or when presidents’ respective parties control a majority of 
the seats in parliament, relations between the two branches are likely to be more 
productive. Accordingly, these authors argue that the electoral rules that affect voter 
behavior and, in turn, the nature of party systems and the extent of party discipline, are 
essential contextual variables for explaining the success or failure of presidentialism. Of 
course, if presidents have substantial constitutional powers, such as decree-making 
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power, they can also avert the immobilization that the critics of presidentialism stress, but 
such strong constitutional powers, these authors argue, are themselves a product of weak 
party systems (pp. 429-434). 
Clearly, in the post-Soviet case, the stronger the president, the less immobilization 
governments have faced. During President Yushchenko’s tenure in Ukraine, when the 
constitutional amendments strengthening the legislature went into effect, the country 
experienced the constant conflict and deadlock that the skeptics of presidentialism 
predicted. Presidents Kuchma, Yanukovych, and Putin, on the other hand, have all 
enjoyed extensive constitutional powers, which tended to “smooth” executive legislative 
relations, because the parliament effectively had very few means to block presidential 
initiatives. Strong partisan powers have also increased the legislative strength of several 
of these presidents. Putin, for instance, enjoyed substantially more power than Yeltsin 
because his party, United Russia, has dominated the State Duma. However, as 
Mainwaring and Shugart acknowledge (p. 396), strong presidential authority, whether 
derived from constitutional or partisan sources, is not always desirable, because in excess 
it can undermine democracy, and, in particular, the “checks and balances” that make 
presidentialism—with its “separation of powers”—the desirable option for preventing the 
tyrannies of either minorities or majorities.  
The post-Soviet experience with super-presidentialism draws attention to this 
issue. While the formal concentration of political power in singular central executives 
manages to skirt some of the perils of presidentialism, it greatly accentuates some of the 
others. On the one hand, the presidential regimes with more evenly balanced power and 
the checks and balances needed to prevent narrow interests from usurping power tend to 
fall prey to conflict and deadlock that stem from the problem of dual legitimacy. A 
dramatic example is the violent conflict between President Yeltsin and the Congress of 
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People’s Deputies (CPD) over the nature of the country’s new constitution and highly 
contentious economic reforms. The problem of dual legitimacy was especially palpable 
because the heavily amended (and ergo, very contradictory) Soviet constitution in force 
at that time stated that the parliament was “the highest body of state power” (article 104), 
while at the same time the presidency was the “highest official...and head of executive 
power” (article 121-1). Consequently the leaders of both branches, President Yeltsin and 
CPD Speaker Khasbulatov, relentlessly clashed over the constitutionality of each other’s 
actions. President Yeltsin ultimately won the fight with the poder moderador (Linz 1990: 
54) of the military on his side and enacted a new constitution that intensely concentrated 
political power in the presidency. Less dramatically, in Ukraine, President Yushchenko’s 
administration was severely hampered by the newly enacted reforms that strengthened 
the legislature. Most of his reform initiatives became mired in persistent conflict between 
the president and the parliament, under both prime ministers Yanukovych and 
Tymoshenko.  
On the other hand, when the constitutional powers of the president are very 
substantial, consensus building is often no longer necessary for governing, and thus, 
while such systems are likely to be more stable and functional, they are also more prone 
to autocracy. Moreover, in such circumstances, democracy is often severely undermined 
as a consequence of the intense personification of the office, the exclusion of most, if not 
all, other interests in the policy-making process, the lack of horizontal accountability in 
government, and the tendency toward the consolidation of power in a small group of 
elites. One or more of these trends is clearly noticeable in the administrations of Putin, 
Lukashenka, Nazarbayev, and Karimov, all of whom began their tenure with very strong 
presidential systems that became further concentrated, and more autocratic, through time. 
Thus, the experience with presidentialism (and semi-presidentialism) in the post-Soviet 
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region has reflected a tradeoff between, on the one hand, greater democracy and less 
functional governments and, on the other hand, less democracy and more functional 
governments. 
A critical question then is: how much presidential power would strike the golden 
balance and make semi-presidentialism (and presidentialism, for that matter) both 
functional and conducive toward democracy? This question is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, but the apparent answer from the post-Communist experience with semi-
presidentialism seems to be: very little. This brings this discussion full circle to the 
virtues of parliamentarism and perils of presidentialism. Indeed, very strong presidents 
have fostered autocracy, and more evenly balanced distributions of power between the 
branches of government have caused incredible tensions between prime ministers and 
presidents. On the other hand, the only semi-presidential regimes that have had 
democratic success are much more parliamentary than presidential, including Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
Fish (2005, 2006) also found a strong correlation between stronger legislatures 
and democracy in the post-Communist region (see Figure 4). Instead of looking at 
parliamentarism and presidentialism, his study used an index that reflects the extent of 
formal constitutional powers vested in legislatures relative to executives (the 
Parliamentary Powers Index or PPI). There is a striking tendency for the countries with 
stronger legislatures to cluster toward the lowest Freedom House scores,14 i.e., the 
strongest indicators of democracy. Specifically, the countries with the strongest 
legislatures—including the three Baltic countries, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—all have Freedom House scores at 
                                                 
14 The Freedom House indices of political rights and civil liberties range from 1 to 7, where 1 reflects the 
most freedom and 7 is the least freedom. Scores of 1 and 2 are classified as “free,” scores of 6 and 7 as “not 
free,” and scores of 3-5 as “partly free.” 
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or below two. Conversely, the weakest legislatures—including Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,15 Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—all have Freedom House 
scores at or above five. Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, and Ukraine 
are in the “partly free” range, although from among these “partly free” countries, 
Armenia, Ukraine, and Georgia have the weakest legislatures and the weakest indicators 
of democracy.  
If the only countries that became successful democracies were either 
parliamentary systems or semi-presidential systems with weak presidencies, a further 
question to ask is: why did these countries choose this constitutional framework to begin 
with? Each country has unique social and historical conditions that must have factored 
into their constitutional choice for either more parliamentary or more presidential power. 
The debate about institutional design and democracy leads to questions about the roots of 
these institutions: why do political actors choose specific institutions? When and why 
does constitutional change occur? To what extent does history, society, and culture matter 
in determining constitutional outcomes? Endogenizing constitutions in this fashion 
tackles the crucial question about the independent causal effects of constitutions on 
democratization: If democracy is, at least partly, a consequence of constitutional 
frameworks that are themselves, at least partly, consequences of historical or structural 
forces for or against democratization, this casts doubt on the conclusions from the 
extensive literature on the effects from variations in the type of constitutional framework. 
The question, however, comes down to how much choice played a role, which, according 
to the critical juncture model of institutional change, would have been especially high in 
the wake of the collapse and dismantling of the Soviet system, and how much (as well as 
                                                 
15 The measurement precedes the 2005 and 2010 revolutions that were followed by legislature-
strengthening constitutional reform. 
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how) broader structural and historical forces forced the hands of elite actors. These 
potential whos and whats behind constitutional change comprise the set of alternative 
hypotheses that are evaluated in the empirical chapters of the dissertation. 
 
EXPLAINING CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 
While political science has an extensive literature on the effects of constitutions, 
some economists have done a significant amount of work on their origins. A prominent 
example is James Buchanan (1990), who proposed a normative argument about how 
constitution-makers should act in order to make choices with more efficient 
consequences (see also Buchanan and Tullock 1964). Positive theories of constitutions 
and other institutions are also significantly developed in economics, including theories of 
constitutions as “equilibrium-producing” 16 institutions, i.e., as exogenous, independent 
variables (for e.g., Persson, Roland and Tabellini 2003), and also of institutions “as 
equilibria,” i.e., as endogenous, dependent variables (for e.g., Ostrom 2005).17 The 
majority of the scholarship on constitutions in Comparative Politics resembles the 
“equilibrium-producing” arguments, because of their focus on the effects constitutions 
have on the quality of democracy. The theories of endogenous institutions, however, 
provide insight into why political elites make particular constitutional choices.  
Within the purview of political science, scholars in the Historical Institutionalist 
tradition have theorized that institutions are primarily subject to change during “critical 
                                                 
16 An “equilibrium” reflects an outcome that rational actors have no incentives to disrupt in either the 
short-term or long-term, depending on changes in exogenous factors. 
17 Douglas North has succinctly defined “institutions” as the “humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction” (North 1990: 3). They include, then, the formal structures of governments, such as 
Russia and Ukraine’s semi-presidential constitutions, as well as informal cultural norms, for example. 
These institutions structure social life in ways that produce more or less just and more or less efficient 
outcomes.  
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junctures” that result from exogenous crises or shocks to otherwise stable “path-
dependent” institutional systems. Such junctures are “relatively short periods of time”—
compared to preceding and ensuing periods of stability—“in which there is a 
substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices, the range of which expands 
substantially, will affect the outcome of interest” (Cappocia and Kelemen 2005: 11).18 
This approach can explain the substantial amount of agency Russian and Ukrainian elites 
enjoyed in the wake of Soviet disintegration as a result of their considerable autonomy 
from social forces. However, the theory’s expectation that actors would subsequently 
have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, thus promoting path-dependency, 
does not satisfactorily account for external structural and institutional changes that 
affected actors’ perceptions about the costs and benefits associated with preserving very 
exclusive constitutions. It also does not specifically theorize about precisely how change 
occurs. Who or what determined just who would draft, negotiate, and ultimately decide 
on the constitution? What accounts for the relative strength of key actors (or opposing 
factions) at the moments in time when their actions were expected to be highly 
consequential? Were actors motivated by rational self-interest or were values and 
ideology more important in their decisions? What were the limits on actors’ ability to 
behave rationally? Why did subsequent attempts to change the constitution in both cases 
only once result in change?  
This dissertation essentially problematizes events that occurred during a relatively 
brief time span of transition from an old to a new system of government—effectively, a 
critical juncture in time. This goal is achieved by evaluating the relative influence of 
                                                 
18 Historical Institutionalism also theorizes about gradual institutional change over long stretches of time 
via “conversion” and/or “layering” over time (Streek and Thelen 2004), in which existing institutions take 
on new purposes or shift their purposes as they adapt to changing historical circumstances. 
 
 39 
structural, institutional, and historical arguments, alongside strategy and ideology-based 
explanations that rely on the actions of human actors. For analytical clarity, it frames the 
argument within Elinor Ostrom’s multi-layered model of institutions (2005). Institutional 
change occurs, according to this approach, when “higher order” exogenous parameters 
change and thus cause actors to reassess the costs and benefits associated with an initial 
institutional choice; this would create that “critical juncture” in time.  The study considers 
two levels of analysis, the constitutional and meta-constitutional levels (Ostrom 2005: 
59). In the first, actors debated the choice of constitution, i.e., the rules for future policy-
making. In the second, actors could alter the conditions affecting the lower constitutional 
level by strengthening their bargaining capacities or manipulating the rules governing 
constitutional ratification, for example. 
The following diagram illustrates the structure of the argument: 
Figure 5: Ostrom’s Meta-constitutional and Constitutional Action Arenas 
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the center in Russia and the interests of the East or the West in Ukraine, and drastic 
versus tempered economic reform; (2) the participants’ positions affecting their standing 
vis-a-vis each other, such as their status as legislative or presidential coalitions; (3) the 
potential outcomes, including what each participant group would gain from reaching a 
constitutional bargain that increased or decreased constitutional inclusivity or remained at 
the status quo; (4) the set of allowable actions, including submitting or not submitting 
amendments to the draft constitution and voting in favor of or against key motions; (5) 
the degree of control the different participant coalitions had over actions and outcomes, 
which is a function of both coalitional strength and the respective positions in the 
bargaining processes; (6) the amount of information participants had, which was 
generally very limited but much more so in the context of more symmetrical distributions 
of power and often confounded by the opportunistic behavior of certain actors; and last 
(7) the costs and benefits, or “utility,” associated with the outcome for all participant 
groups that varied depending on levels of uncertainty regarding the balance of power. 
The empirical chapters of this dissertation test a set of hypotheses about the actors 
within the “action arenas” and a set of hypotheses about the conditions that shape the 
above “action arena” variables. For the basic actor-centric level—the events within the 
action arena—the point of departure is existing literature on why elites would prefer 
presidentialism over parliamentarism or a stronger presidency over a weaker presidency. 
With regard to why some East European countries chose parliamentarism and 
others chose presidentialism after the demise of communism, Easter (1997) proposed a 
“balance of power” argument that focused on the strength of communist-era elites: when 
they were very powerful, they chose (or imposed) presidentialism because it best served 
their interests. On the other hand, old regime elites preferred parliamentarism in cases 
where their power was dispersed, because it would prevent any one group from 
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dominating politics and controlling state resources. Using a related rationale, Fry (1997) 
argued that stronger presidencies in Eastern Europe were chosen by powerful elite groups 
who faced little uncertainty about their future electoral prospects. The logic of these 
“balance of power” arguments is the same as the fundamental assumption in NIE 
arguments: actors are motivated by rational self-interest. When powerful elite groups are 
fairly certain they will control the presidency, it is in their interest to concentrate power in 
that office. On the other hand, when uncertainty about future political prospects is high, it 
is in their interest to choose a constitutional framework that would cause them to lose the 
least if their opponents ended up in control of the presidency. This study also assumes 
that greater uncertainty among elites about the balance of political power—and by 
extension future electoral prospects—creates a “veil of ignorance” that disincentivizes the 
choice to concentrated political authority in an exclusive super-presidential constitution. 
At this first choice-centered level, the hypotheses the study tests are:  
Hypothesis 1: Russian and Ukrainian elites were more likely to prefer a more 
inclusive constitution—i.e., with less concentrated authority—when there was 
substantial uncertainty regarding the balance of power among political factions. 
By contrast, 
Hypothesis 2: Russian and Ukrainian elites were more likely to prefer a more 
exclusive constitution—i.e., with more concentrated authority—when there was 
little uncertainty regarding the balance of power among political factions. 
These hypotheses would stand up to empirical scrutiny if the process-tracing 
narratives of Russian and Ukrainian constitutional development revealed that actors 
changed their preferences for more or less concentrated presidential authority over time 
in response to the shifts in their relative bargaining strength resulting from new elections 
or coalition formations and breakdowns. Likewise, if actors were motivated by self-
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interest rather than ideology or values, then these hypotheses would be true for each 
faction, whether opposition or incumbent, or insider or outsider to the former regime. On 
the other hand, if ideology was in fact a more powerful motivator than self-interest, the 
empirical process-tracing narrative would show consistency in the various elites’ 
preferences over time, in spite of fluctuating levels of uncertainty about the balance of 
power among elites. The expectation departs from the actor-centered argument proposed 
by Easter (1996), which specifically attributed presidentialism to the dominance of old 
regime elites. It also challenges McFaul’s (2002) actor-centered argument that stressed 
the ideology of the most powerful elite groups as the most significant factor in whether or 
not “unbalanced” elite transitions produced democracy or authoritarianism.  
“Situations of unequal distributions of power produced the quickest and most 
stable transitions from communist rule. In countries with asymmetrical balances 
of power, the regime to emerge depends almost entirely on the ideological 
orientation of the most powerful. In countries where democrats enjoyed a decisive 
power advantage, democracy emerged. Conversely, in countries in which 
dictators maintained a decisive power advantage, dictatorship emerged. In 
between these two extremes were countries in which the distribution of power 
between the old regime and its challengers was relatively equal (McFaul 2002, 
212, emphasis added).”19 
 In addition to assessing the motivations of elites at the choice-centered level of 
the analysis, another set of hypotheses tests the effects of the institutional and structural 
contexts within which the constitutional negotiation processes occurred. A first key goal 
is to uncover the external conditions that determined the set of “action arena” variables at 
                                                 
19This argument was made in the context of a different dependent variable—consolidated democracy rather 
than the choice of constitution that is the focus of this study. However, institutional choice is a part of the 
broader process of regime transition that is the focus of McFaul’s argument. 
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key moments throughout the two countries’ constitutional processes, one of the most 
crucial of which was the actors who could, in fact, participate in the bargaining processes. 
A second objective is to uncover when these factors mattered less or more. When did 
institutions, traditions, and social cleavages overlap with the purely choice-centered 
explanations? 
Some scholars have argued that Leninist (Jowitt 1992) and even pre-Leninist 
(Pipes 2004) institutional legacies of centralized political authority in former communist 
countries would undermine attempts to build democratic and capitalist institutions. Such 
“cultural path-dependency” arguments resemble the historical institutionalist contention 
that history matters, because once institutions are created they tend to persist due to such 
mechanisms as “increasing returns” (Pierson 2000) or “lock-in” that provide incentives 
for actors to preserve institutions over time. In other words, the choices made within 
“critical junctures” (Collier and Collier 1991) establish a path of institutional 
development that becomes increasingly difficult to reverse. On a much more fundamental 
level, as countries enfranchise their populations through democratization, their deep 
historically forged societal divisions begin to define political discourse and serve as the 
bases for political contention, which can have a significant effect on the configuration of 
the variables in the “action arenas” from which new institutions—in this case, new 
constitutions—emerge. 
The seminal work on the structural foundations of elite competition is Lipset and 
Rokkan’s (1967) theory that traces the origins of political party systems to major 
historical events. Socioeconomic cleavages have received the greatest amount of 
attention within this literature (Zuckerman 1975: 239), largely because the majority of the 
literature on political cleavages and democratic elections has focused on Western Europe, 
where the class-based cleavages that formed as a result of the Industrial Revolution were 
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institutionalized in political parties. Studies in this vein have also shown that 
socioeconomic divisions translate into more stability than ethnic or regional divisions, for 
example, because they foster bargaining and compromise on both elite and mass levels 
(Evans and Whitefield 1998: 119). The latter societal divisions, however, have tended to 
be more politically salient in many post-Communist countries, which may have been 
because industrialization under communism did not establish the capital-labor divisions 
that have dominated politics in Western Europe. As Tavits (2005) argued, “one cannot 
deny that class and other socioeconomic cleavages matter less today in Eastern Europe 
than they do in Western Europe, and this discrepancy has to do with the communist past 
(p. 288).” Some studies, moreover, have suggested that the severe economic hardship 
from the transition tended to unify rather than polarize these populations “in shared 
suffering” (Hesli, Reisinger and Miller 1998: 244). The dispersed nature of economic 
hardship could have promoted significant barriers to “collective action” (Olson 1965; see 
also Hellman 1998) among voters, which would have hindered the formation of class-
based alignments with parties and candidates. 
That is not to say that class interests were absent from these countries’ politics. In 
fact, some studies have found that urban-rural cleavages, which overlap heavily with 
richer-poorer divisions in these countries, can help explain support versus lack of support 
for former communist and other left-wing parties. However, regional, ethnic, and 
linguistic divisions in these countries became far more salient voting cues in the absence 
of strong class-based identities (Goodnow and Oziashvili 2010; Goodnow and Moser 
2012). Thus a key difference between the two cases is that Russian elites’ decisions were 
less vulnerable to social forces largely because the country’s regions were much too 
heterogeneous to form a coherent cleavage structure. Yet even in Ukraine, with its very 
unambiguous regional divide, political realities have not always reflected societal 
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structures. At the beginning of the transition, elites who were creating the new 
institutions were largely unaffected by the social underpinnings of the country, because 
civil society was only just beginning to form, and because the elites at the helm of the 
transition process were themselves elected in what had been at best the quasi-democratic 
elections that came with Gorbachev’s “demokratizatsiia” reforms. As the transition 
progressed and party elites were actively mobilizing voters along the more salient 
regional and language lines, the relative balance of power was re-ordered in a way that 
created enough uncertainty for the more powerful elite groups to want to greatly reduce 
the powers of the presidency that they were less certain to control. Yet fractures among 
the elites representing the western Ukrainian cleavage frequently caused the balance of 
power to disproportionately favor the eastern cleavage. The argument that the politics of 
region were more important than the politics of class, and ergo promoted the (albeit 
temporary) inclusive constitutional outcome in Ukraine compared to the consistent 
reinforcement of constitutional exclusivity in Russia, is supported by testing the 
following sets of hypotheses against electoral and census data. The first reflects the 
expectation that electoral politics in these countries were initially detached from social 
realities, given the infancy of civil society and political parties.  
Hypothesis 3: voting in the first election cycles in Russia and Ukraine did not 
significantly reflect rich/poor and urban/rural societal divisions. 
Likewise, 
Hypothesis 4: voting in the first election cycles in Russia and Ukraine did not 
significantly reflect societal divisions based on region, ethnicity, and language. 
If these two hypotheses hold up to empirical testing, the argument that elites were very 
insulated from societal forces in the first few years after the two countries’ founding 
elections would have strong support. It would support the contention that this “critical 
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juncture” imbued insulated political elites with substantial decision-making autonomy, in 
which opposition groups were far weaker political players. On the other hand, if the data 
analyses were to show more crisp cleavage lines, implying a more mobilized and distinct 
voter base, then the argument about the relative autonomy of elites, given the critical 
juncture, would be more difficult to sustain.  
Another set of hypotheses tests the expectation that when cleavage lines began to 
solidify in subsequent elections, they did so along regional lines to a much greater extent 
than along socioeconomic lines. This would have promoted a greater balance of political 
power among Ukrainian elites—in contrast to the balance of power among Russian 
elites—as a result of Ukraine’s dichotomous, coherent regional cleavage structure.   
Hypothesis 5: voting in subsequent election cycles in Russia and Ukraine 
primarily followed societal divisions based on ethnicity, language, and region. 
In contrast,  
Hypothesis 6: voting in subsequent election cycles in Russia and Ukraine was less 
defined by socioeconomic divisions, including differences among income levels 
and rural compared to urban divisions.  
If hypotheses 5 and 6 were to hold up to empirical testing, the study could confidently 
argue that Ukraine’s “national identity” cleavage emerged as the more significant and 
persistent point of political contention, which helps explain the greater ease with which 
Russian elites consolidated their power even as their country was undergoing 
democratization in the 1990s. It would also be supported by the basis of the political 
discourse during elections, such as parties’ use of anti-nationalist, pro-Russia, and pro-
Russian-language platforms in the East, along with the converse pro-west, anti-Russia, 
anti-Russian-language platforms in the West. In Russia during the 1990s, this would be 
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reflected in the politicization of issues affecting the regions compared to the “center” in 
Moscow and St. Petersburg, for example. 
Alternative hypotheses that would challenge the theory would discount human 
actors’ ability to enact change. Rather, the outcome would be the product of the country’s 
historical legacy, economic circumstances, or societal structure. One could argue, for 
example, that existing institutions prevented a stark departure from Soviet era norms of 
centralized authority. Or, alternatively, that the interests of Russophone Ukraine would 
inevitably dominate politics, because the country’s economic resources were 
concentrated in the East. A different type of challenge to the theory would agree with the 
micro-foundational reasoning but disagree with the notion that actors were motived by 
rational self-interest. Instead, for example, liberal and capitalist values and ideals 
motivated the democratizers, while the non-reformists remained committed to principles 
of social equality. 
 The argument advanced in this dissertation is effectively a synthesis of some of 
these alternatives: utility-maximizing actors adjusted their strategies over time with the 
intention of minimizing their personal losses and maximizing personal gains to the extent 
allowed (or facilitated) by underlying social and institutional structures. If this were true, 
then we would expect to see changes in actors’ strategies and end goals across time as 
their efforts to mobilize voter support and forge new alliances changed their perception of 
their political prospects, and, in turn, their constitutional preferences. If, on the other 
hand, only the structural circumstances mattered, then we would expect to see a 
constitutional process more persistently favoring the Eastern oblasts, from an economic 
standpoint, or one that more consistently reflected the country’s dichotomous ethnic and 
linguistic structure, from a societal perspective. Moreover, if actors’ motivations 
transcended their rational self-interest, then we would see consistency in their goals and 
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preferences over the full period of constitutional negotiations, rather than the “flip-
flopping” of constitutional preferences over time. 
The chapters that follow unravel these layers of potential causes behind the 
constitutional choices in Russia and Ukraine. Chapters 3 and 4 evaluate the micro-level, 
actor-centered hypotheses 1-2 in the context of the Ukrainian and Russian constitutional 
processes, beginning in 1990 when their respective parliaments formed commissions to 
begin drafting new constitutions. They assess whether the actual course of events is 
consistent with the processes that the different theories would presumably generate. The 
approach thus resembles Hall’s (2003) “Systematic Process Analysis” and Bates et al.’s 
(1998) “Analytical Narratives,” which work deductively from hypotheses to uncover the 
best explanation for an outcome. Chapter 5 examines the macro-level structural 
underpinnings of the balance of power. It uses electoral and census data to compare 
voting patterns in Ukraine with voting patterns in Russia, thereby evaluating hypotheses 
3-6. Finally, chapter 6 surveys similar constitutional events across a broader set of cases 
in the post-Communist region. 
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Chapter 3: The Process of Constitutional Creation in Ukraine 
 
In contrast to the dramatic and relatively sudden imposition of the new 
constitution in Russia, newly independent Ukraine underwent a long and difficult 
constitutional negotiation process. However, the constitutional battles were 
fundamentally the same in both cases: Fights over how legislative and executive strength 
would be balanced in the new constitutions were also fights over who would end up in 
control of the massive economic and political reforms facing these new states.  At stake 
were enormous gains and losses for different elite actors and social groups from either the 
“shock therapy” advocated by the neoliberals or the gradual course of reform supported 
by the factions on the left. In Ukraine, negotiations were further complicated by the 
divisive issues of national symbols and the status of the Russian language. The nationalist 
politicians representing the western part of the country wanted to banish the vestiges of 
Russian colonialism, especially the use of Russian in any official capacity, which 
Russophone eastern Ukrainians certainly opposed. Over time, the country’s geographic 
divide became the primary basis of elite competition, because it proved to be the most 
salient and persistent point of political contention for Ukrainian voters. More specifically, 
rival political elites and parties became more and more defined by their pro-Russian 
versus pro-western stances on issues20 that garnered support from a cleavage comprised, 
on the one hand, of ethnic Russians and Russophones who identified more strongly with 
Russia and, on the other hand, of ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian speakers who 
identified more strongly with the West. 
                                                 
20 Examples of these issues include the status of the Russian Navy in the Crimean port of Sevastopol and 
the use of the Russian language in higher education and government. 
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While actors’ preferences regarding “national identity” questions remained mostly 
geographically fixed over time, actors’ preferences for a stronger or weaker presidency 
tended to fluctuate in response to changes in their political strength. One of the more 
prominent examples of this variation in elite preferences occurred in 2010 when east-
oriented Yanukovych reversed his stance on a set of 2004 constitutional amendments that 
significantly increased the parliament’s prerogatives. He and his political cohort had 
initiated the reforms in the first place, at a time when he faced a strong rival presidential 
contender. Furthermore, he had been an outspoken critic of prior attempts to annul the 
reforms by west-oriented President Yushchenko, calling them efforts to “return to 
totalitarian times.”21 The situation in 2010 was much different: Yushchenko’s political 
career had ended with a humiliating fifth-place defeat in the first round of the presidential 
election; the new Yanukovych administration was using prosecution and other measures 
to weaken the west-oriented opposition from Tymoshenko’s political party; and the 
eastern coalition had become increasingly cohesive due in part to political loyalty based 
on patronage and in part to loyalty from eastern Russophone voters. Under these 
conditions, Yanukovych had a new-found incentive to stack the constitutional court in 
order to revoke the very constitutional amendments he had championed when he faced a 
much stronger “Orange” opponent. In the same fashion, the Bloc of Yuliia Tymoshenko 
(BYuT)—the only parliamentary group that had voted against the constitutional reforms 
in 2004—criticized the court’s decision to revoke the amendments, alleging bribery and 
calling for “a special commission be set up to investigate the actions of members of the 
                                                 
21 Onyshkiv, Yuriy, “Constitutional Court nixes 2004 changes,” Kyiv Post, October 7, 2010, 
http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/constitutional-court-nixes-2004-changes-85441.html, accessed 
March 2013. 
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Constitutional Court, who reversed the political reform of 2004.”22 These “flip flops”—
each from a different side of Ukraine’s east-west political spectrum—support this 
chapter’s argument that actors’ preferences for more or less liberal democratic and 
inclusive constitutions are contingent on how they perceive their political prospects. The 
narrative also shows that elite actors’ perceptions of the relative balance of power was 
very vulnerable to pressure from social forces, which distinguished the Ukrainian and 
Russian cases in the extent to which more balanced political competition, and 
consequently more uncertainty about political fortunes, produced challenges to super-
presidentialism in one case but not the other.  
The systematic comparison of the social-structural components of elite 
competition in Ukraine and Russia is the subject of chapter five of this dissertation. This 
chapter (as well as chapter four) primarily grapples with the level of human agency in the 
argument, i.e., the actions and interactions of groups of elites. The chapter is therefore 
designed to evaluate hypotheses 1 and 2, presented in the preceding theoretical chapter, 
which state that, on the one hand, elites were more likely to prefer a more inclusive 
constitution—i.e., with less concentrated authority—when there was substantial 
uncertainty regarding the balance of power among political factions, and that, on the 
other hand, elites were more likely to prefer a more exclusive constitution—i.e., with 
more concentrated authority—when there was little uncertainty regarding the balance of 
power among political factions. The following narrative shows that changes in elites’ 
preferences for more or less concentrated power over time depended on changes in their 
relative strength vis-à-vis their political opponents, which supports these two hypotheses 
and the overarching “balance of power” argument advanced in this dissertation. What's 
                                                 
22 Interfax-Ukraine, “Opposition party demands inquiry into Constitutional Court's Oct. 1 ruling,” Kyiv 
Post, October 5, 2010, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/opposition-party-demands-inquiry-into-
constitution-85049.html, accessed March 2013. 
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more, it suggests that this trend was true for each faction, whether opposition or 
incumbent, insider or outsider to the former regime, east-oriented or west-oriented, or 
left-leaning or right-leaning, which supports the assumption that self-interest was a much 
stronger motivator than ideology or values.  
“Democrats,”23 this chapter argues, did not foster democracy in Ukraine. What 
created the demand for more democratic institutions was greater competition among 
democrats as well as non-democrats. This challenges prior “balance of power” 
arguments, in which democracy was expected to result from “unbalanced transitions” 
favoring democrats (McFaul 2002), or in which strong presidential regimes were 
attributed to “unbalanced transitions” favoring non-democrats (Easter 1996). It also 
suggests that competition among diverse interests is more important than whether 
reformist, conservative, secularist, or Islamist forces, for example, are in power during 
regime transitions. When creating new institutions, elites of any political stripe would be 
more likely to adopt a framework that represents the interests of diverse societal interests 
if the bargaining conditions mimicked a Rawlsian veil of ignorance. In the majority of 
successful transitions to democracy throughout the post-communist region, the respective 
former communist parties re-entered electoral competition after the dust had settled from 
the collapse of the one-party communist regimes. The resulting balancing effect on elite 
competition promoted new institutions of government that would better accommodate the 
spectrum of societal interests across socioeconomic classes and ethnic groups, even if 
                                                 
23 The distinction between “democrats” and “non-democrats” in the context of post-authoritarian political 
transitions can be quite ambiguous. Most research on the post-communist region treats neoliberal reformers 
as the former and the communists as the latter, or else outsiders to the former regime as the former and the 
insiders to the former regime as the latter. In Ukraine the distinction sometimes depends on elites’ 
westward versus eastward orientation. However, these distinctions make little sense when the discussion is 
about democracy and the different factions are in fact reflections of different societal interests—the 
neoliberals, the entrepreneurial “new” Ukrainians who could profit from the reforms, and the communists, 
the pensioners and workers who would likely suffer from the reforms.  
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ultra-nationalist, “hardened” communist, and/or “indifferent” neoliberals were at the 
bargaining table. The institutions ultimately adopted in the countries with successful 
democratic transitions were either parliamentary (e.g., Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, and 
others) or semi-presidential with substantial “checks and balances” (e.g., The Czech 
Republic, Lithuania, Poland, and others).24  
 
Figure 6: Freedom House Ratings for Ukraine (1991-2012) 
 
 
Ukraine has struggled with democracy in the more than twenty years since its 
independence from the Soviet Union. According to the country’s Freedom House ratings 
(see Figure 6), the country has remained in the grey zone between authoritarianism on the 
one hand and democracy on the other. Ukraine’s combined rating for political rights and 
civil liberties has hovered between four, which is more “competitive authoritarian,” and 
                                                 
24 Parliamentarism, especially in combination with PR elections, would promote more inclusive policy 
outcomes because of the greater diversity of interests that are represented in coalition governments. 
Presidentialism, on the other hand, is a “winner-takes-all” arrangement that could undermine democracy 
unless it incorporates the “checks and balances” to protect the interests of the minority against the majority 
as well as the interests of the majority against the minority (see Federalist 51).   
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Fr
e
e
d
o
m
 H
o
u
se
 S
co
re
 
 54 
two and half, which is “electoral” rather than “liberal” democratic.25 In sum, the country 
has yet to reach the full-fledged democratic end of the continuum, and although it tended 
toward greater democracy after the 2004 Orange Revolution, it began to trend back 
toward competitive authoritarianism with the resurgence of the Party of Regions and the 
consolidation of President Yanukovych’s power in a renewed “super” presidency. 
While the fluctuation between more or less concentrated political authority 
matches the trends toward more or less democracy, it also matches the transition of 
power between eastern pro-Russia and western pro-Europe forces. In other words, the 
dominance of the country’s eastern cleavage between approximately 1996 and 2004,  and 
then again from 2010 onward, is associated with the tendency toward competitive 
authoritarianism, in contrast to the post-Orange period under west-oriented President 
Yushchenko’s leadership, which is related to a tendency toward electoral democracy. 
This pattern could also support an ideology-based explanation for democratic 
development, which would challenge a key contention in this dissertation that, in the long 
run, the ideology of political leaders matters less than real political competition among 
politicians representing diverse societal interests. Values can certainly have an effect on 
political transitions in the short-term; for example, Yushchenko’s administration was not 
associated with the electoral fraud that has increasingly occurred since Yanukovych took 
office. But the case studies in this dissertation indicate that normative considerations 
rarely influenced the preference for the more inclusive political institutions that could 
foster greater democracy over the long-term. In Russia, Boris Yeltsin resorted to illiberal 
means—i.e., a violent offense against the parliament and the subsequent imposition of a 
super-presidential constitution—in order to achieve liberalizing ends—i.e., “shock 
                                                 
25 Countries with approximate Freedom House ratings of two to one are at the liberal democratic end of the 
spectrum and countries with approximate ratings of six to seven are at the authoritarian end of the 
spectrum. 
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therapy” style reforms. These actions had the unintended, but perhaps not surprising, 
consequence of engendering authoritarianism. This argument is also supported by the 
Freedom House scores for the Republic of Georgia in the years since the country’s Rose 
Revolution in 2003, in which power was transferred to Mikheil Saakashvili, who, like 
Yushchenko, was considered a pro-West “democrat.” 
 
Figure 7: Freedom House Ratings for Ukraine compared to Georgia (1991-2012) 
 
 
As Figure 7 indicates, the country at first trended slightly toward greater electoral 
democracy in 2003-2004, although it never reached a score below the borderline 
competitive authoritarian/electoral democratic level of “three.” However, while still 
under Saakashvili’s leadership, Georgia’s democratization reversed course for several 
years, returning to pre-Rose Revolution competitive authoritarian levels. Incidentally, the 
renewed authoritarianism followed the constitutional reforms that greatly strengthened 
President Saakashvili’s office vis-à-vis the parliament. The authoritarian trend has 
reversed course toward electoral democracy since 2010, which uncannily coincided with 
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a new set of constitutional reforms that substantially increased the powers of the prime 
minister relative to the president. Even if Saakashvili’s motivation for the reforms was to 
potentially prolong his leadership after his final presidential term ends in 2013 (as newly 
empowered prime minister), the country has indeed experienced a power-balancing trend 
in recent years, reflected in the electoral victory of the opposition Georgian Dream 
coalition in the October 2012 parliamentary elections. 
Ukraine’s similar pattern makes the country an especially good case for 
evaluating an argument about the importance of competition among elites of any political 
stripe in the creation of more or less inclusive political institutions. Variation over time in 
the dependent variable—the extent of presidential power—can be evaluated in the 
context of variation over time in the key independent variable for this actor-centered 
portion of the analysis—the degree of certainty about the balance of political power 
among elite actors. In addition to uncovering the conditions under which actors would 
prefer certain institutions over others, the process-tracing account grapples with how the 
various demands and concessions of the different elite groups translated into a 
constitutional bargain. The narrative that follows accomplishes these goals by assessing 
the balance of power among the key actors, their preferences and goals, and the 
constraints on their actions during five periods of time in the Ukrainian constitution-
making process. The first period includes the passage of the Constitutional Concept and 
the creation of the Office of the Presidency, just prior to the country’s independence; the 
second comprises the fruitless constitutional negotiations that followed the country’s 
independence; the third accounts for the circumstances that produced the constitutional 
Dohovir (Agreement) in 1995 that was designed to serve temporarily in lieu of a 
constitution, in addition to the passage of the constitution itself in 1996; the fourth 
accounts for the legislature-strengthening constitutional amendments that occurred during 
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the 2004 Orange Revolution; and finally, the fifth looks at the conditions that facilitated 
Yanukovych’s electoral victory in 2010 and motivated him to reverse the 2004 
constitutional reforms. 
 
TIME 1: CONCEPTUALIZING AN INDEPENDENT STATE 
At the time of the first constitutional moment in Ukraine, the parliament, or 
Verkhovna Rada (Rada), was formally divided between a communist majority and the 
much weaker Narodna Rada (People’s Council) opposition. However, the de facto 
balance of power in the Rada consisted of two distinct, quite disciplined, and fairly 
symmetrical voting blocs based on support for the Soviet regime or support for Ukrainian 
sovereignty, as many communists were consistently voting with the opposition on 
legislation that concerned independence and state-building (Whitmore 2004: 53-54). The 
prospect of independence had effectively split the communist majority between the 
hardliners, in what was called the “Group of 239,” and the pro-independence deputies in 
their ranks, including then Rada Chairman, and later President, Leonid Kravchuk. The 
deputies in the People’s Council opposition held just over one quarter of the assembly’s 
450 seats. The majority of them had been elected as part of the Democratic Bloc, an 
electoral coalition of anti-communist, pro-democracy, and pro-independence groups, 
most prominently the national democratic movement Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy (Rukh).  
This first semi-democratically-elected Rada launched the constitutional process in 
October 1990 with the formation of a commission charged with drafting a new 
constitution for the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, in anticipation of Gorbachev’s 
new “voluntary federation” Union Treaty that was designed to transform the USSR into a 
loose federation. The failed August 1991 coup, in which Soviet hardliners attempted to 
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thwart Gorbachev’s decentralization efforts, convinced even the most conservative 
Ukrainian communists that independence was the only viable alternative. The result was 
the near-unanimous August 24, 1991 vote in the Rada on Resolution No. 1427-XII “On 
the Independence of Ukraine,” which declared Ukrainian independence from the Soviet 
Union and called for an all-Ukraine referendum to confirm the declaration. Just prior to 
this watershed moment in the history of Ukraine, the Rada had been in intense debates 
over a general concept for its new constitution.  
In these debates, most of the initial controversy was about whether to adopt a 
presidential or parliamentary system in what was to be either a more sovereign republic 
under the new Union Treaty or a fully independent state. Most of the communists were 
committed to the system of soviets and supported the idea of a parliamentary regime as 
the more natural reflection of their vision, but the opposition, as well as Rada Chairman 
Kravchuk, thought a president as “head of state” would be an important symbol of 
sovereignty and a potential bastion against encroachment from Moscow into Ukrainian 
affairs. The People’s Council opposition, moreover, were campaigning for immediate 
massive economic reforms, stating in their formal platform that “…in the case of 
paralysis of the executive branch of government…it is essential to institute a presidential 
form of government (Narodna Rada Bloc Position Statement, September 18, 1991).”26 
However, early Rukh documents envisioned limited powers for the president within a 
“parliamentary-presidential” system in which the president is the head of state and not 
chief executive.27 
                                                 
26 Official document published in The Ukrainian Review, Winter 1991, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, p. 53.  
27 “Konseptsia derzhavotvorenia v Ukraini (Concept of government in Ukraine),” Program document 
adopted at Rukh’s Fourth All-Ukraine Congress, December 2-4, 1992, quoted in Wolchuk 1997, p. 144. 
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The form of government that in terms of (Ukraine’s) historical tradition, 
theoretical thoughts on statehood at the beginning of the twentieth century, and 
the psychological traits of the Ukrainian nation is the most appropriate is that of a 
parliamentary-presidential republic with the head of state, who is not the chief 
executive. Historically, this is confirmed by the forms of government utilized in 
the Cossak Republic and the Ukrainian People’s Republic (quoted in Wolchuk 
1997: 144). 
The national communists eventually came on board with the idea of a “head of 
state” presidency and proposals for pure parliamentarism were tabled, but the debates 
continued to center on concerns, particularly from the communist majority, about 
transferring too much power to a presidency that could end up in anyone’s hands.   
The version of the “Concept” that Rada passed in June 1991 recommended the 
presidential system proposed by the non-communist opposition in the legislature, but 
with a quite limited, mostly foreign policy role for the president. The document formally 
recommended that Ukraine would be a “presidential republic” with a president and vice-
president.28 However, the president’s primary role would be to represent the state abroad; 
the document granted the sole right to the Rada to speak on “behalf of the people of 
Ukraine,” while the President could only speak “on behalf of the state.” Moreover, the 
document proposed that the Verkhovna Rada would have the power to: (a) impeach the 
president, (b) veto presidential decrees, (c) determine the constitutionality of presidential 
actions, and (d) call national no confidence referenda prior to the expiration of his or her 
term. Further reflecting a rather more parliamentary model, in the event that the no 
confidence referendum failed to pass, the document indicated that the Verkhovna Rada 
                                                 
28“Kontseptsiia novoi konstitutsii Ukrainy (Concept for the new constitution of Ukraine),” June 1991, F. 1; 
Op. 16; Sp. 1605; Ark. 121-140, TsDAVO Ukrainy; See Appendix A for a guide to archival references. 
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would be dissolved and new elections called. Additionally, while the president would 
have the power to issue decrees, the “Concept” otherwise anticipated scant legislative 
powers for the presidency. Instead, 
…Legislative power is realized through referenda and the Verkhovna Rada…Its 
functions according to the constitution are: passing laws; making decisions on the 
budget; determining state and territorial organization; ratifying international 
agreements; ensuring that the president’s activities correspond to the constitution, 
budget, and other state institutions; participating in the selection of judges; among 
other functions (Kontseptsiia Novoi Konstitutsii Ukrainy, June 1991). 
Soon after approving the Concept, the Rada passed a bill creating a similarly 
limited presidency and set elections to the new office for the following December. This 
new office effectively amended the country’s existing 1978 Soviet constitution, which 
asserted that formal state power was vested in the Verkhovna Rada (Article 2). The 
president’s power to issue binding decrees (Articles 114-6), however, conflated the 
structure of power and set the stage for intense legislative-executive conflict in the early 
post-Soviet period. These circumstances are similar to the events leading up to the 
constitutional crisis in Russia between 1990 and 1993. Ukraine, however, weathered its 
ongoing constitutional crises in a manner that protracted the constitutional negotiations 
process, but avoided actual violence. 
 
TIME 2: INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL STALEMATE 
After independence, any discipline among voting blocs in the Rada died out. 
From approximately late 1991 to early 1992, the Rada fragmented as the deputies 
realigned along overlapping and murky political lines, which made further constitutional 
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progress practically impossible. The communists reorganized as the Socialist Party of 
Ukraine (SPU) under the leadership of Oleksandr Moroz, which, as Whitmore (2004) put 
it, turned out to be the “death knell” (p. 58) for the Rada majority. Many of the former 
communist deputies instead joined the Agrarian Party and others, including newly elected 
President Kravchuk, eschewed party affiliations. Likewise, the parties in the former 
People’s Council opposition bloc stopped cooperating to a significant extent. Rather than 
provide a unified front in the December 1991 presidential election, for example, most of 
the opposition bloc’s parties fielded their own candidates. They also fractured in terms of 
their support or opposition to newly elected President Kravchuk. European consultants on 
the draft constitution at the time observed in a report that “…The 450 members of the 
unicameral Parliament are split into a large number of parties of unclear connotations in 
the political spectrum. This gives rise to a very confrontational climate, with the 
population being wary of political parties that all call themselves democratic but fail to 
take clear stands.”29 Whitmore (p. 59) described a situation in which Rada decisions and 
legislation were being “...passed by ad hoc ‘situational’ alliances of the left or right 
together with the large (around 200) shifting boloto (marsh) of deputies located between 
the left and right flanks. In this context, political groupings formed and re-formed 
frequently.” Many of these deputies of the “swamp” became the basis for Kravchuk’s 
informal “Party of Power.” It consisted primarily of apolitical, pragmatic former 
nomenklatura members, who were intent on preserving their power and influence in the 
newly independent state and were therefore willing to support the president in return for 
the access it gave them to state resources.  
                                                 
29 Venice Commission, Secretariat Memorandum “Meeting on the Draft Constitution of Ukraine,” Kyiv, 
Ukraine, May 31 – June 2, 1993. 
 62 
Kravchuk appointed Leonid Kuchma as Prime Minister and the two executives 
soon entered a prolonged struggle over their relative powers. Kuchma was continuously 
pressing the parliament to give him special powers to enact “shock therapy” style 
reforms, which went against Kravchuk’s more conservative gradual approach to reform. 
Meanwhile the Rada was in disarray and legislative power was effectively “bankrupted,” 
as one local scholar observed (Fedorchuk 1993: 2). In late 1992, the parliament 
temporarily transferred its powers to the Cabinet of Ministers, while Kravchuk and 
Kuchma sparred over which of them would control the cabinet. In May of 1993, Kuchma 
threatened to resign after the Rada refused to extend his decree-making powers and 
instead gave sweeping powers to Kravchuk over the course of reforms.30 By early 
summer of that year the constitutional crisis deepened as inflation sky-rocketed, spurring 
mass strikes among coal miners in the eastern Donbas region.31 In the face of this acute 
social unrest, the two executives agreed to a truce in the form of an agreement to hold 
joint confidence referenda—one in the president and one in parliament. The goal, as then 
Chairman Pliushch put it, was to resolve the problem of “a sapling with two main 
trunks,” where, “one has to be cut down.”32 The Rada, however, abruptly voted to cancel 
the referenda just prior to their scheduled date in September and instead opted to hold 
early parliamentary and presidential elections in March and June of the following year, 
respectively. This decision was perhaps not surprising, because the more numerous 
deputies on the left were quite confident in their electoral prospects, especially in light of 
the resurgence of the Communist party in the face of the severe hardship Ukrainian 
                                                 
30 The Ukrainian Review, XL, no. 3 (1993): 61. 
31  “Donbas” is the name of the eastern coal mining Donetsk Basin region of Ukraine. It includes parts of 
the Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Luhansk oblasts. 
32 Ibid. 
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workers, pensioners, and other social groups were experiencing as a result of the early 
shocks from liberalizing economic reforms. 
The constitutional commission, chaired by President Kravchuk, produced several 
drafts of the new constitution during the period leading up to this executive-executive 
standoff, which, given the conflict between the two executives and the disarray and 
uncertainty in the parliament, never progressed to a point that would force even a 
semblance of agreement or compromise. The first draft of a new constitution was 
introduced in the Rada in January 1992. Under Kravchuk’s administration two more 
versions were put out, in June 1992 and October 1993. In these early drafts, the nature of 
executive-legislative relations lacked clarity, which, as the Venice Commission 
delegation observed, was the product of  “an attempt to compromise between certain 
features of presidential and parliamentary systems, which are however irreconcilable 
(1993).” The attempts at compromise between the parliamentary and presidential visions 
may have been a result of the murky and uncertain nature of the balance of power among 
the different groups. Neither the factions on the left nor the right of the ideological 
spectrum had the leverage to achieve their vision of what the new constitution should 
look like, nor were the drafters willing to shift the powers they had in the parliament to 
the president. At this point, moreover, Kuchma’s immediate interest was in increasing the 
powers of his office as prime minister, but he also had his sights set on the presidency.  
The various drafts illustrate some of the back-and-forth over the question of 
presidential power. For example, the first draft in January 1992 described the president as 
“head of state and executive power” (article 174) with substantial control over the cabinet 
and the power to nominate judges. However, the October 1993 draft described the 
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president as “head of state” (article 142)33 and gave him (or her) much less exclusive 
control over the nomination and dismissal of cabinet members and judges. Commenting 
on the first of the drafts, foreign consultants34 raised concerns over the excessive 
emergency powers of the president (Troper 1992: 43) and the lack of “checks and 
balances,” both horizontally across the institutions of government and vertically in terms 
of citizens’ ability to contest government (Lampert 1992). The thrust of many of the 
concerns from outside commentators was that the draft lacked the mechanisms to ensure 
that competing processes could effectively operate throughout the system, which meant 
that decisions could ultimately end up in the hands of a small group of elites.  For 
example, while Article 4 of the 1992 draft spelled out the right to regional and local self-
government, elsewhere in the document the national government had the power to 
appoint many of the more important local positions (ibid.: 12).  
The commission incorporated some minor suggestions from foreign and domestic 
consultants into subsequent drafts, including remedying the more blatant inconsistencies 
in the document. But on the whole, the voices of western consultants were not addressed 
in a meaningful fashion. Furthermore, it appeared that the commission did little to 
incorporate the advice they had solicited from the public. There were also some rather 
significant contradictions emanating from westerners and the voices from society. On the 
one hand, the main message coming from western, especially American, consultants 
concerned the “Soviet traces” of positive rights in the draft.35 On the other hand, an 
                                                 
33 Although subsequent drafts, including the final ratified version, kept the “Head of State” wording, the 
actual powers of the president in subsequent drafts were substantially increased and more “executive” in 
nature (until the 2004 reforms).  
34 “Zauvazhennia ta propozytsii amerikans’kykh fakhivstiv do proektu novoi konstytutsii Ukrainy 
(Comments and suggestions by American experts on the draft constitution of Ukraine),” March 3, 1992-
March 17, 1992, F. 1; Op. 35; Sp. 120; Ark. 11-53, TsDAVO Ukrainy. 
35 See memoranda by Judge Bohdan Futey of the US Court of Federal Claims and Roger Pilon of the 
CATO Institute. The materials from various international seminars on the first draft of the constitution are 
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impassioned letter to President Kravchuk from the head of the Ukrainian Labor Union 
Federation, for example, expressed outrage over the fact that the latest draft had 
completely ignored the federation’s concerns about guaranteeing the social rights of 
citizens.36 The many, often handwritten, letters to the constitutional commission 
expressed similar concerns, including those from regional and municipal councils and 
private citizens.37  
 The constitutional process was effectively occurring as a power struggle among 
political elites with little external—either societal or foreign—influence. Although the 
factions on the left were very vocal in their demands to include social welfare provisions 
in the constitution, these concerns were continually sidelined by the more contentious 
questions relating to who would wield power: the president or the parliament, the regions 
or the center, etc. As summarized by Mykhailo Syrota, the chairman of the Rada’s 
“temporary special commission” charged with finalizing the draft constitution in 1996, 
the questions that kept stalling progress on the country’s new constitution were: (1) the 
country’s territorial structure, especially with regard to the autonomous status of Crimea; 
(2) national symbols and language, including the critical question of whether Russian 
would be a second official language; (3) the number of chambers in the parliament; (4) 
                                                                                                                                                 
archived in TsDAVO, including F 1; Op. 35; Sp. 119, 120, and 179. The Futey and Pilon memoranda are 
on pp. 112-116 and pp. 165-170 of sprava 119, respectively. In contrast to most of the foreign advice was 
Herman Schwartz’s (American University Law School) memo on pp. 87-99, which supported the draft’s 
commitment to aspirations concerning social welfare and social justice. He argued that that they are 
consistent with democratic constitutions worldwide and that it should be irrelevant that the Soviet 
Constitution contained, for example, the right to education. In the end, these provisions remained largely 
unchanged throughout the drafting process.  
36 Letter to the Chairman of the Constitutional Commission, President Kravchuk, from O. M. Stoian, dated 
12.10.93, F. 1; Op. 35; Sp. 179; Ark.114-115, TsDAVO Ukrainy. 
37 For example, Archive of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, F. 1; Op. 46; Sp. 56 and 57. The other 
frequent concern voiced by citizens concerned allowing Russian as a second official language. 
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questions about the nature and extent of presidential power; (5) the nature and role of the 
judiciary; and (6) the power of local self-government.38 
Prior to the early elections to the Rada in March 1994 and the run-off election to 
the presidency in July 1994, none of the factions were very committed to concentrating 
power in the presidency. However, after the elections altered the power balance within 
the Rada and between the Rada and the President, when Kuchma defeated Kravchuk, the 
subsequent drafts of the constitution—in addition to a temporary agreement over the 
distribution of power between the president and the Rada (the Dohovir)—dramatically 
increased presidential power.  
  
TIME 3: THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL BARGAIN 
Even though the new parliamentary elections did not give any one party a 
majority, the three political parties on the left, including the re-constituted Communist 
Party of Ukraine (CPU), the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU), and the Agrarian (or 
Peasant) Party, initially formed the largest and most disciplined bloc (see Table 8).  
However, the role of this bloc in the constitutional process was very limited due to the 
president’s efforts to undermine the legislature and the willingness of opposition parties 
on the right39 to ally with the president in order to undercut the influence of the leftist 
majority in the Rada. Ultimately, the result was loss for Rada deputies of all political 
stripes and a win for President Kuchma. 
 
 
  
                                                 
38 F. 1; Op. 46; Ark. 2, AVR Ukrainy. 
39 The largest contingent of which was Rukh (by then a political party under the leader of Viacheslav 
Chornovil). 
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Table 8: Party and Faction Membership in the Verkhovna Rada after the 1994 
Elections. 
Party Membership (March/April 1994) Faction Membership (May 1995) 
Left 
Communist Party of Ukraine 91 Communist Party of Ukraine 90 
Socialist Party of Ukraine 14 Socialist Party of Ukraine 27 
Peasant Party of Ukraine 21 Peasant Party of Ukraine 47 
Center 
Labor Party 5 Inter-Regional Group of Deputies 30 
Civic Congress of Ukraine 2 Unity 31 
Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine 4 Center 30 
Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine 2 Independents 27 
Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine 2   
Party of Democratic Revival of Crimea 1   
Right 
Rukh 22 Rukh 28 
Ukrainian Republican Party 10 Reforms 35 
Democratic Party of Ukraine 3 Statehood 28 
Radical Right 
Ukrainian Conservative-Republican Party 1   
Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists 3   
Ukrainian National Assembly 3   
Non-Affiliated 
No Party Affiliation 218 Did not belong to a faction 29 
Source: Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy: Paradygmy i Paradoksy, Ukrainska Perspectyva, 1994, 1995, in 
Wolchuk, Kataryna, The Moulding of Ukraine, 1997, pp. 131, 134. 
 
The debate over the Dohovir began with Kuchma’s proposed law “on state power 
and local self-government,” which sought to extensively concentrate political authority in 
the president. It proposed to bring local councils (radas) directly under the president’s 
control and greatly strengthen the presidency via provisions that would give the president 
the power to appoint and dismiss the members of the cabinet without the Rada’s approval 
and issue decrees on economic reform. Most factions on the left were uncompromising in 
their opposition to the bill, but Kuchma did have some conditional support from the 
center-right, because the bill would also eliminate the system of local soviets (i.e., the 
radas). When a toned-down version of the bill failed to win the needed majority, which 
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was virtually impossible given the opposition from the left, Kuchma threatened to issue a 
decree to force confidence referenda in the Rada and the president. This threat pressured 
the Rada to accept the bill as a temporary Dohovir, which translates as an “agreement” or 
“treaty,” between the president and the Rada.  
The Dohovir substantially increased the president’s power. To the center-right 
this was perceived as a temporary victory, as it took power away from the left-dominated 
Rada. Official Rukh correspondence described the agreement as a “peaceful and civilized 
way out of political crisis…, an important step toward dismantling the system of 
soviets..., and establishing real distribution of power as a basis for democracy (Rukh 
Statement 1995).”40 The fact that the president would have the authority to accelerate 
economic reforms, or, as the national-democratic minority viewed it, conduct a much-
needed “economic conversion (Zavrych 1996),” was also perceived as a victory for many 
of the deputies on the center-right. However, they also viewed the Dohovir as a flawed 
basis for a new constitution, because it “violated the principle of ‘checks and balances,’ 
given the distinct advantages the President has over the parliament (ibid.).”41 It was 
nevertheless a temporary arrangement; the parties agreed that the Dohovir would expire 
within one year, at which point they would ratify a final version of the constitution.  
A new constitutional commission was put in place after the parliamentary and 
presidential elections, which was to be formally chaired jointly by President Kuchma and 
Rada Chairman and SPU leader Moroz. However, the politically contentious process of 
forming the new commission ended in a way that favored the president. In particular, he 
had disproportionate power to appoint members of the commission, especially given that 
                                                 
40 “Zaiava tsentral’noho provodu Narodnoho Rukhu Ukrainy (Statement by Rukh leadership),” Visnyk 
Rukhu: 1995, F. 270; Op. 2; Sp. 12, Ark. 74zv, TsDAHO Ukrainy.   
41 Roman Zvarych, “Konstytutsiinii protses: v poshuku suspil’noho konsensusu (The Constitutional 
Process: in Search of Social Consensus),” Visnyk Rukhu: 1996, F. 270; Op. 2; Sp. 13, Ark 43v-45, 
TsDAHO Ukrainy. 
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his share of appointees would represent a unified front compared to the diverse views 
held by the Rada appointees. The commission solicited suggestions for revisions from 
Rada factions, labor union leaders, civic organizers, etc., but, much like under 
Kravchuk’s chairmanship, very little of this input made it into the text of the document. 
Instead, the thrust of the text was produced by a working group of ten scholars and 
jurists, and although it was more “professional” than prior drafts, it had a clear pro-
presidential bent. In addition to granting full control of the cabinet and prime minister to 
the president, it proposed a two-chamber parliament, which would have produced an 
additional “check” on the powers of the legislature. This draft was passed to the Rada for 
deliberation in March 1996, but was, not surprisingly, overwhelmingly voted down.42 
The deputies on the left were uncompromising in their objection to the president’s 
draft constitution. They wrote: 
After analyzing the constitutional draft, which was endorsed by the pro-
presidential majority on the constitutional commission and presented in the 
Verkhovna Rada, we declare that its content is anti-people and that it should in no 
case be adopted as the constitution of Ukraine…It purports to change the nature 
of social relations, limit citizens’ socioeconomic and political rights, liquidate the 
rule of the people, limit the powers of the legislature, and provide the legal basis 
for virtually unlimited singular power for the president (Joint statement by 
Communist, Socialist, and Agrarian factions, April 1996).43 
                                                 
42 “Kiev Draws Up New Constitution,” ITAR-TASS, March 11, 1996. 
43 “Zaiava Presydii Tsentral’noho Komitetu Komunistychnoi, Politvykonkomiv Sotsialistychnoi i  
Selians’koi partii Ukrainy ta yix fraktsii u Verxovnii Radi Ukrainy ‘Shchodo konstytutsiinoho protsesu v 
Ukrainy (Statement of the Central Committee of the Communist, Socialist, and Agrarian parties of Ukraine 
and their factions in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ‘On the constitutional process in Ukraine’), April 10, 
1996, F. 328; Op. 1; Sp. 51; Ark. 67-68, TsDAHO Ukrainy. 
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 In addition to requiring greater social guarantees, the factions on the left 
demanded that the president act solely as head of state and not government, that local 
radas would be preserved, and that Crimea would be granted autonomous status (ibid.). 
They also launched grassroots campaigns to gain public support for their opposition to 
Kuchma’s constitution.44 In an appeal to the public, the Socialist faction in the Rada  
wrote: “This is a project of a president who is seeking the support of the national-
‘democrats’ in order to prolong his term and have dictatorial powers…his solution to an 
oppositional parliament is in keeping with his strategy to ‘divide and conquer’—split the 
parliament into two chambers and let them squabble while the president rules!”45 
Because of the completely incongruent views on the nature of executive-
legislative relations between the president and the factions on the left, Kuchma indeed 
needed the support of the national-democrats on the center-right. These factions were 
more “malleable” to Kuchma’s vision for a constitutionally strong president because, 
despite the natural rivalry between the west-oriented center-right opposition and east-
oriented Russophile Kuchma, they had a mutual political opponent on the left. At the 
time, moreover, the parties on the left were numerically much stronger than any of the 
other parties in terms of both party organization and membership as well as the number 
of representatives serving in the national Verkhovna Rada and the regional radas (see 
Table 9). Viacheslav Chornovil and others on the center right were therefore determined 
                                                 
44 “Deiaki pidkhody do provedennia agitatsiino-propagandysts’koi SPU u konstytutsiinomu protsesi (Some 
approaches to the Socialist Party of Ukraine’s agitprop/campaign efforts regarding the constitutional 
process), Socialist Party of Ukraine internal document, date unknown, F. 328; Op. 1; Sp. 55; Ark. 83, 
TsDAHO Ukrainy.  
45 “Zvernennia do narodu, do vsikh patriotychnykh syl Ukrainy (Appeal to the people, to all patriotic forces 
in Ukraine),” Socialist Faction of the Verkhovna Rada, date unknown, F. 328; Op. 1; Sp. 51; Ark. 72, 72zv, 
73, TsDAHO Ukrainy. 
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to pass the new constitution before the left had the chance to regroup. In a letter to the 
regional Rukh leaders,46 he wrote:  
The leftist factions are using all their power to interfere with the constitutional 
process. They are attempting to organize a national referendum on questions of 
national order, sovereignty, and symbols, and other important aspects of state 
building; they are working with the armed forces of Ukraine…in the effort to 
organize “autumn” and “winter” communist offensives in the form of nation-wide 
strikes—all measures intended to prevent the passage of the new constitution. The 
constitutional agreement (Dohovir) will expire on June 8; the presidential election 
in Russia is on June 12. Leftist hopes rely on this connection. Therefore, the 
constitution must be adopted before June 1996. (Chornovil 1996).  
 
Table 9: Relative Strength of Ukrainian Parties 1996-1997 
 Membership Verkhovna Rada 
Deputies 
Local Rada 
Deputies 
 Left 
Communist Party of Ukraine  80,000-120,000 92 4005 
Socialist Party of Ukraine  29,370 20 378 
Peasant Party of Ukraine 65,000-100,000 19 932 
 Right 
Rukh 50,000 26 965 
Republicans 13,000 10 428 
Congress  14,000 5 297 
 Center 
Liberals 40,000 12 20 
Christian Democrats 12,000 10 53 
Source: Andrew Wilson, “The Ukrainian Left: Still a Barrier to Reform?,” The Ukrainian Review 44, 
no. 1 (1997): 30.  
 
                                                 
46 Letter from Viacheslav Chornovil “Holovam kraiovykh orhanizatsii Narodnoho Rukhu Ukrainy,” dated 
February 19, 1996, F. 270; Op. 1; Sp. 220; Ark. 27-28, TsDAHO Ukrainy. 
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Chornovil even stressed Rukh’s and the President’s mutual interest in defeating 
efforts by the factions on the left to derail the passage of the president’s constitution in a 
published zverennia47 (appeal) to President Kuchma in April 1996:  
Dear Mr. President!  
We are writing to you because the constitutional process in Ukraine is in 
jeopardy. We believe …that there will be tragic consequences if the adoption of 
the Constitution is delayed, and that a great responsibility for those consequences 
lies with you.  
You were not our candidate in the presidential elections and we do not support all 
your actions....We do not think you adequately used the powers you received from 
the Constitutional Agreement to remove those from power who act against the 
Ukrainian state, and who even challenge the institution of the presidency…. 
…In the regions, there is a massive campaign (by lefist factions) aimed at 
defeating the passage of the constitution on the basis of the Constitutional 
Commission’s current draft…. 
…Rukh’s platform has been one of constructive opposition to you. But we are 
ready to fully support you in decisive steps toward establishing the constitutional 
independence of Ukraine (Chornovil 1996, emphasis added).  
As discussed in the “Time 1” section of this chapter, Rukh had initially 
envisioned a parliamentary-presidential system. However, by 1996 they had embraced 
Kuchma’s preference for a presidential-parliamentary model. The alliance with the 
President, moreover, was reinforced by Kuchma’s willingness to concede on issues like 
the status of the Ukrainian language and national symbols, which were major points of 
                                                 
47 “Zverennia narodnoho rukhu Ukrainy do prezidenta Ukrainy Leonida Kuchmu,” April 24, 1996, F. 270; 
Op. 2; Sp. 13; Ark. 2zb, TsDAHO Ukrainy.  
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contention for the right. According to Viacheslav Koval’, Chornovil’s deputy in Rukh at 
the time and the head of Rukh’s All-Ukrainian Public Committee for the Support of the 
New Constitution of Ukraine, the “most brutal fights” with the president were bound to 
result from disputes about national symbols.48 Kuchma also conceded on the issue of 
designating Ukrainian as the only state language, even though he had campaigned on the 
promise that he would advance the status of the Russian language in the country. In 
concessions that also appealed to the left, he retreated on his demands to divide the Rada 
into two chambers,49 and somewhat softened his demands for exclusive presidential 
control over the cabinet and prime minister.50 He also agreed to give Crimea its 
autonomous status, which helped to mollify the left.  
The special temporary committee, chaired by Mykhailo Syrota, and consisting of 
members of the different Rada factions, produced the modified draft reflecting the above 
concessions. Even though it denied the president the right to dissolve the parliament, it 
still gave the president broad powers to make appointments for key government 
positions. The Rada’s control over the government, moreover, was limited to confirming 
the president’s candidate for prime minister. In all other non-legislative (see Table 2) 
respects—e.g., the appointment, dismissal and supervision of the government—it was 
effectively toothless. While not “completely satisfied,”51 after signing off on the revised 
Syrota draft, Kuchma passed it to the Rada for a final reading and ratification vote. 
However, it received only 258 votes out of the 300 needed to pass, which precipitated a 
                                                 
48 Viacheslav Koval’, “Holovam oblasnykh organizatsii Narodoho Rukhu Ukrainu (To the regional Rukh 
leaders),” May 15, 1996, F. 270; Op. 1; Sp. 220; Ark. 74, TsDAHO Ukrainy. 
49 He initially only agreed to allow an “interim one chamber parliament” to operate temporarily for a five 
year term; “Kuchma Accepts ‘Majority’ of Amendments to Constitution,” ITAR-TASS, May 20, 1996.  
50 Even so, the Rada’s role was limited to confirming the president’s candidate for prime minister. In all 
other respects—e.g., the appointment, dismissal and supervision of the government—it effectively had no 
power.  
51 “Kuchma Accepts `Majority' of Amendments to Constitution,” ITAR-TASS, May 20, 1996.  
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dramatic set of events on the night of June 27, 1996. President Kuchma threatened to 
issue a decree to hold a referendum on the constitution rather than allowing the Rada that 
prerogative. The Rada in turn responded just as they had to his prior threat of a no-
confidence referendum over the Dohovir—to maximize their chances of retaining at least 
some power and minimize their chances of losing more power. A twenty-three hour 
session in the Rada that included several rounds of voting ended with a ratified 
constitution for the new Ukrainian state. However, Rada deputies had been bullied into 
this vote and acted in a way that would spare them from a fate similar to their 
counterparts in the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD) three years earlier. The 
deputies within the Rada made some concessions to each other, but the Rada as a whole 
made the most concessions to the president.  
In the short-term, Kuchma was the clear winner and the left was the clear loser. 
For the center-right, it was less clear; they certainly made concessions, but they had 
defeated the more powerful left. In the medium-term, however, the right was also a loser, 
as Kuchma and his allies monopolized political power. To ultimately win, the right would 
need to have control of the presidency. Thus, in subsequent years, the non-communist 
opposition started to actively mobilize a voter base in the western regions. The campaign 
materials from the various national-democratic parties from this period demonstrate their 
shift to a much clearer anti-Russian message, reflecting a strategy to mobilize voter 
support along regional, ethnic, and linguistic cleavage lines by changing the political 
discourse from the ideological left versus right—or gradual versus neoliberal reforms—to 
one that is focused on the question of Ukrainian “national identity.” Such efforts to either 
maintain or reshape the balance of power were apparent, on the one hand, by Kuchma’s 
pervasive use of patronage and strategies to consolidate his power base among the eastern 
“clans” and Russophone voters, and, on the other hand, by Tymoshenko and 
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Yuschchenko’s electoral alliance that unified the west-oriented opposition and helped 
consolidate the support of voters united on the basis of their stronger affinity with the 
west. 
 
TIME 4: A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL BARGAIN 
Even though the new constitution did not include all the presidential prerogatives 
that Kuchma wanted, he effectively had full control of the government and pursued an 
aggressive policy to consolidate his authority over all aspects of government and policy-
making. The circumstances in the Rada were initially not very favorable to his ambitions, 
but after his re-election in 1999 he managed to create a pro-presidential “artificial 
majority (Whitmore 2004),” giving him a consolidated majority government (see Skach 
2005) and effectively super-presidential powers. After the new parliamentary elections in 
March 1998, neither the left, right, nor center factions had a majority (see Table 10). The 
left received 39 percent of the seats, the center 30.7 percent, the right 10.4 percent, and 
unaligned independents made up 19.6 percent of the Rada. The “centrist” factions in 
addition to the unaffiliated deputies, which together comprised a simple majority in the 
Rada, were ideologically a very loose group of parties, many of which served as various 
oligarchs’ political power bases and were often closely linked to Kuchma (Whitmore 
2004: 44-45).52 Kuchma also had support from some of the factions on the right; by this 
point Rukh had split into a group that tended to support the president under Hennady 
Udovenko and a group that maintained the party’s platform of “constructive opposition” 
to the incumbent president under Yurii Kostenko (ibid.: 45). 
                                                 
52 Including SDPU (o), the Revival of the Regions, Trudova Ukraina, Bat’kivcshchyna, and others, that 
were funded and linked, respectively, to Medvedchuk and Surkis, Volkov, Punchuk and Derkach, and 
Tymoshenko (see Whitmore 2004). 
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Table 10:  Party and Faction Membership in the Verkhovna Rada after the 1998 
Elections 
Faction No. of deputies Percent Seats 
Communist Party 123 27.4 
“Left-Center” (Socialist 
Peasant bloc) 
35 7.8 
Progressive Socialists 17 3.8 
Total “Leftists” 175 39.0 
   
People’s Democratic Party 89 19.8 
Green Party 24 5.3 
Social Democratic Party 25 5.6 
Total “Centrists” 138 30.7 
   
Rukh 47 10.4 
Total “Rightists” 47 10.4 
   
Hromada (non-aligned oppositionists)  39 8.7 
Unaffiliated deputies  49 10.9 
Total Non-aligned 88 19.6 
Source: Registration of first factions by the secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada, 14 May 1998. In Sarah 
Whitmore, “Faction Institutionalization and Parliamentary Development in Ukraine,” Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics 19, No. 4 (2004): 46. 
 
The left was steadfast in its opposition to Kuchma and for a time managed to 
curtail his attempts to consolidate his “super-presidency,” usually with the help of some 
of the less loyal centrists. However, Kuchma’s reelection victory in a second round 
against CPU leader Petro Symonenko in November 1999, in addition to a court ruling 
that overturned a law in which deputies could only join factions on the basis of their party 
affiliations, opened up the opportunity for Kuchma to construct a consolidated majority 
government based on his “artificial majority.”  
 Kuchma achieved this artificial majority using bullying tactics similar to those he 
had used for the Dohovir and constitution: He threatened to hold a referendum to 
decrease the constitutional powers of the Rada if the members failed to form a pro-
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presidential majority. This majority consisted primarily of center-right deputies and was 
buffered by his nomination of Yushchenko, then still a presidential ally,53 to the post of 
prime minister. The leftist Chairman (or Speaker) Moroz was ousted and replaced by 
Kuchma-loyalist Ivan Pliushch. Kuchma, moreover, was simultaneously attempting to 
regain the concessions he had made to the opposition at the time of the first presidential 
bargain. In April 2000 he held a referendum to gauge public support for a bill that would: 
(a) give the president the power to dissolve the Rada if it failed to form a majority or pass 
the budget, (b) eliminate deputies’ immunity from prosecution, (c) reduce the size of the 
Rada from 450 to 300 deputies, and (d) establish a bi-cameral parliament.  
 The referendum’s results were overwhelmingly in favor of the president’s 
objectives. With his majority, the bill passed its first reading in the Rada in July 2000, but 
by the time of the subsequent Rada session, in which it would need to receive 300 votes 
to become law, the “Kuchmagate” scandal had erupted. Moroz exposed tape recordings 
made by a former Kuchma bodyguard, in which the president appeared complicit in the 
murder of journalist Georgii Gongadze who had been investigating political corruption. 
The scandal created a rare moment of unity among the left and right as they jointly called 
on the president to resign.  
 Attempts to impeach Kuchma did not get very far, but his now weakened position 
and the prospect of his chosen successor Yanukovych’s potential electoral loss to 
Yushchenko caused him to reassess the costs associated with further weakening the 
Rada’s powers. A new Rada was elected in March 2002. The various parties on the right 
coalesced into the Our Ukraine bloc, on the basis of their support for potential 
presidential candidate and now Kuchma opponent, Yushchenko. For the first time, the 
                                                 
53 At the time, Yushchenko compared their relationship to a father and son. 
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right was numerically more powerful than the leftist faction, with 23.4 percent of the 
seats compared to the left’s 20 percent. The pro-presidential United Ukraine bloc 
included the Party of Regions that would back Yanukovych in the next presidential 
election. Kuchma’s reduced power base and the recognition that Yushchenko would be 
quite a competitive contender for the presidency not only caused Kuchma to moderate his 
super-presidential ambitions, but to soon be proposing constitutional reforms that would 
increase the prime minister’s power at the expense of the president. 
 Around this time, Kuchma appointed Yanukovych to the post of prime minister. 
While also an “easterner,” he belonged to a different political/financial clan; Kuchma was 
from Dnipropetrovsk and Yanukovych was from Donetsk. However, Kuchma relied on 
the support of the Party of Regions and shared their pro-Russia and pro-Russian language 
orientation. Kuchma’s proposed reforms in favor of the prime minister were actively 
taken up by these parties in late 2003, when it was becoming less and less clear which 
direction the election would take. The BYuT and Our Ukraine blocs opposed the reforms, 
but the leftist factions came on board when the president’s coalition agreed to also change 
the electoral system from a mixed single-member-district-plurality/proportional 
representation system to a pure proportional representation system, which was likely to 
mostly benefit the left. However, when this joint constitutional and electoral system 
reform bill was put to a vote on April 8, 2004, it fell just six votes shy of the 300 it 
needed to pass. The incumbent and his chosen successor had one remaining option to 
ensure an electoral victory: to falsify the results.54 
 However, they grossly miscalculated the extent to which society would mobilize 
in response to the manipulated second-round election that gave Yanukovych a slim edge 
                                                 
54 Or possibly even to assassinate their political opponent. Yushchenko nearly died and was left disfigured 
by dioxin poisoning in September 2004. The case is still open.   
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over Yushchenko in November 2004. The resulting “Orange Revolution” greatly 
underscored the east-west divide in the country. Support for the candidates closely 
followed ethnic, linguistic, and regional lines, in which ethnic Russians and Russophones 
identified more closely with Russia, and ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian speakers united 
on the basis of Ukrainian patriotism and a closer affinity to the West (see chapter 5). Pro-
west “Orange” forces rallied in support of their candidate of hope and change, 
Yushchenko, with the campaign slogan “Tak!—My mozhemo” (Yes we can!). In the 
three Galician oblasts55 his support ranged from 92 to 94 percent. By contrast, in the 
easternmost oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk, voters supported Yanukovych at levels as 
high as 96 and 92 percent, respectively. Several weeks of massive rallies by Orange 
supporters in downtown Kyiv, and a decision by the Constitutional Court to nullify the 
election result based on evidence of widespread and systematic fraud, created a tense 
political crisis for Ukraine’s elites. Kuchma was determined to reach a compromise that 
would protect him and his family from prosecution over Kuchmagate and other 
corruption charges, in the event his political cohort lost power. He was also determined to 
push through his Rada-strengthening reforms prior to the next election round that had 
been set by the court for December 26. The rival political factions sat down for a series of 
three “round table” discussions in late November and early December with a group of 
mediators, including Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus and Polish President 
Aleksander Kwasniewski. The proposal on the table was to bring the Ukrainian political 
system closer to the Polish and Lithuanian “parliamentary-presidential” semi-presidential 
                                                 
55The Galician region is comprised of the Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Ternopil oblasts. It was incorporated 
into the Soviet Union several decades later than other Ukrainian regions. Anti-Russian nationalism is 
deeply rooted in this part of the country, where OUN-UPA separatists—the Organization of Ukrainian 
Nationalists (Orhanizatsiya Ukrayinskykh Natsionalistiv) and its militant wing (Ukrayinska Povstanska 
Armiya)—fought the Soviets during World War II and contemporary nationalist parties and movements 
took root shortly before and after the country’s independence.  
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model. To Kuchma this was arguably about control of government, but to the foreign 
mediators, dispersing power would allow more inclusion and representation for the 
country’s different deeply divided societal groups. Yushchenko agreed to the 
compromise under the condition that the current government, in which Yanukovych was 
prime minister, would be fired prior to the presidential election and that the reforms 
would not take effect for another two years. Once the parties agreed to this compromise, 
the Rada overwhelmingly passed Resolution No. 2222 to amend the constitution of 
Ukraine. Ukrainian elites had renegotiated their constitutional bargain.   
 
TIME 5: THE RETURN OF THE STRONG EXECUTIVE  
 Yushchenko went on to win the election and appoint his Orange ally Yuliia 
Tymoshenko to the post of prime minister.56 The new president still had all the 
prerogatives Kuchma had enjoyed, but they were set to expire on January 1, 2006 when 
the Rada would assume control of the government (with the exception of the Foreign 
Affairs and Defense ministers). Almost immediately, however, the power-balancing 
among elites that had occurred as a result of the electoral alliance between Yushchenko 
and Tymoshenko—and supported by voter mobilization—reversed course. 
Disagreements between President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko caused 
their coalition to dissolve, with Tymoshenko’s BYuT bloc serving as the pro-prime 
minister coalition and Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc serving as the pro-presidential 
coalition. Furthermore, the balance of power shifted back toward the east-oriented Party 
of Region after it received the largest share of the vote (32.14 percent) in the March 2006 
parliamentary elections (see Table 11).  Tymoshenko’s bloc BYuT also emerged as a 
                                                 
56 Tymoshenko had backed Yushchenko with the understanding that she would receive that nomination. 
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much stronger political contingent than Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine, with their respective 
22.29 and 13.95 percentages of the vote. The SPU and CPU for the first time received 
among the lowest vote shares of the parties represented in the Rada, each with less than 6 
percent of the vote. Political discourse was now much more defined by east-west rather 
than left-right ideological conflict. 
 
Table 11:  Verkhovna Rada Election Results, March 2006 
Party/Bloc Percent Votes 
Party of Regions  32.14 
Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT) 22.29 
Our Ukraine Bloc  13.95 
Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) 5.69 
Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) 3.66 
Source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/, accessed April 2013. 
 
 Given that the west-oriented groups were not easily consolidated, the Rada 
selected Yanukovych as prime minister. Not surprisingly, this set the stage for intense 
political conflict and gridlock, which ultimately forced a compromise between the 
president and the Rada to hold special early parliamentary elections. The result was both 
a win and a loss for the Party of Regions opposition (see Table 12). The party gained 
more seats than they had in the 2006 election, but BYuT gained 10 percent more of the 
seats than they had won in the previous election. Thus, with the support of Our Ukraine, 
Tymoshenko became prime minister.  
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Table 12:  Verkhovna Rada Special Election Results, September 2007 
Party/Bloc Percent Votes 
Party of Regions  34.37 
Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT) 30.71 
Our Ukraine bloc  14.15 
Communist party of Ukraine (CPU) 5.39 
Lytvyn's Bloc 3.96 
Source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/, accessed April 2013. 
 
 Yushchenko tried and failed to increase his powers throughout his tenure as 
president. Tymoshenko, who had her sights set on running in the next presidential 
election, also campaigned to have the reforms reversed. These efforts, however, did not 
have enough support from the Constitutional Court justices, even after Yushchenko 
dismissed three of the justices and replaced them with more compliant members. The 
administration also attempted to put an entirely new constitution in place with a much 
more presidential than semi-presidential framework; one of the drafts proposed an 
effectively pure presidential system, in which the president would be both head of state 
and chief executive, with the prime minister serving as a perfunctory administrator.57 
However, Yushchenko’s popularity and coinciding ability to govern successfully was 
rapidly waning. It was impossible to secure the 300 votes it would take for a new 
constitution to be ratified by the Rada. In January 2010 when he ran for a second term, he 
came in a distant fifth with just over 5 percent of the vote in the first round of the 
election. Tymoshenko and Yanukovych went on to the second round, each drawing votes 
along linguistic and regional cleavage lines; Tymoshenko emerged as the candidate for 
the west as opposed to Yanukovych’s appeal to eastern voters (see Chapter 5). The 
                                                 
57 Interview with the author of the new constitution draft, Vsevolod Rechytsky of the Kharkiv Human 
Rights Protection Group, Kyiv, Ukraine, December 14, 2010. 
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“villain” of the Orange Revolution had won the presidency in an election that 
independent observers declared “free and fair.” Yanukovych quickly moved to 
consolidate power. Control of government was wrested from BYuT and Our Ukraine 
forces, when six deputies from Prime Minister Tymoshenko’s coalition defected to the 
pro-Yanukovych coalition consisting of the Party of Regions, the Communist Party, and 
Speaker Lytvyn’s Bloc. Subsequently, electoral manipulations and various forms of 
patronage became the means to maintain a “consolidated majority” government. It also 
was not long before the (now stacked) Ukrainian Constitutional Court revoked the 2004 
amendments and returned presidential powers to pre-Orange Revolution levels. 
The pro-presidential majority in the Rada submitted a petition to the 
Constitutional Court in the summer of 2010 to have reforms revoked. However, the court 
was not sufficiently accommodating and so, under what appeared to be pressure from the 
president’s administration, four of the eighteen judges abruptly resigned just two weeks 
before the court was expected to issue its ruling. The judges who resigned were rumored 
to oppose Yanukovych.58 By the end of September 2010, Yanukovych was newly 
empowered and on the road to fully consolidating his party’s control of government and 
the policy agenda. He also waged a campaign to weaken his main opponent—
Tymoshenko and her Bat’kivshchyna party—through harassment and the prosecution 
(and eventual imprisonment) of its more prominent members, including Tymoshenko. 
The country’s electoral democracy reverted to competitive authoritarian levels (see 
Figure 6). 
 
                                                 
58 They included Ivan Dombrovskii, Viacheslav Dzhun, Anatoliy Didkovskiy, and Yaroslava Machuzhak. 
 84 
 CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
   The constitutional process in Ukraine has been characterized by changing 
preferences about the nature of the constitution. This pattern implies that to understand 
the reasons for more or less concentrated political power in the post-Soviet context, it 
makes more sense to look at the conditions that would incentivize the choice of more 
politically inclusive institutions than to focus on who was in power during the transition. 
Democrats as well as non-democrats, however defined, were just as likely to choose to 
either concentrate or disperse political power, depending on whether it was in their 
interest to do so. When Ukraine was on the verge of independence at Time 1, the very 
high levels of uncertainty about the future of the country fostered the desire among the 
different factions for a more parliamentary-presidential system. At Time 2, the power 
struggle between President Kravchuk and Prime Minister Kuchma, as well as the disarray 
in the Rada, stalled the constitutional progress, but also caused the different parties to 
prefer a constitution with less concentrated political authority. When Kuchma came to 
power, he exploited the weakness of the Rada to consolidate his power base and demand 
a very strong presidency. Although he had to make some concessions to the various 
factions, he ultimately won. The right sided with the president on the question of a 
stronger presidency, because the left was numerically much stronger in the Rada. With 
the new constitution in place, Kuchma temporarily moved forward in his attempt to 
undermine any and all power in the Rada until his power base was compromised in the 
wake of Kuchmagate, and it was now in his interest to strengthen the Rada’s power at the 
expense of the presidency.  
What’s more, by the time of the dramatic events of the Orange Revolution, the 
reality of the country’s underlying societal divide along ethnic, linguistic, and regional 
lines started to shape the power dynamics among elites. Kuchma had relied on a co-opted 
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“artificial” majority in the Rada, which his substantial powers and access to patronage 
resources had facilitated. However, when society was mobilized enough to protest, the 
distribution of power among elites began to reflect the distribution of interests in society. 
In this way, regional and ethnic structural divisions in the country had, at least 
temporarily, moderated attempts by the eastern cohort to consolidate political power, 
because societal support for the different elite camps was quite symmetrical and well 
defined. These circumstances produced the power symmetry and resulting uncertainty 
that can explain the paradoxes of the 2004 legislature-strengthening constitutional 
reforms: Kuchma’s about-face after attempting to increase the formal and informal 
powers of the president, and Yuschenko’s concession to the reforms despite the large-
scale mobilization of his supporters. The much more symmetrical balance of power had 
given the key players the incentive to choose an outcome from which they would lose the 
least as a result of the uncertainty over which of the parties would end up controlling the 
presidency. 
Efforts by the victorious “Orange” forces to gain back the power lost in the 
power-balancing compromise during the Orange Revolution were unsuccessful, largely 
because of their weakening position relative to eastern forces. In contrast, by 2010 
Yanukovych had the incentive and the capacity to re-concentrate power in the 
presidency. In fact, Yanukovych, who had been one of the main proponents, and 
Tymoshenko, who had been one of the main opponents of the reforms in 2004, each 
reversed their prior preferences regarding the concentration of political authority in 2010. 
The multiple instances of changing preferences for the different elite factions in the two 
decades following the country’s independence helps substantiate the hypothesis that 
uncertainty would cause actors to be more willing to choose inclusive constitutions and 
less willing to choose exclusive constitutions. If actors are not purposefully acting as if 
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they were behind a veil of ignorance because of a commitment to democracy and 
inclusivity, uncertainty would cause them to behave in a way that would achieve a similar 
outcome even if their actions were based on self-interested “utility maximizing.” 
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Chapter 4:  The Process of Constitutional Creation in Russia 
 
The constitutional battle in Russia was similar to the constitutional struggle in 
Ukraine: It was a fight over who would control the reins of government during a crucial 
political and economic turning point for the country. However, in contrast to Ukraine, 
where the Verkhovna Rada ultimately ratified the final document, albeit with a “twisted 
arm,” the already tenuous Russian constitutional negotiations devolved into a violent 
executive-legislative confrontation that resulted in a total victory for President Yeltsin’s 
political cohort. The institutional consequence was a very illiberal “super-presidential” 
constitution that was intended, ironically, to facilitate neoliberal reforms. Presidential 
power was severely threatened by economic and political crisis in the summer of 1998, 
opening a window of opportunity for constitutional change. However, not only did 
Yeltsin survive the challenges to his presidency from the parliament, but political power 
subsequently became more and more concentrated to the point that the regime has 
reverted to nearly full-scale authoritarianism. 
Russia’s Freedom House ratings over time reflect its steady democratic decline, 
beginning in 1998 when the country’s previous score of 3.5, indicating a modicum of 
democracy, worsened first to four, indicating more “competitive authoritarianism,” and 
then ultimately to 5.5, which is close to the out-and-out authoritarian end of Freedom 
House ratings’ continuum.59 This trend contrasts with Ukraine, which remained much 
more steadily “competitive authoritarian” and experienced an interval of “electoral 
democracy” in the mid-2000s (see Figure 8).  
                                                 
59 As noted in chapter 3, countries with approximate Freedom House ratings of 2 to 1 are at the liberal 
democratic end of the spectrum and countries with approximate ratings of 6 to 7 are at the authoritarian end 
of the spectrum. 
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Figure 8: Freedom House Ratings for Russia and Ukraine (1991-2012) 
 
 
 
The story of constitutional creation in Russia provides additional grounds in 
support of the second hypothesis presented in the theoretical chapter of this dissertation, 
which states that elites were more likely to prefer a more exclusive constitution—i.e., with 
more concentrated authority—when there was little uncertainty regarding the balance of 
power among political factions. When the military handed a complete victory to 
President Yeltsin during the 1993 presidential-parliamentary standoff, the balance of 
power was dramatically skewed in favor of the liberal reformist political cohort. 
However, in the absence of real ideological political competition, any normative 
commitments to liberal democratic principles among elites were trumped by “utility-
maximizing” behavior: the victorious anti-communist “democrats”60 centralized political 
                                                 
60 See Footnote 2 in Chapter 3.  
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authority in order to marginalize the opposition in the parliament. Similarly, the “non-
democratic” communist opposition campaigned for a more inclusive parliamentary-like 
system of government when their advantage was in the legislature, but supported the 
status quo when the presidency appeared within their grasp. This pattern of behavior is 
consistent with elites’ shifting preferences in Ukraine, where the “democrats” backed a 
constitution that would concentrate authority in the president when their leftist opponents 
were the dominant force in the legislature, but supported a more balanced distribution of 
power between the branches of government when the uncertainty about electoral 
outcomes made the compromise of “checks and balances” the most rationally “safe” 
course of action.  
Like the previous chapter, this chapter is based on a process-tracing methodology 
that assesses variation over time in the study’s dependent variable—the preference for 
concentrated political authority—in relation to variation over time in the key independent 
variable at the actor-centered portion of the analysis—the degree of certainty about the 
balance of political power among elite actors. The narrative that follows assesses the 
balance of power among the key actors, their preferences and goals, and the constraints 
on their actions during four periods in the Russian constitution-making process. The first 
period was a time when centrifugal tendencies in the Soviet Union pressed Russian elites 
to consider the status and nature of a sovereign Russian state. During this period, 
legislators created both a Russian presidency and a commission to begin drafting a new 
constitution.  The second period chronologically overlaps with the first by covering the 
various constitutional drafts that reflected ideological debates in addition to actors’ 
strategic preferences in the three years between the creation of the constitutional 
commission and the autumn of 1993’s violent executive-legislative standoff. The third 
period accounts for the circumstances and dramatic events that produced Russia’s super-
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presidential constitution. The fourth was a period when opposition groups attempted to 
impeach the president, which gave Yeltsin the incentive to seek a constitutional 
compromise. However, Yeltsin survived the challenges to his authority and passed the 
legacy of super-presidentialism to his chosen successor Vladimir Putin, who, like his 
Ukrainian counterpart Kuchma, was soon attempting to further consolidate political 
authority into a small group of elites at the Kremlin center.  
 
TIME 1: SOVIET DISINTEGRATION AND RUSSIAN STATEHOOD 
By the late 1980s, the constitution of the USSR and the constitutions of its 
constituent republics had been substantially amended to accommodate Gorbachev’s 
perestroika, glasnost, and demokratizatsiia reforms. When the Soviet Union dissolved at 
the end of 1991, the 1978 constitution of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic 
(RSFSR) was encumbered with approximately 400 amendments (Henderson 2011: 59). 
The new Russian state inherited a democratically elected parliament from these late 
soviet-era reforms. Its Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD) had been created with an 
October 1989 amendment to the RSFSR constitution and filled with elected 
representatives during Russia’s first federal, regional, and local elections in March 1990. 
Although democratic processes were still in their infancy, the composition of the CPD 
was the result of a quite competitive electoral contest between reformist “democrats” and 
the communists. Some local observers even described “the surge in popular participation 
in politics” during the 1990 legislative electoral campaigns as “a peaceful February 
revolution akin to the swelling of popular participation in February 1917 (McFaul 2001: 
79).” 
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At the start of the first session of the CPD in May 1990, 86 percent of the deputies 
were officially members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The rest 
were a diverse group of candidates united on the basis of their opposition to communism, 
most of whom had been endorsed by the “DemRossiia”—short for “Democratic 
Russia”—umbrella organization of non-communist candidates. Over time as coalitions 
formed and re-formed, both reformists and non-reformists were quite well-represented in 
the CPD, although the leftist groups remained the largest and most disciplined throughout 
the CPD’s short history. Table 13 shows approximate memberships in the different blocs 
for the final three convocations of the CPD. Out of a total of 1,068 members,61 
approximately 250 to 300 belonged to factions that supported “shock therapy”-style 
reforms; another 250 supported a more moderate course of reform, including the 
“Communists for Democracy” and other left-center groups; and another 300-350 deputies 
were conservative socialists who remained opposed to market capitalism.  
 
  
                                                 
61 Not all of these seats were consistently filled.   
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Table 13: Coalitions and Factions in the Congress of People’s Deputies (with 
approximate coalition membership for sessions 6-8) 
 
“Radical Reformists” 
Reform Coalition (initially the  Bloc of Democratic Factions) 300 241 - 
Democratic Russia    
Radical Democrats    
Joint faction of Social Democrats and Republicans    
    Consent for the Sake of Progress    
“Reformists” 
Democratic Center Bloc - 200 167 
Left Center—Cooperation    
A Free Russia (formerly Communists for Democracy)    
Sovereignty and Equality (Deputies from Autonomous Regions)    
Independents    
Not part of a bloc - 52 57 
Motherland    
“Leftists” 
Constructive Forces Bloc 167 151 158 
Industrial Union    
Workers’ Union--Reform without Shock    
Change--New Politics    
“Radical Leftists” 
Russian Unity Bloc 310 355 302 
Communists of Russia    
Agrarian Union    
Russia    
Homeland    
Russian Union    
Civil Society    
Notes: The ideological groupings are based on information from “The Congress of People’s 
Deputies and the Supreme Council of the RSFSR/Russian Federation (May 16, 1990 – October 4, 
1993),” http://www.politika.su/gos/ndrs.html, accessed May 9, 2013. 
 
In spite of the relative numerical strength of the left, Yeltsin became increasingly 
influential during the waning years of the Soviet Union. He was already a deputy in the 
USSR CPD and Supreme Soviet when he entered the race for a seat in the RSFSR CPD, 
representing a district from his native oblast of Sverdlovsk. He won easily and was soon 
elected to the highest executive office in the RSFSR—Chairman of the Presidium of the 
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Supreme Soviet62—by a razor thin margin over Ivan Polozkov, his ideological opposite 
as a member of the Communists of Russia faction that later joined the most conservative 
leftist Rossiiskoe Edinstvo (Russian Unity) bloc. Thus, although the balance of power in 
the CPD favored the forces on the left, the new chairman was directing the policy-making 
process toward liberalizing reforms. In fact, in the early sessions of the CPD, Yeltsin 
quite easily marshaled a majority coalition on the basis of the issue of Russian 
sovereignty within the USSR; the “Declaration of Sovereignty of the RSFSR”63 was 
adopted by an overwhelming 907 to thirteen votes. It called for “political sovereignty” in 
anticipation of potential legal conflicts over the supremacy of Russian or Soviet law, 
when it came to the large-scale reforms envisioned by Yeltsin and other reformists. Thus, 
rather than the full-scale independence that the Lithuanian parliament, for example, had 
already declared, it stated its “resoluteness in creating a democratic rule-of-law state 
within a reformed USSR.”64 Soon after, on June 16, 1990, the CPD created a commission 
charged with drafting a new constitution for a more sovereign RSFSR.65 Yeltsin was 
formally the chairman of the 102-member commission. However, a smaller working 
group comprised of fifteen deputies took the lead in the drafting process under the 
chairmanship of Oleg Rumiantsev, a legal scholar and member of the centrist, rather 
more social-democratic Rodina (or Motherland) faction. 
                                                 
62 The Supreme Soviet was a smaller legislative body elected by the CPD that met between sessions.  
63 “Deklaratsiia s’ezda narodnykh deputatov RSFSR ot 12 iiunia 1990 g. № 22-1 ‘O gosudarstvennom 
suverenitete Rossiiskoi Sovetskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki’ (Declaration of  the RSFSR 
CPD from June 12, 1990 “On State Sovereignty of the RSFSR”),” in Iz istorii sozdania konstitutsii 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Konstitutsionnaia Komissiia: Stenogrammy, materialy, dokumenty, 1990-1993 gg. 
(On the History of Creating the Constitution of the Russian Federation: Constitutional Commission: 
Stenograms, Materials, Documents, 1990-1993), vol. 1, edited by O. G. Rumiantsev, 51-53, Moscow: 
Wolters Kluwer (2007). 
64 Ibid., p. 51. 
65 “Postonovlenie s’ezda narodnykh deputatov RSFSR ot 16 iiunia 1990 g. № 37-1 ‘Ob obrazovanii 
konstitutsionnoi komissii’ (Resolution of the RSFSR CPD from June 16, 1990 “On the Formation of a 
Constitutional Commission”),” in Iz istorii sozdania konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, vol. 1, 54-61. 
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The commission—and in particular the working group—was at work on the new 
constitution as the movement toward greater Russian autonomy was gaining momentum. 
From the beginning, the drafts envisioned the presidential republic, which came into 
existence independently of the commission, “as a product of ‘life itself’”66 in the waning 
years of the Soviet Union. The Russian presidency was created soon after RSFSR citizens 
responded positively to a supplemental question on Gorbachev’s March 17, 1991 all-
union referendum asking: “Is it necessary to introduce the post of President of the 
RSFSF, who would be elected by all-republic popular vote?” Russian voters in fact 
overwhelmingly supported both the preservation of the USSR in response to the 
referendum’s general question as well as the creation of a Russian presidency at 71.4 
percent and 69.9 percent, respectively. Soon after, on May 24, the CPD adopted the “Law 
on the President,”67 which amended the still extant RSFSR constitution to accommodate 
the new presidency (Chapter 13-1). In short order, on June 12, Yeltsin was elected 
president of the RSFSR with 57 percent of the vote. By year’s end, he was president of a 
fully sovereign state after a series of events resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union:  
When soviet hardliners attempted to block further progress toward Gorbachev’s 
new union treaty of “more sovereign” soviet republics during the (failed) August 1991 
coup, many of the USSR’s constituent republics declared full independence from the 
Soviet Union for fear of losing the sovereignty gains they had already achieved. On 
December 8, 1991, Yeltsin along with the popularly elected new presidents of Ukraine 
                                                 
66 From Rumiantsev’s opening remarks during a fall 1991 press conference on the constitution process. 
“Press-konferentsii po priniatoiu novoi konstytutsii RSFSR (Press-conference on the adoption of a new 
constitution in the RSFSR),” September-October 1991 (no specific date in file), F. 10026;  Op. 1; D. 2924; 
L. 5, GARF. 
67 “Zakon RSFSR ot 24 maia 1991 g. № 1326-1 ‘Ob izmeneniakh i dopolneniiakh Konstitutsii – 
Osnovnogo Zakona – RSFSR’ (Law of the RSFSR from May 24, 1991 “On changes and additions to the 
Constitution – Basic Law – of the RSFSR”),” in Iz istorii sozdania konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, vol. 2, 
233-242. 
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and Belarus’—the other two founding republics in the original 1922 Union Treaty—
signed the “Agreement on the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS),”68 which declared that “The USSR as a subject of international law and as a 
geopolitical entity ceases to exist.”69 The Russian CPD subsequently ratified the CIS 
agreement and most of the other constituent republics also became signatories. By the 
end of that same month, Gorbachev resigned as President of the defunct USSR and 
Yeltsin automatically became president of a new nation state. 
 
TIME 2: CONSTITUTIONAL BARGAINING IN THE NEW RUSSIAN STATE 
Yeltsin’s star was rising, just as Gorbachev’s was falling. He defied the coup in 
August 1991, most dramatically in a speech from on top of one of the tanks that had 
surrounded the Russian legislature, or “White House.” Soon after, he asked the 
legislature for more expansive powers to help him carry out reforms that he promised 
would lift the country out of economic crisis. Because of his post-coup popularity, the 
CPD was quick to agree. Plus, he had only recently marshaled the support of an 
overwhelming majority coalition on the basis of the issue of Russian sovereignty. With 
his temporary year-long special powers, Yeltsin had the authority to issue decrees that 
would have the force of law, appoint the heads of local government (without legislative 
approval), and appoint ministers (with legislative approval). Yeltsin found ways to 
further expand his powers, such as appointing himself prime minister,70 so that he could 
                                                 
68 “Soglashenie o sozdanii Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv ot 8 dekabria 1991 g. (Agreement on 
the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States from December 8, 1991),” in Iz istorii sozdania 
konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, vol. 2, 824-827. 
69 Ibid., p. 825. 
70 The Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation was informally called “Prime Minister”—a 
convention that still exists in Russia. 
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form his own government without consulting the legislature. He made Yegor Gaidar—the 
architect of Russia’s “shock therapy”—his first deputy prime minister.  
The CPD (and the constitutional court) were soon wary of the power they had 
given the president; he had accumulated too much power and the country was 
experiencing the first shocks from the reforms. A struggle about each branch’s control 
over the course of reform and how the balance of power would be institutionalized in the 
new constitution started to take shape. In April an anti-Yeltsin coalition attempted to fire 
the reformist Yeltsin-Gaidar government. Yeltsin and his government survived, partly 
because he was willing to compromise. Yeltsin resigned as prime minister and brought in 
a few cabinet members from the industrial lobby—including Victor Chernomyrdin—who 
were rather more conservative in their approach to economic reforms. However, despite 
temporary compromises, the executive-legislative power struggle persisted. When Yeltsin 
managed to hold onto power, the CPD sought ways to impede his reform efforts, such as 
wresting control of the Central Bank from presidential control to make the 
implementation of his economic policies difficult if not impossible (Rahr 1993a: 18). As 
a result, drastic measures like introducing emergency rule were beginning to appeal to the 
liberal reformist camp; as early as mid-1992 some of Yeltsin’s closest advisers were 
convinced that Russia could only move forward with economic reform if it had a 
centralized “energetic, strong power (Rahr 1992: 16).” However, it was not clear whether 
the military and other security forces would in fact support the president over the CPD if 
the conflict escalated (Rahr 1993a: 19), and this encouraged several more arduous 
attempts at negotiation between the two branches.   
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For example, in December 1992, Yeltsin agreed to a compromise that made 
Chernomyrdin prime minister instead of Gaidar,71 who had been acting prime minister 
since Yeltsin’s resignation from the position. In return, the CPD agreed to an extension of 
the president’s temporary special powers beyond December 1992, when they were set to 
expire. These agreements were reached thanks to the mediation of Valerii Zor’kin, the 
chairman of the Constitutional Court, but they had relied on both parties agreeing to put 
the “main provisions” of a draft constitution to a country-wide referendum on April 11, 
1993. The compromises, however, were very short-lived. CPD Chairman Khasbulatov, 
with the backing of a majority of both conservatives and centrists in the CPD, reneged on 
the agreement during a special session called in March 1993, after Yeltsin’s version of 
the “main constitutional provisions” caused Khasbulatov and a majority in the CPD to 
balk at the idea of a referendum that could legitimize their opponent’s agenda. They 
passed a new resolution,72 which cancelled the agreement reached during the previous 
session (see footnote 69) and reinstated three constitutional provisions that had been 
temporarily suspended to give Yeltsin more leeway with his reform agenda. These 
included article 121.6 from Chapter 13.1 on the president, which stated that “the 
president is not entitled to use his powers to change in an arbitrary manner the borders of 
the Russian Federation or to disband constitutionally elected bodies, such as the congress 
or the parliament. Should the president attempt to dissolve any of these bodies without 
their consent, he will automatically be deposed (Wishnevsky 1993: 2).”  
                                                 
71 “Postanovlenie s’ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 12 dekabria 1992 g. ‘O stabilizatsii 
konstitutsionnogo stroia Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ (Resolution of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the 
Russian Federation from December 12, 1992 “On the Stabilization of Constitutional Order in the Russian 
Federation”),” in Iz istorii sozdania konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, vol. 3/2, 789-790. 
72 “Postanovlenie s’ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 12 marta 1993 g. № 4626-1 ‘O 
merakh po osushchestvleniiu konstitutsionnoi reformy v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ (Resolution of the CPD of 
the Russian Federation from March 12, 1993 “On Measures for Implementing Constitutional Reform in the 
Russian Federation”),” in Iz istorii sozdania konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, vol. 4/1, 319-320; see 
especially points 2 and 7. 
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While Khasbulatov was openly calling for the total return of power to the 
legislature, Yeltsin and his advisers began to allude to introducing “special administrative 
rule.” Yeltsin was counting on a positive outcome from a referendum to give him more 
leverage than the legislature if the fight came down to suspending one of their respective 
institutions. The CPD had already shot down the president’s proposal regarding the 
“main provisions” of a draft constitution that would go on the referendum, first by 
refusing to vote on a four-question “confirmation ballot” similar to the referendum 
question that led to the sudden creation of a presidency in 1991: “Do you agree that the 
Russian Federation will be a presidential republic?” and “Do you agree that the 
legislative branch will be a two-chamber parliament?”73 The president’s referendum 
proposal had also intended to ask whether voters supported his preferred method for 
ratifying the new constitution—via a constitutional assembly (or convention) comprised 
of representatives from across the Russian Federation—and whether “every citizen 
should have right to own, use, and sell private land in the capacity of owners.”  He 
managed to get the Supreme Soviet to vote on whether or not to put just two of those 
questions to a national vote: the first and the last, but the proposal was voted down by 
422 to 286. By law, Yeltsin could not call for a referendum without either (a) one million 
signatures from citizens or (b) the approval of one-third of elected deputies (ibid.). He 
first tried a confrontational approach, but eventually moderated his appeal in an attempt 
at another possible compromise, another indication of the ambiguity that remained over 
the balance of power. 
                                                 
73 Official correspondence from President Yeltsin to Supreme Soviet Chairman Khasbulatov (two letters), 
March 7, 1993 and March 9, 1993, in Iz istorii sozdania konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, vol. 4/1, 666-
667.  
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In a bold decree74 on March 20, which he announced that same day on national 
television, Yeltsin condemned the CPD’s actions, which he described as “arrogantly 
denying Russia’s citizens the right to determine their own destinies and cowardly burying 
the April referendum on property rights and the fundamentals of a new constitution.” He 
announced that he was calling for “special rule” as well as a confidence referendum in his 
leadership:   
I have honestly tried to compromise with the Congress, despite their 
machinations, despite their insults, despite their rudeness; every path has been 
taken and every attempt to find agreement has resulted in the Congress 
discrediting power and destroying the state….The Congress is trying to limit the 
president's desire to give the land to the people and to protect Russia. Any 
possibility of reaching an agreement with the conservative majority of deputies 
has been completely exhausted....The Congress has refused to listen to the voice 
of the country and rejected the views of the majority of voters….Under these 
conditions, the president must take responsibility for the fate of Russia….I signed 
a decree today on “special rule” to overcome the crisis of power. According to the 
decree, on April 25, 1993, citizens will take a vote of confidence in the president 
and the vice-president…they will determine if I should continue to fulfill my 
obligations and who should lead the country: the president or the Congress of 
People’s Deputies.”75 
                                                 
74 “Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 20 marta 1993 g. № 379 ‘O deiatel’nosti ispolnitel’nykh 
organov do preodoleniia krizisa vlasti’ (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation from March 20, 
1993 “On the Activities of the Executive Bodies Pending the Resolution of the Crisis of Power”),” in Iz 
istorii sozdania konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, vol. 4/1, 725-727. 
75 From Boris Yeltsin’s televised address to the country, March 20, 1993, in Iz istorii sozdania konstitutsii 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii, vol. 4/1, 719-724.  
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On March 23, Zor’kin’s constitutional court condemned Yeltsin’s actions as 
unconstitutional; and on March 26 the CPD convened another special session to vote on 
impeachment proceedings against Yeltsin. The impeachment vote came in seventy-two 
votes short of the two-thirds majority needed for the vote to succeed, but the 617 votes 
against the president and the uncertainty over the loyalties of the military facilitated yet 
another joint compromise. Yeltsin moderated his immediate ambitions by revising the 
referendum questions he had announced; he removed any reference to “special rule” and 
refrained from asking for a confidence vote in his much more conservative vice-
president—and now political opponent—Alexander Rutskoi. In the end, he managed to 
get the CPD’s approval for the following four questions to be put to nation-wide vote on 
April 25: (1) “Do you have confidence in the President of the Russian Federation, Boris 
Yeltsin?” (2) “Do you approve of the socioeconomic policies carried out by the President 
of the Russian Federation and the government of the Russian Federation since 1992?” (3) 
“Do you consider it necessary to hold early elections to the Presidency of the Russian 
Federation?” (4) “Do you consider it necessary to hold early elections of the people’s 
deputies of the Russian Federation?” (Sakwa 2002: 51).  
Yeltsin actively campaigned for a favorable referendum outcome with the “Da, 
Da. Net. Da! (Yes. Yes. No. Yes!)” slogan, indicating how his supporters should vote. He 
had also increased students’ stipends, pension benefits, and some salaries in the months 
leading up to the poll, which, in addition to the disproportionate media coverage he 
received, gave him an advantage over the legislature (Tolz and Wishnevsky 1993: 2). 
Nevertheless, based on the votes of 64.5 percent of the electorate, Yeltsin could claim a 
stronger democratic mandate than the CPD. The positive response rates to the first and 
second questions were 58.7 and 53 percent, respectively; and 67.2 compared to 49.5 
percent of respondents supported early elections to the CPD compared to the presidency. 
 101 
The results, however, were very uneven, especially in the republics where Yeltsin did not 
receive the same levels of support. Yet, because the most densely populated regions of 
the country did in fact support the president at levels at least as high as 60 percent, 
Yeltsin was confident enough to speed up the process of adopting a new constitution. On 
May 12 he issued a decree76 establishing a new pro-presidential constitutional working 
group, headed by one of his advisers, Sergei Alekseev; and on May 20 he issued another 
decree77 to convene a June 5 “constitutional convention” to finalize the text of the 
document. On the surface, the 750 participants in the Constitutional Convention appeared 
to be quite representative of diverse societal interests, regions, parties, and factions. 
However, to the opposition this was a group of people brought in by invitation only to 
“rubber stamp” a constitution that favored the president.   
The two “sanctioned” drafts at the convention were the Rumiantsev draft and an 
alternative presidential draft. The Rumiantsev group had published a first draft of the 
constitution as early as November 1990. With Yeltsin initially focused on questions of 
economic reform and the country’s future territorial boundaries (McFaul 2001), 
opposition to that draft had come from leftist conservatives, who held the plurality of 
seats in the CPD (see Table 14). These critics opposed the Rumiantsev draft as a 
“constitution designed for thieves and robbers,” (Rumiantsev 1991: 2) largely because of 
its capitalist provisions.78 Therefore, the working group incorporated some concessions 
                                                 
76 “Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 12 maia 1993 g. № 660 ‘O merakh po zaversheniiu 
podgotovki novoi konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation 
from May 12, 1993 “On Measures to Finalize the New Constitution of the RF”),” in Iz istorii sozdania 
konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, vol. 4/2, 179-182. 
77 “Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 20 maia 1993 g. № 718 ‘O sozyve Konstitutsionnogo 
soveshchanii podgotovki proekta konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii’  (Decree of the President of the Russian 
Federation from May 20, 1993 “On Convening a Constitutional Convention to Finalize the Draft 
Constitution of the RF”),” in Iz istorii sozdania konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, vol. 4/2, 305-306. 
78 “Press-konferentsii po priniatoiu novoi konstytutsii RSFSR (Press-conference on the adoption of a new 
constitution in the RSFSR),” September-October 1991 (no specific date in file), F. 10026;  Op. 1; D. 2924; 
L. 2, GARF. 
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based on constitutional drafts prepared by the Communists of Russia faction and the 
Saratov Institute of Law. Over time, however, Rumiantsev steered the text back toward 
his original rather more social-democratic vision, but it continued to reflect a middle 
ground between the radical reformists on the one hand and the leftists on the other. In 
addition, while the Rumiantsev drafts provided for a president with enough authority to 
lead reform efforts, they ensured that the parliament would have quite extensive control 
over the nomination and dismissal of the government. During a press conference in the 
fall of 1991, Constitutional Court Chairman Valerii Zor’kin outlined the project’s vision 
as follows: 
In this project, as you can see, we began with the classical theory of the separation 
of powers.…We believed that a presidential republic would be the most 
appropriate choice for Russia. But it is, I stress, based on the separation of 
powers. Our draft is not like the Latin American presidential republics, nor some   
president who can go as far as to dissolve the parliament or “hide it somewhere in 
his pocket”; rather, it is about balance between the legislative, executive, and 
judicial powers…(Regarding the need for a president) where the executive branch 
does not have enough power to carry out reforms; where a generally civilized 
“Roosevelt”-level president does not emerge, a “Pinochet” will. Unfortunately, 
nowadays this name does not evoke such aversion in this country, but we are 
talking about momentous and fateful events in Russia. If we fail to create a 
civilized constitution, which would give us the opportunity to build this version of 
democracy, then we will condemn Russia to hard and dark times (Zor’kin 1991: 
8-10).79  
                                                 
79 Ibid. 
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As Zor’kin outlined, the Rumiantsev project proposed a presidential republic. 
However, President Yeltsin’s cohort was dissatisfied with the limits on presidential 
authority, and so it published a “presidential draft” on April 30, 1992. The main author of 
this draft was Yeltsin’s primary legal adviser, Sergei Shakhrai. This competing draft 
greatly strengthened the president’s prerogatives relative to the parliament; the president 
would have the power to dissolve the parliament, practically full control over the cabinet, 
and the ability to serve longer fixed terms of six years. Shakhrai’s original “presidential 
draft” was revised in April 1993 with help of the liberal mayor of Leningrad, Anatolii 
Sobchak,80 and former mayor of Moscow Gavriil Popov, as well as presidential advisor 
Alekseev. This latest presidential draft drew on parts of the Rumiantsev’s draft, but the 
two texts had some key distinctions, especially with regard to the relationship between 
the president and the parliament (and prime minister) and the relationship between the 
Russian center and the federal regions—the two most divisive issues in the constitutional 
debates. The task of the Constitutional Convention would be to consolidate these two 
drafts into a final version of the constitution. The communist version of the draft was not 
allowed to enter the discussion. In fact, Yeltsin opened the Convention with remarks that 
cast his opponents in the CPD as the illegitimate and authoritarian heirs to the 
Bolsheviks. As Tolz (1993a) summarized:  
“Today’s representative bodies,” Yeltsin maintained, “were elected (in 1990) in 
accordance with Soviet legislation. They are the direct heirs of those soviets that 
usurped power in 1918” and therefore are illegitimate. “The soviet type of 
                                                 
80 Sobchak initially put out an alternative draft that was based on a draft Andrei Sakharov drew up as a 
template for a new USSR constitution just prior to his death in 1989. It had a primarily parliamentary basis 
and the executive would have limited independent authority (Thorson 1992: 48). However, he never 
succeeded in getting the CPD to consider it.  
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power,” he concluded, “cannot be reformed. Soviets and democracy are 
incompatible” (p. 9). 
In response, Khasbulatov stormed out of the hall “denouncing the body as 
shameful and dictatorial (Tolz 1993a: 9).” Approximately sixty other delegates, including 
Rumiantsev and Zork’in, left with him (ibid.). Additionally, when a communist deputy, 
Yuri Slobodkin, attempted to introduce the communist version of the draft constitution, 
he was forcibly removed from the hall (ibid.). After several delays, the Convention 
finally agreed on a “final” draft. However, only thirty out of the 100 members of the 
original constitutional commission approved the revised text, including Yeltsin who was 
formally commission chairman. Moreover, representatives of just three factions in the 
CPD signed the document— Democratic Russia, the Radical Democrats, and Consent for 
the Sake of Progress (Rumiantsev 2009: 43)—all of which belonged to the “radical 
reformist” Reform Coalition.  
The version approved by the Convention was primarily based on the “presidential 
draft,” but it incorporated elements from the Rumiantsev draft, in particular the first and 
second chapters on the fundamentals of the constitutional order and the rights and 
freedoms of citizens. According to Rumiantsev, the final revised draft was therefore more 
“society-oriented” than the initial presidential draft (ibid., p. 45). However, even though 
it reduced the presidential term to four years, it kept most of the provisions from the 
original presidential draft that emphasized the personal power of the president: he or she 
had the right to dissolve the parliament and faced few accountability mechanisms, among 
other pro-presidential provisions.  
The discussion about how to ratify and promulgate the constitution was the next 
question for the major actors in the constitutional debates. According to the existing 
rules, constitutional changes could occur with a two-thirds majority vote in the CPD. But 
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it was extremely unlikely that the CPD would agree on the version of the draft that came 
out of the Constitutional Convention, when it met during for its tenth session the 
following November. The deputies on the Constitutional Commission and in the Supreme 
Soviet were not in any particular hurry to pass the constitution; according to Rumiantsev, 
they wanted to continue working toward a version of the draft that could realistically be 
passed in either the current CPD or its successor after a new round of elections. 
Regarding this period in time, Rumiantsev (2009) wrote that “In spite of the political 
battles, the legislative process continued to function. This led to many more instances of 
agreement and compromise during this final stage of the constitutional debate. The 
questions that remained were whether or not the opposing parties would continue this 
incremental progress toward each other and whether or not the parties would abandon 
their political tolerance (p. 46).” Nevertheless, the presidential cohort was neither willing 
to wait nor willing to reduce the executive powers it envisioned as necessary for pursuing 
“shock therapy.” And because of the major discrepancies between the parties in terms of 
the powers of the president and in terms of the timing of the ratification, the CPD, along 
with the constitutional court, would have to be forcibly removed from the bargaining 
table.  
 
TIME 3: CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS AND SUPER-PRESIDENTIALISM 
The crisis that produced Russia’s super-presidential regime was a dramatic 
example of the problem of “dual democratic legitimacy” that Juan Linz (1990) associated 
with presidential regimes. In the case of the new Russian state, moreover, the inherent 
ambiguity over which of the country’s directly elected branches of government more 
legitimately represented the people was complicated by the conflicting provisions in the 
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much-amended RSFSR constitution in force at the time. It stated that the parliament was 
“the highest body of state power” (article 104), while at the same time the presidency was 
the “highest official...and head of executive power” (article 121-1). Additionally, while 
only the CPD could alter the constitution with a two-thirds majority vote, Yeltsin had the 
decree-making powers that the CPD had given him early in his presidency, which he had 
tenuously held onto after they were set to expire at the end of 1992. As Slater and Tolz 
described the situation at the time of the crisis:  
The crux of the problem is that over the past eighteen months the Russian 
legislature has altered the constitution in its favor, while Yeltsin has issued 
decrees on his own terms and strenuously resisted relinquishing any of the 
extraordinary powers granted him in November 1991. While each side ignored the 
other, Russia was still lacking authoritative institutions that could set limits for 
political ambitions and a political culture of compromise rather than rule by the 
strongest (Slater and Tolz 1993: 3) 
By September, the branches were pursing divergent constitutional strategies that 
reflected, on the one hand, the legislature’s weaker position that necessitated ongoing 
compromise and, on the other hand, the president’s stronger position, where there was no 
longer any need to compromise if he could claim a total victory. The opposing strategies 
were apparent in each of the parties’ disparate constitutional activities at the time.  On 
September 10, the Supreme Soviet passed a resolution  requesting that the president 
consult with Chairman Khasbulatov and a delegation of Supreme Soviet deputies about 
subsequent steps in the process of constitutional reform ahead of  the CPD’s upcoming 
session in November81 (Rumiantsev 2009c: 51). Around the same time, Yeltsin formed a 
                                                 
81 “Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Sovieta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 10 sentiabria 1993 g. ‘O merakh po 
obespecheniiu soglasovannoi konstitutsionoi reform v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’  (Resolution of the Supreme 
Soviet of the Russian Federation from September 10, 1993 “On approaches for assuring agreement on 
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new working group on September 8 that would “review the constitutional draft approved 
by the Constitutional Convention in order to prepare recommendations for developing a 
single harmonized draft constitution.”82 Khasbulatov’s deputy Supreme Soviet Chairman, 
Nikolai Riabov, who was much closer to the reformist camp than his superior, was put in 
charge of this new working group. It consisted of sixteen members of the original 
commission, “practically all of whom,” as Rumiantsev sarcastically described in a 
footnote, “were the ‘democrats’ from the working group’s predecessor (i.e., 
Rumiantsev’s group)…the ‘single-partisanship’ (of the new working group) was only 
slightly diluted by the ‘opportunist’ O. G. Rumiantsev. Not a single oppozitsioner 
(opposition member) was included in the new working group (Rumiantsev 2009c: 51-
53).” It was becoming clearer and clearer that the president was not interested in any 
further compromise; he no longer needed to compromise because the balance of power 
was much more clearly in his favor. First, he had the results of the April referendum on 
which to base a claim for popular support for him and his reform program; second, he 
managed to secure the support of all the members of the Security Council (Sovet 
Bezopasnosti) during a meeting on September 15 on his prospective plans to disband the 
legislature and introduce emergency rule (Rumiantsev 2009: 56); third, he was confident 
that as “the reformist” he had the support of the West even if he chose a “Pinochet 
option” for maintaining the course of radical liberalizing economic reforms (Klein 2007: 
226).”83 
                                                                                                                                                 
constitutional reform in the RF”),” in Iz istorii sozdania konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, vol. 4/3, 408, 
415. 
82 “Rasporiazhenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 9 sentiabria 1993 g. № 621 - rp (Directive of the 
President of the Russian Federation from September 8, 1993), in Iz istorii sozdania konstitutsii Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, vol. 4/3, 410-412. 
83 In fact, at the height of the conflict, the U.S. Congress voted to give Yeltsin 2.5 billion dollars in 
economic aid to ensure his victory. Moreover, U.S. Secretary of State Christopher Warren went to Moscow 
just after the crisis to support Yeltsin. In a speech at the Moscow Academy for the National Economy on 
October 23 he said: “On October 3-4, the world witnessed what we all hope was the last gasp of the old 
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Decree number 1400 from September 21, 1993, “On stage-by-stage84 
constitutional reform in the Russian Federation,”85 contrary to the implication in the title, 
outlined a speedy process for adopting a new constitution. The CPD and the Supreme 
Soviet were suspended, effective immediately, and the country would be governed by 
presidential decree and resolutions of the Council of Ministers until elections to a new 
legislative body—the State Duma—were held on December 12, the same day the 
constitution would be ratified by national referendum. It also brought the Central Bank 
and the Prosecutor under presidential control. As he had done the previous March, 
Yeltsin went on television to announce the decree, only this time he faced a much higher 
probability of achieving an outcome in his favor. The preamble to the decree claimed that 
the legislature had become a “liability to democratic reform,” which necessitated his 
extra-constitutional and unilateral actions: 
…The Supreme Soviet has directly opposed the implementation of socioeconomic 
reforms, openly and routinely obstructed the policies of the popularly elected 
President of the Russian Federation, has attempted to exercise executive authority 
in lieu of the Council of Ministers. Therefore, the majority of the Supreme Soviet 
of the Russian Federation and some of its leaders have grossly violated the will 
                                                                                                                                                 
order in Russia. The political crisis was a struggle of the sort well known to students of Russian history—a 
battle between reform and reaction. As the crisis unfolded, we in America knew what we had to do: We 
stood firmly behind reform. Let me be clear about our decision to support your President during this crisis. 
The United States does not easily support the suspension of parliaments. But these are extraordinary times. 
The steps taken by President Yeltsin were in response to exceptional circumstances. The parliament and the 
constitution were vestiges of the Soviet communist past, blocking movement to democratic reform. By 
calling elections, President Yeltsin was once again taking matters to the Russian people to secure their 
participation in the transformation of Russia (www.speeches-usa.com/Transcripts/warren_christopher-
russian.html, accessed June 13, 2013).” 
84 The Russian word is “poetapnyi,” which also means “step-by-step” or “gradual.”  
85 “Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 21 sentiabria 1993 g. № 1400 ‘O poetapnoi konstitutsionnoi 
reforme v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation from September 21, 
1993 “On Stage-by-Stage Constitutional Reform in the RF”),” in Iz istorii sozdania konstitutsii Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, vol. 4/3, 456-461. 
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the Russian people expressed by referendum on April 25, 1993….Constitutional 
reform in the Russian Federation has nearly collapsed….In the effort to eliminate 
the political obstacles that have deprived the people of their right to decide their 
own destiny; given the unsatisfying quality of parliamentary standards of the 
Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation; 
bearing in mind the security of Russia and its people—a higher value than the 
formal adherence to contradictory rules established by the legislative branch; in 
order to preserve the unity and integrity of the Russian Federation; in order to lift 
the country out of economic and political crisis; in order to support state and 
public security; in order to restore the authority of the government; based on 
Articles 1, 2, 5, 121-5 Constitution of the Russian Federation, the results of the 
referendum of April 25 1993, I decree: …86 
The Supreme Soviet immediately denounced the actions of the president, deferred 
all presidential powers to the vice-president Alexander Rutskoi, and called an 
extraordinary session of the CPD for the following day to discuss the “coup in the 
Russian Federation.”87 Additionally, during an emergency meeting, the Constitutional 
Court sided with the legislature in declaring that Yeltsin’s decree was unconstitutional.88 
                                                 
86 Ibid., pp. 456-457. 
87 “Postanovlenie Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 21 sentiabria 1993 g. № 5779-1 
‘O nemedlennom prekrashchenii polnomochii Prezidenta Rossikoi Federatsii B. N. Yel’tsina’ (Resolution 
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RF “On the immediate suspension of the powers of the 
President of the Russian Federation B. N. Yeltsin”),” in Iz istorii sozdania konstitutsii Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, vol. 4/3, 481;  “Stenogramma vystuplenia predsedatelia Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii R.I. Khasbulatova pered narodnymi deputatamy Rossiiskoi Federatsii, pressoi, 
obshchestvennost’iu (Stenogram of Supreme Soviet Chairman R.I. Khasbulatov’s address to people’s 
deputies, the press, and the general public),” in Iz istorii sozdania konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, vol. 
4/3, 472-478.  
88 “Zakliuchenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ‘O sootvetstvii Konstitutsii RF deistvii i 
reshenii Prezidenta RF B.N. Yel'tsina, sviazannykh s ego Ukazom 'O poetapnoi konstitutsionnoi reforme v 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ ot 21 sentyabrya 1993 goda i Obrashcheniem k grazhdanam Rossii 21 sentyabrya 
goda’ (Decision of the Constitutional Court of the RF “On the constitutionality of B.N. Yeltsin’s actions 
and decisions relating to his decree No. 1400 ‘On stage-by-stage constitutional reform in the RF’ from 
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The responses from the legislative and judicial branches resembled the events of the 
previous March, except that this time there would be no compromise. When Khasbulatov, 
Rutskoi, and the deputies that supported them refused to leave the “White House,” even 
after power and water had been cut off, Russian special forces stormed the building, 
leading to a bloody end to the crisis on October 4 with hundreds of casualties among the 
supporters of the parliament. The balance of power had dramatically shifted to one side 
of the constitutional bargaining table. 
In the aftermath of the crisis, the presidency was the only remaining institution 
branch of government; the parliament and the higher courts were defunct. Yeltsin, along 
with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and presidential adviser and architect of “shock 
therapy” Gaidar, publicly defended “the disbandment of the parliament, the suspension of 
the constitutional court, and the crackdown on the opposition” as necessary measures for 
speeding up the reform process (Tolz 1993b: 1). However, even prominent “democrats” 
were concerned; Yurii Afanasev, who had been the leader of the Democratic Russia 
electoral bloc during the 1990 parliamentary election, warned “that there are signs that 
Yelsin’s ‘total victory’ over his opponents could create a ‘dangerous situation’ in which 
political discourse is ‘reduced to a monologue of one political force’ (ibid.).”  
Further presidential resolutions completed the basis of the country’s future 
constitution. First, the resolution “On the Federal Organs of Power during the 
Transitional Period” 89 outlined the nature of government during the “transition” period. It 
stipulated power arrangements that were, not surprisingly, greatly weighted in favor of 
the president. It was based on the Constitutional Convention draft, where the president 
                                                                                                                                                 
September 21, 1993 and his address to the citizens of Russia on September 21, 1993”) in Iz istorii sozdania 
konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, vol. 4/3, 486-487. 
89 “Polozhenie ‘O federal’nykh organakh vlasti na perekhodnyi period’ (Resolution “On the Federal 
Organs of Power during the Transitional Period”),” in Iz istorii sozdania konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 
vol. 4/3, 461-466. 
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would nominate the prime minister, and the soon-to-be-elected lower chamber90 of the 
new legislative body, the State Duma, would not be able to contradict his decrees, 
although he could overturn any government resolution that contradicted his decrees. 
Furthermore, according to Decree No. 1400, the new constitution that would be put to a 
referendum on December 12 was to be prepared “jointly by the Constitutional 
Convention and the Constitutional Commission,” whose members were no longer 
deputies but could continue to attend as “experts.” Rumiantsev immediately resigned 
from this group because of its bias in favor of the presidential draft (Slater and Tolz 1993: 
3). The group that, in fact, finalized the draft was, as Henderson quotes,  
…a small circle of people from the President’s associates and individual scholar-
experts. On controversial issues a decision was taken by the President himself, 
some final provision went into the text in his formulations (Avak’ian quoted in 
Henderson 2011: 79).  
The draft that was ultimately put to a dubiously91 successful vote provided for a 
semi-presidential regime with a rhetorical façade of “checks of and balances.” In terms of 
presidential power, one of the only concessions from the initial April Presidential draft 
was to reduce presidential terms to four years.92 It also included some of the content from 
the Constitutional Commission’s draft, but these provisions were primarily “social” and 
                                                 
90 The upper chamber would be an “advisory-consultative” body, comprised of the heads of the executives 
and legislatures from the country’s then 87 constituent regions. 
91 Many reports of ballot stuffing occurred, but because the Central Election Commission had the ballots 
destroyed soon after the referendum, they were impossible to confirm. What’s more, there were reports that 
the head of the CEC, Nikolai Riabov, admitted privately that the turnout rate had only been 46.7 percent, 
when the official results claimed that it was 54.8, with 58.4 percent of those ballots approving the 
constitution (Henderson 2011: 79-80).   
92 In 2008, in a first major constitutional amendment, the term was increased to six years, effective after the 
next presidential election in 2012. Journalists and other observers remarked on the rather obvious strategy 
on Putin’s part to return to the presidency with even more expansive powers after Medvedev’s four-year 
term. This was an alternative to the more controversial option of amending the constitution to allow an 
individual to serve more than two consecutive terms.  
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did not affect the nature of executive-legislative power relations. Article 80 in the 
constitution summarizes the role of the president: he is “the guarantor of the Constitution 
(80-2), he defines the basic direction of the domestic and foreign policy of the state (80-
3) and represents the Russian Federation domestically and internationally (80-4) (White 
1997: 47).” According to article 83, he 
“appoints with the agreement of the State Duma the Chairman of the Government 
of the Russian Federation,” has the right to preside at government meetings and 
“takes decisions on the resignation of the Government of the Russian Federation”; 
he nominates candidates for the Chairmanship of the State Bank; on the 
recommendation of the prime ministers, he appoints and dismisses deputy 
premiers and federal minister; he nominates candidates for the Constitutional 
Court, the Supreme Court and the Procuracy General; he forms and heads the 
Security Council, appoints and dismisses his plenipotentiary representatives in the 
regions as well as the high command of the armed forces and diplomatic 
representatives in foreign states and international organisations (ibid.). 
 He also “calls elections to the State Duma, dissolves the Duma in appropriate 
circumstances, calls referenda, initiates legislation, and reports annually to the Federal 
Assembly on ‘the situation in the country’ and the ‘main directions of the domestic and 
foreign policy of the state’ (article 84) (ibid.). Furthermore, “he is commander in chief 
and can declare a state of war (article 87) as well as a state of emergency (article 88); he 
declares amnesties (article 89) and issues decrees that have the force of law throughout 
the territory of the Federation (article 90) (ibid.). What is more, the president can cancel 
any governmental decrees and regulations that are inconsistent with his own decrees, in 
addition to his ability to suspend legislation issued by the regional governments (articles 
115 and 85) (Henderson 2011: 127). 
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 Included among the “appropriate circumstances” under which the president can 
dissolve the State Duma is the provision in article 111 that states that if the Duma rejects 
a president’s nominee for Government Chairman (the “prime minister”) three times, the 
president can dissolve the legislature and call new elections. Because the constitution 
says nothing about whether or not the president can propose the same candidate three 
times, he has extraordinary leverage over the Duma in terms of both full control over the 
appointment of the prime minister and as a tool to dissolve the legislature by nominating 
a candidate that would have no chance of being confirmed (Henderson 2011: 114). 
Yeltsin, in fact, used this provision to force his choice of prime minister—Sergei 
Kirienko—on the parliament several years later, nominating him for the second and third 
time within less than an hour after the parliament failed to confirm him. However, only 
months later, after the country was shaken by the severe economic crisis of 1998 and 
impeachment had become a viable prospect, the opposition was able to deprive Yeltsin of 
his choice of Chernomyrdin as prime minister in favor of left-leaning Yevgenii 
Primakov. For the first time since the passage of the constitution, Yeltsin came close to 
potentially agreeing to change the constitution in a way that would strengthen the 
prerogatives of the legislature in exchange for ending the impeachment proceedings 
against him.  
 
TIME 4:  CHALLENGES TO SUPER-PRESIDENTIALISM  
The snap elections held in the wake of the fall 1993 crisis brought in a range of 
ideological persuasions during hasty campaigns for which political parties and candidates 
had little time to prepare and very little ability to compete fairly in terms of their media 
exposure. Zhirinovsky’s right-wing nationalist “Liberal Democratic Party of Russia” 
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(LDPR) won an alarming 14.3 percent, which was only slightly less than Gaidar’s liberal 
reformist “Russia’s Choice” party that received 15.6 percent of the vote.93  Chernomyrdin 
continued in the role of prime minister, but neither he nor the president had the support of 
a majority coalition in the parliament. As a result, the country was primarily being 
governed on the basis of presidential decrees94 and the policies of a prime minister and 
government that Duma deputies could not “fire” without risking their own seats in the 
parliament.95 Even after the next elections to the Duma presented more of a challenge to 
Yeltsin because of its large leftist plurality, he had the constitutional prerogatives to 
override their opposition, as evidenced by the Kirienko appointment. It took the external 
shock from the Ruble crisis of 1998 to destabilize the status quo, so that Yeltsin was 
forced to acquiesce to the Duma’s demands with regard to his nomination of 
Chernomyrdin, in addition to considering constitutional reforms that would level out the 
powers of the two branches in order to avoid his potential impeachment. 
The Communist Party of Russia, which had come in third with only 10.7 percent 
of the vote in the December 1993 election, came back strongly with a substantial plurality 
of 34.9 percent during the December 1995 elections. Chernomyrdin’s moderate reformist 
“Our Home is Russia” party came in a distant second with 12.2 percent of the vote, which 
                                                 
93 Source: “Results of Previous Elections to the Russian State Duma,” Centre for the Study of Public 
Policy, University of Strathclyde, http://www.russiavotes.org/duma/duma_elections_93-03.php, accessed 
June 17, 2013. Results include the SMD (in addition to the PR) tier, which listed candidates’ party 
affiliation. 
94 The Duma was very active during this time and, in fact, passed a substantially higher number of laws 
than Yeltsin issued decrees. However, the majority of the laws that passed had both presidential and 
parliamentary support (Remington, et al. 1993, quoted in McFaul 2001: 237).  
95 The “loans for shares” program that created Russia’s oligarchs in 1994 is an example of a government 
policy that the Duma had no control over. Chernomyrdin’s government gave temporary control of the 
shares in the country’s most profitable companies to a small group of banks in exchange for loans. Because 
the government could not repay the loans, these private banks acquired control of vast national oil, gas, 
nickel, etc., industries worth billions more in projected profits than the loans they had provided the 
government.  
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was only a slight edge over LDPR’s 11.3 percent.96 Once the dust settled after the 
elections, and the many independents elected in the first-past-the-post tier of the 
country’s then SMD-PR mixed-member system aligned themselves with factions, the 
makeup of the Duma after the 1995 election was much closer to a “divided majority” 
situation. The factional makeup of the Duma after the 1993 and 1995 elections is 
represented in Tables 14 and 15, respectively.   
 
Table 14: Faction Membership in the State Duma 1993-1995 
Faction Percent Seats 
Total Liberals – “Radical Reformists” 23.7 
   Russia’s Choice (Gaidar)/Liberal-Democratic Union of December 12 17.6 
   Yabloko (Yavlinskii) 6.1 
  
Total Centrists – “Reformists” 13.6 
   Party of Russian Unity and Agreement (“PRES” – Shakhrai) 5 
   “Center” - Women of Russia/Group of New Regional Politics 8.6 
  
Total “Leftists” 17.8 
   Communist Party of Russia 9.5 
   Agrarian Party of Russia 8.3 
  
Total Radical “Rightists” 15.5 
   Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (Zhirinovskii) 14.4 
   Russian National Union/Russian Way 1.1 
Source: “Politicheskii Altas (Political Atlas),” http://www.pe-a.ru/ru/main,  accessed June 15, 2013. 
 
 
Although Gaidar’s and Yavlinskii’s “radical reformist” factions had a small 
plurality in the first Duma with 23.7 percent of the seats between them, they represented 
just 12 percent of the parliament after 1995. Similarly, the leftist Communist and 
Agrarian parties held 17.8 percent of the seats after the first Duma election, compared to 
their near majority of 49.1 percent after the second Duma election. The more moderate 
                                                 
96 Source: http://www.russiavotes.org/duma/duma_elections_93-03.php, accessed June 17, 2013.  
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reformist “centrists,” including deputies representing the interests of the regions, fared 
better in the second Duma election, with 23.5 percent of the seats, than they had in the 
first with 13.6 percent of the seats. 
 
Table 15: Faction Membership in the State Duma 1995-1999 
Faction Percent Seats 
Total Liberals – “Radical Reformists” 12 
   Russia’s Democratic Choice (Gaidar) 1.8 
   Yabloko (Yavlinskii) 10.2 
  
Total Centrists – “Reformists” 23.5 
   Our Home is Russia (Chernomyrdin) 14.4 
   “Center” – Russia’s Regions Deputy Group 9.1 
  
Total “Leftists” 49.1 
   Communist Party of Russia 33.1 
   Agrarian Party of Russia/Agrarian Group 7.8 
   People’s Power Deputy Group 8.2 
  
Total Radical “Rightists” 11.3 
   Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 11.3 
Source: “Politicheskii Altas (Political Atlas),” http://www.pe-a.ru/ru/main,  accessed June 15, 2013. 
.  
 What’s more, the communist candidate Gennadii Ziuganov came in a close 
second to Yeltsin in the first round of the presidential election in 1996; the former 
received 32.5 and the latter 35.8.97 The margin of victory was wider in the second round, 
however, with Ziuganov at 40.7 percent compared to Yeltsin at 54.4 percent. These 
election results were surprising, especially considering the margin of victory in the 
second round, because the first few years of liberalizing economic reforms had 
dramatically affected voters’ livelihoods. In fact, the country had experienced a 14.5 
percent drop in GDP in 1992; a further 8.7 percent decline in 1993; yet a  further 12.6 
                                                 
97 “Results of Previous Presidential Elections,” Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of 
Strathclyde, http://www.russiavotes.org/president/presidency_previous.php, accessed June 17, 2013. 
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percent drop in 1994; and two more years of subsequent negative GDP “growth” of -4.1 
and -3.6 percent in 1995 and 1996 respectively.98 According to the extensive literature on 
the relationship between economic hard times and election outcomes, Russian voters 
“should have” rejected the incumbent Yeltsin as a result of the deteriorating economic 
circumstances under his administration, or turned to a candidate like Ziuganov who was 
associated with the greater stability of the previous era and had a much stronger social 
protection agenda (see for e.g. Tucker 2006). However, the basic assumption that 
material self-interest is the strongest predictor of vote choice was not very strong in the 
Russian (nor the Ukrainian) context. As Chapter 5 of this dissertation shows, voters in 
both of the countries were motivated to a greater extent by ethnicity, which helped 
Yeltsin survive the challenges to his presidency even in the face of economic 
catastrophe.99 
Up until Ziuganov’s defeat by Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election, the 
communist opposition’s much weaker status relative to the president gave them an 
incentive to work within the system to achieve either a different constitutional outcome 
or even win the ultimate prize of the presidency. As McFaul (2001) wrote: 
(Communist officials had) highlighted the transitional nature of the constitution 
and the new Duma. In underscoring the temporal nature of the new political order 
they could reassure more militant forces within their ranks that they were not 
giving in to Yeltsin and his system but just gathering strength for the next battle. 
As communist commentator Yevgeny Fochekov wrote soon after the December 
1993 election, “Two years is a sufficient period in which to prepare without haste 
                                                 
98 Source: “Growth GDP (annual %), The World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG, accessed June 19, 2013. 
99 Many observers attribute his victory to the financial backing and strategizing of the oligarchs who 
profited from the “loans for shares” program. 
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a draft of a constitution which would represent the will of the majority.” 
Fochenkov and others saw the Duma and Federation Council as transitional 
bodies that could use their new electoral mandates to create a more just and long-
lasting political system. Zyuganov also made repeated statements urging his 
comrades to seek power by “civilized ways…through the ballot box.”…Zyuganov 
obviously saw his part as working with the rules—even if those rules were 
dictated by Yeltsin…(he) grew increasingly supportive of the new political rules 
of the game when it looked more likely that he might be able to come to power 
through the ballot box (McFaul 2001: 240-241) . 
After Ziuganov’s defeat, the potential gains for the opposition to pursue a 
confrontational approach to the president and the constitutional order now outweighed 
the potential costs. Their window of opportunity came with the “Ruble crisis” that further 
devastated the economy. On August 17, 1998, Russia defaulted on its debt, which 
produced a sharp spike in inflation with especially devastating effects for the country’s 
pensioners and others on fixed incomes. The crisis was the result of many internal and 
external factors coming to a head, including the mounting cost of the war in Chechnia, 
and the extremely high levels of unemployment, as well as the recent Asian crisis that 
affected the price of Russia’s natural resource exports. Yeltsin immediately fired 
Kirienko, but as mentioned above, his attempts to reinstall Chernomyrdin as prime 
minister failed. He was forced to accept the left-leaning Primakov or else risk a potential 
vote of impeachment. 
 Under the constitution, the requirements for impeachment are extremely stringent. 
He (or she) can only face an impeachment vote for “commission of high treason or 
another grave crime” and only after a lengthy process, whereby: (1) at least one-third of 
the members of the Duma support a measure to indict the president; (2) at least two-thirds 
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of the members of the Duma support the initiative (at this stage of the process the Duma 
is protected from dissolution); (3) within five days the Supreme Court must agree that the 
charge (or at least one of multiple charges) is an impeachable offense; (4) the 
Constitutional Court confirms that the impeachment procedure has been followed 
correctly; and finally (5) a two-thirds majority in the Federation Council must confirm 
the decision within three months (Henderson 2011: 138). The proceedings against Yeltsin 
ultimately failed at “stage 2” of this process. However, the real possibility of 
impeachment due to the recent crises had opened up prospects for compromise for the 
first time since Yeltsin’s complete victory over the parliament in 1993.  
Earlier in the year Duma deputies Lev Rokhlin and Victor Iliukhin, the chairmen 
of the Defense and Security committees, respectively, formally launched the 
impeachment process. Whereas the latter was a conservative communist, the former had 
previously been a member of Chernomyrdin’s pro-government Our Home is Russia 
party. After  Kirienko’s “forced” appointment as prime minister, the disgruntled Duma 
expedited the process: on May 20, Ziuganov put out a statement that the CPRF had 
gathered sufficient signatures to begin the impeachment proceedings, and a Duma 
Commission was formed to investigate five possible counts against the president as 
grounds for impeachment. The accusations included “high treason” for the “Belozheva” 
(or CIS) Agreement that dissolved the Soviet Union in 1991; for the improper use of 
force in resolving the constitutional crisis in 1993; for abusing his office with regard to 
initiating and waging the war in Chechnia; for allowing the disintegration of the military; 
and even for “genocide against the Russian people” due to the rapid decline in population 
since the initiation of his economic policies (Baumgartner 2003: 101-102). 
Of the charges, the allegation of abuse of office for unilaterally starting the war in 
Chechnia had a realistic chance of securing the support of a two-thirds majority of the 
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Duma, and this possibility became an even likelier prospect in the wake of the August 
financial meltdown. The Duma called for both President Yeltsin’s and Prime Minister 
Kirienko’s resignations. Yeltsin, of course, refused to step down, but he did fire his prime 
minister. However, he could not replace him with his ally Chernomyrdin, because he was 
prevented from nominating him for a third time when the Duma threatened to move on to 
the next stage of the impeachment process, which, if successful, would have protected the 
parliament from dissolution. The uncertainty about the outcome had given Yeltsin a 
strong incentive to compromise by nominating Primakov.  
The position of the opposition had improved significantly: they had finally 
achieved a concession from the president and continued to move forward with a 
confrontational strategy. In the fall, there were indications that the Duma would begin 
debating impeachment in January. Around this time, Yeltsin summoned his former legal 
adviser and one of the main authors of the current constitution, Sergei Shakhrai, to 
discuss a process of amending the constitution in return for an end to the parliament’s 
impeachment efforts.100 The president would “oversee” the process, but because the 
prime minister and government would take the lead, Shakhrai became Primakov’s legal 
adviser. One of his main proposals was to bring the government under the control of a 
majority coalition in the Duma, a concession that would lessen some of the president’s 
non-legislative powers and create a more “parliamentary-presidential” rather than 
“presidential-parliamentary” semi-presidential system. 
As these discussions were occurring, Primakov tried to broker a truce between 
Yeltsin and the Duma that would guarantee that each would remain in office until their 
respective terms ended in 2000. The opposition, however, was not persuaded to abandon 
                                                 
100 Natal’ia Timakova, “Konstitutsionnaia anarkhia (Constitutional Anarchy),” Kommersant’ Vlast’,  No. 
41 (293),  November 27, 1998, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/14883,  accessed June 20, 2013. 
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the impeachment process. As previously mentioned, if the impeachment vote on at least 
one of the charges succeeded in the Duma, the parliament would be protected from 
dissolution (at least temporarily). The Chechnia charge appeared to have sufficiently 
broad support across Duma factions for the process to advance to the next stage. When 
the vote was finally imminent, after several postponements, Yeltsin abruptly fired 
Primakov, who was on the verge of creating a majority coalition in the Duma. Within 
hours, the parliament passed a non-binding resolution by an overwhelming 243-20 calling 
on Yeltsin to resign, which proved meaningless: Yeltsin did not resign and the Chechnia 
charge—on which the opposition had pinned its hopes—fell seventeen votes short of the 
300 needed for the impeachment process to advance to the next stage. The opposition had 
miscalculated the odds of a successful vote of impeachment in the Duma; its leaders 
pressed ahead rather than compromise and they ultimately failed. Prior to the vote, 
Ziuganov stated that he was confident that he had the votes of 312 deputies, and Yeltsin 
later admitted in his memoirs that he had been “rather worried” (Baumgartner 2003: 106). 
Why did Yeltsin survive in spite of his extreme lack of popularity in addition to 
his failing health? And why did the opposition fail in spite of its increasing cohesion 
under Prime Minister Primakov? The events surrounding the executive-legislative 
struggle in 1998-1999 stress the importance of the “interactive” effects of the institutional 
and structural contexts in which the different actors pursued goals.  For Yeltsin this 
meant survival and the ability to choose his successor, and for the opposition this meant 
impeachment and the potential for a candidate like Ziuganov or Primakov (or Luzhkov) 
to become president. On the one hand, Yeltsin had the institutional advantages afforded 
by his super-presidential office. He fired Primakov just days before the vote of 
impeachment was supposed to take place, which served two potential purposes: first, to 
prevent Primakov from forming an anti-Yeltsin majority coalition in the Duma, which 
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would have created a situation of “cohabitation” and produced a “check” on Yeltsin’s 
authority; and, second, to possibly exploit his prerogative to dissolve the Duma if it failed 
to accept his new nominee for prime minister. Furthermore, offers of patronage from the 
executive branch trumped some deputies’ partisan loyalty;101 a legislative coalition 
supporting the president was persuaded to either abstain or else vote against impeachment 
with promises of rewards for their support. In the end, the impeachment vote was very 
close—just seventeen votes short of the two-thirds majority necessary for the process to 
go forward. Yeltsin’s term was ending and his health was failing; the thwarted 
impeachment vote—figuratively and literally—bought Yeltsin and his small remaining 
trusted inner circle102 the time they needed to ensure the succession went to someone of 
their choosing rather than to Primakov, who had the support of both the leftist camp as 
well as the support of an “army” of regional governors (Gessen 2012: 22). On the other 
hand, the opposition was trying to mobilize anti-Yeltsin support among voters, but its 
constituency was not coherent or unified enough to present a challenge to the very 
insulated elite contest that was occurring in Moscow. 
 
CONCLUSION: SUPER-PRESIDENTIAL DURABILITY AND DEMOCRATIC DECLINE 
After their loss, the opposition once again had a greater incentive to return to a 
non-confrontational strategy. The costs associated with pursuing a confrontational 
                                                 
101 Indeed, the president had already been using patronage to keep parliament at bay.  As Huskey (1999) 
noted: “In return for the support or forbearance of the parliament, deputies extracted—or the president 
proffered—a variety of “goods,” some benefitting the parliament as a whole, others targeting individual 
leaders…including apartments, transportation, and vacation packages allocated to deputies by the 
president’s Administration of Affairs, and posts on the presidency’s Security Council, granted to the 
leaders of the Duma and the Federation Council (Huskey 1999: 171).” 
102 Yeltsin’s trusted inner circle by then was so small and “cloistered” that the media referred to it as “The 
Family” (Gessen 2012: 12). It was comprised primarily of Yeltsin’s daughter Tatiiana, current and former 
Chiefs of Staff Anatolii Chubais, Alexander Voloshin, and Valentin Yumashev (Tatiiana’s future husband), 
as well as the oligarch Boris Berezovsky. 
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approach seemed too high compared to the relative benefits of maintaining the status quo. 
The consequence was that Yeltsin and his inner circle had the ability to orchestrate the 
presidential succession; Yeltsin nominated the little-known former KGB officer Vladimir 
Putin to be prime minister and then resigned early on New Year’s Eve in 2000. The new 
prime minister became acting president. In the end, the effort to eliminate competition—
by ensuring that Primakov103 or any other left-leaning politician would not win the 
presidency—produced a steady democratic decline in the country (see Figure 8).  Under 
the new president’s administration, the influence of the regions in national politics via the 
Federation Council—the upper chamber of the parliament—was reined in over a series of 
reforms; regional governors became Kremlin appointees104 and “super-governors” were 
installed to ensure that local governors within each of their seven districts remained in 
step with the president. Additionally, civil society organizations faced huge obstacles to 
forming and operating; any independent national television stations were closed or 
brought under Kremlin control; the energy industry was re-nationalized; less-than-loyal 
oligarchs were exiled or imprisoned; party-lists with very high barriers for entry and 
winning seats became the exclusive means for elections to the Duma; and other reforms 
served to further concentrate political authority in the Kremlin. The indicators of levels of 
democracy deteriorated in tandem with this centralization of political power to the point 
that it now makes more sense to call the regime “authoritarian” rather than “super-
presidential.” 
                                                 
103Whom the oligarch and member of Yeltlsin’s inner circle purportedly described as a “monster who 
wanted to reverse everything that had been accomplished…” (Gessen 2012: 21). 
104 Dmitrii Medvedev had pushed a law through the Duma during his final year in office to restore the 
direct election of governors, but in April 2013 Putin signed a new law whereby governors would be 
selected by the local (usually United Russia-dominated) legislatures from a list of candidates approved by 
the Kremlin. 
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The challenges to presidential authority were fruitless in Russia largely because of 
the detachment between politics and society. This facilitated a “rule by the strongest” 
approach to politics that the constitution—and ultimately politics—came to reflect. The 
intuitive part of the argument in this dissertation is that competition among diverse 
interests is the basis for the creation of an inclusive and representative constitutional 
order. A rather less intuitive aspect of this argument is that real competition may well  
include interests that are purportedly “non-democratic,” which in the case of Russia was 
the leftist opposition. At the time of the October 1993 crisis in Russia, many outside 
observers, including western leaders, defended the actions of the president simply 
because he was considered to be a “democrat,” or at the least because he was not a leftist. 
The general consensus in the western press was that the country’s fledgling democracy 
would have been at greater risk of deteriorating if the leftist opposition in the CPD had 
the upper hand. However, had the basic conditions of a democracy—competition among 
diverse ideas and interests and the compromise that that entails—not been threatened by a 
president and presidential entourage intent on “total victory,” then arguably the 
institutional foundations would have been designed in a more inclusive and democratic 
manner, and authoritarianism would have been more difficult to consolidate over the long 
term. Indeed, the communist resurgence in the mid-1990s in several former communist 
countries, including Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria, did not mark 
the end of democracy, but was rather a sign that democracy was working. 
In the case of Russia, a counterfactual could include a scenario in which the 
constitutional debates would have continued and eventually resulted in a new 
constitution. The outcome almost certainly would have been less super-presidential. 
Whether or not Russian democracy would have fared better is, of course, more difficult to 
answer. However, based on experience of the post-communist countries, every successful 
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democracy established either a parliamentary system or a semi-presidential system with 
weak presidencies (see Fish 2006). The conditions that foster a sufficient level of 
competition are the subject of the following chapter. Societal mobilization was certainly 
key (McFaul 2004), but what caused divergent levels of mobilization in Ukraine 
compared to Russia? The following assessment of the electoral foundations of elite 
competition stresses the difficulties Russian voters faced in presenting a unified and 
mobilized voice, both for and against the incumbent, which facilitated the creation of a 
system of “rule by the strongest” rather than one that fosters the liberal democratic 
hallmark of compromise and checks on any one interest exerting disproportionate 
authority. 
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Chapter 5: The Structure of Constitutional Creation in Russia and 
Ukraine 
 
Taken as a whole, the narratives of the constitutional processes in the Russian and 
Ukrainian cases presented in the preceding two chapters are consistent with O’Donnell 
and Schmitter’s (1986) proposition that competition from opposing political forces would 
cause incumbent autocrats to enter into power-sharing “pacts” that would, in turn, 
engender institutions with “checks and balances” and other liberal democratic 
characteristics. However, “transitology” arguments are based almost exclusively on the 
actions and interactions among elite groups, where at best the involvement of “the 
masses” does not matter and at worst could spoil democratic prospects. McFaul (2004) by 
contrast has stressed the importance of societal forces for democratization in the post-
communist region. According to his argument, anti-regime popular uprisings in the 
waning years of Soviet dominance help explain the consolidation of democracy in many 
post-communist states. Yet in his argument only the “democrats” among elite factions 
would be motivated to create more liberal democratic institutions. He also does not 
account for the conditions under which initially elite-driven transitions from authoritarian 
rule are more or less likely to ultimately result in democracy. The argument developed in 
this dissertation has similarities and differences with both the O’Donnell and Schmitter 
and the McFaul contentions: the mobilization of societal forces makes it impossible for 
elites to survive politically unless they adopt inclusive institutions and policies; and the 
concentration of power in a super-presidency would be an irrational choice for 
incumbents, when an opposing faction could just as easily win election to that office in a 
subsequent election as a result of voter mobilization. Such conditions would cause elites 
of any political stripe to be responsive to diverse societal demands in order to increase 
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their chances of winning reelection, and make them prefer an institutional framework that 
would not shut them and their interests out of the political process if their opponents 
happened to win a subsequent election. The cases in this dissertation did not start off with 
mobilized societies; even severe economic hardship failed to engender a mobilized 
opposition force. However, the continual reinforcement of concentrated executive power 
in Russia compared to the interruptions to a similar trend in Ukraine can be explained at 
least partially by the fundamental structures in these two ethnically heterogeneous states. 
Whereas in the case of the former, major societal cleavages were poor predictors of 
electoral outcomes, in the case of the latter, elite competition began to reflect societal 
preferences as the major groups began to mobilize along ethnic, linguistic, and regional 
lines. The corresponding changes in elite preferences for more or less inclusive 
constitutions in Ukraine stress the significance of the structural context for moderating 
elite actions; a mobilized society fostered political competition among elites that, in turn, 
gave them the incentive to act as if they were behind a “veil of ignorance” when creating 
new institutions of government. This raises a crucial question for countries in transition 
from authoritarian rule: When do “the masses” begin to matter? In other words, under 
what conditions are elite-driven regime transitions from authoritarian rule more or less 
likely to themselves become democratized with the participation of social forces in the 
politics of transition? This would occur when the balance of power among elite factions 
becomes a more accurate reflection of the balance of forces in society. The above 
questions grapple with the broader issue of why some elite-led transitions from 
authoritarian rule eventually fully democratized while others de-democratized. They fit 
into the puzzle investigated in this dissertation, because the eventual democratization of 
the regime transition in Ukraine toward the mid-2000s—as voters became more 
mobilized—created a more balanced distribution of power among elite forces that, in 
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turn, promoted the preference for institutional inclusivity among elites with diverse 
interests and ideologies. 
According to the extensive literature on election outcomes during times of 
economic hardship, Yeltsin and Kuchma should have lost their reelection bids during the 
1990s (for e.g., Lewis-Beck, et al. 2000), especially because they both faced opponents 
who were associated with greater economic stability and stronger social protection 
platforms (for e.g., Tucker 2006; Fidrmuc 2000). The basic assumption in this literature 
is that voting behavior is largely a function of material self-interest, and therefore, 
socioeconomic cleavages should be the most powerful predictors of electoral outcomes, 
given the extreme inflation, wage arrears, and plummeting living standards that Russian 
and Ukrainian citizens were experiencing as a result of the drastic economic changes that 
were occurring as their countries transitioned toward market-based economies. Indeed, 
throughout the 1990s annual per capita purchasing power parity (PPP) was in an almost 
yearly decline in both of the cases; in 1990 Russians and Ukrainians had 8,218 and 6,794 
dollars of PPP on a per capita basis, respectively, but by 1996 these figures declined to 
5,793 and 3,626 dollars (see Figure 9).105 These countries were experiencing the worst 
part of Przeworski’s (1991) “J-curve,” which predicted a steep initial decline in economic 
performance after the enactment of market reforms before any long-term gains from 
efficiency could take effect. However, even though there was clear evidence of class-
based and “pocketbook” voting in the two country cases during the 1990s, it was not 
sufficient to unseat the incumbent or foster substantial uncertainty over electoral 
outcomes. The losses from the economic downturn were too dispersed throughout the 
                                                 
105 Source: The World Bank, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx, accessed July 6, 2013. 
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majority of the population for the losers to overcome their “collective action dilemma” 
(for e.g., Hellman 1998).   
 
Figure 9: Annual Purchasing Power Parity (in U.S. Dollars) in Russia and Ukraine 
(1989-1999) 
 
 
Such circumstances promoted the concentration of political power, because 
insulated reformist elites were fairly certain they could hold on to power. However, as 
political discourse became more and more defined by the question of “national identity” 
in Ukraine during the 2000s, ethnic, linguistic, and regional divides proved to be far more 
powerful predictors of electoral outcomes than the more traditional socioeconomic 
cleavages. Conversely, even though ethnicity proved to be an equally important voting 
cue for Russian voters during the country’s first few democratic elections (Goodnow and 
Moser 2012), it never became a significant predictor of electoral outcomes, due in part to 
the structure of its ethnicity-based cleavages.  
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Ukraine has a well-defined, well-balanced, and even quite dichotomous national 
identity cleavage, in which ethnic Russians and Russophones tend to identify more 
closely with Russia and ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian speakers tend to identify more 
closely with the West. In Russia, by contrast, ethnic and language differences are 
dispersed throughout the country. According to the latest census (2010),106 23 percent of 
the country’s population identified as belonging to one of dozens of non-Russian 
ethnicities. However, the Tatars, who represent the largest of these groups, comprised just 
3.72 percent of the country’s total population. Similarly, the diverse set of the next largest 
ethnic minority groups—Ukrainians, Bashkirs, Chuvash, Chechens, and Avars—
comprised just 1 percent each of the population. Nevertheless, politics were, in fact, 
strongly affected by demands from ethnic federal regions for greater autonomy in the 
early post-soviet period. Yeltsin recognized the need to make concessions to the regions 
early in his tenure in order to bolster his bargaining capacity, when the nature of the 
balance of power appeared especially murky, which was reflected in The Federation 
Treaty signed on March 31, 1992 that gave considerable power to the regions.107 The fact 
that the Soviet Union had been based on “ethnic federalism” was a key reason these 
cleavages survived the Soviet period more so than other cleavages in the first place; the 
nationalities that had their own ethnic homelands had managed to preserve their 
languages and resist assimilation into Russian culture, and soviet “affirmative action” 
policies such as “Korenizatsiia” (indigenization policy) in the 1920s had promoted the 
advancement of ethnic minorities in local government often at the expense of ethnic 
Russians. Historical research has demonstrated the lasting legacy of such policies (Martin 
                                                 
106 Source: “Natsional’nyi sostav i vladenie yazykami, grazhdanstvo (Composition of Nationalities and 
Languages Spoken, Citizenship),” 
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm, accessed July 6, 2013. 
107 See Iz istorii sozdania konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, vol. 3/3; the Federation Treaty was later 
trumped by the 1993 constitution. 
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1991). However, in the post-Soviet period, these deeply forged, enduring cleavage lines 
only served to balance out elite competition in cases where they reflected consistent, 
cohesive, and balanced underlying structures. 
The following sections in this chapter test a set of hypotheses designed to 
determine the most powerful predictors of vote choice in the two cases. The goal is to 
gauge whether the “politics of region” (and/or ethnicity and language) were more 
important than the “politics of class,” which arguably promoted the more inclusive 2004 
constitutional bargain in Ukraine compared to the consistent reinforcement of 
constitutional exclusivity in Russia.  
 
THE SOCIAL BASES OF ELITE COMPETITION: CLASS VERSUS ETHNICITY 
The broad consensus in the literature on voting behavior is that economics and 
elections are closely intertwined; although the hows and whys are often debated, voters 
are expected to punish incumbents for poor economic performance and reward 
incumbents for good economic performance (for e.g., Lewis-Beck, et al. 2000; Kiewiet 
and Rivers 1984; Tucker 2006; Fidrmuc 2000). Beyond the “pocketbook voting” 
literature, the literature on social cleavages demonstrates that the structure of political 
divisions shapes electoral outcomes and defines political discourse in democracies 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Socioeconomic cleavages have received the greatest amount 
of attention within this literature (Zuckerman 1975: 239), largely because the majority of 
the literature on cleavages and democratic elections has focused on Western Europe, 
where political parties formed within the context of the class-based divisions that resulted 
from the Industrial Revolution. Even though industrialization under communism did not 
establish the capital-labor divisions that have dominated politics in Western Europe 
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(Tavits 2005), class interests have certainly been present in post-communist politics. 
Urban-rural cleavages, which overlap heavily with richer-poorer divisions in these 
countries, have tended to predict support versus lack of support for former communist 
and other left-wing parties.  
Was the failure of the leftist challengers during the 1990s in Russia and Ukraine, 
at a time when political competition was primarily defined by class, a result of weak 
socioeconomic cleavages? Or did voters’ regional, ethnic, and/or linguistic identities 
simply supersede their socioeconomic interests? If voter behavior indicates a lack of 
definition between the supporters of presidential candidates on different points of the 
traditional left-right spectrum—specifically radical neoliberalism versus gradual 
reform—this would support hypothesis 3 presented in the theoretical chapter of this 
dissertation that states: 
Hypothesis 3: voting in the first election cycles in Russia and Ukraine did not 
significantly reflect rich/poor and urban/rural societal divisions. 
Likewise, hypothesis 4 would be supported because these early electoral contests were 
effectively plebiscites on the contestants’ reform agendas: 
Hypothesis 4: voting in the first election cycles in Russia and Ukraine did not 
significantly reflect societal divisions based on region, ethnicity, and language. 
The underlying assumption is that the voter base for a socioeconomic contest was not 
sufficiently mobilized to present a challenge to the incumbent despite the very real 
economic hardships the citizens in these countries were enduring. It could also mean that 
other factors—such as ethnicity or region—are stronger predictors of vote choice. 
Therefore, when subsequent elections began to appeal to the ethnic and language 
identities of voters, a more salient cleavage was activated. In other words, the data would 
support hypothesis 5 that states: 
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Hypothesis 5: voting in subsequent election cycles in Russia and Ukraine 
primarily followed societal divisions based on ethnicity, language, and region. 
In addition to 
Hypothesis 6: voting in subsequent election cycles in Russia and Ukraine was less 
defined by socioeconomic divisions, including differences among income levels 
and rural compared to urban divisions.  
What is more, this would be the case in Ukraine to a greater extent than it was in Russia, 
because opposition groups had begun actively mobilizing voters along these lines in the 
early 2000s. By contrast, any regional threats to the center were cut off almost as soon as 
the Putin administration gained its footing. It therefore makes little sense to consider vote 
choice during subsequent Russian elections because, according to multiple measures, 
electoral fraud and other authoritarian methods later became the means to ensure that 
there could not be a “balancing” of political forces, but rather a continual reinforcement 
of the incumbent’s authority with few vestiges of the democratic experiment that had 
begun with Gorbachev’s reforms in the late 1980s. Additionally, if these final two 
hypotheses hold up to empirical testing, the study could confidently argue that the 
structural component of constitutional bargaining matters, because during the volatile 
phases of early democratization, only clear-cut lines of mass mobilization can ensure that 
political elites face the need to act like democrats in order to ensure their own political 
survival, in the event voters choose to reject them at any given electoral juncture.  
 The following section presents the data and methods to be used by the subsequent 
sections that analyze the two country cases in turn.  The analyses uncover a story of 
electoral competition that can help explain the greater ease with which Russian elites 
consolidated their power, even as their country was undergoing democratization in the 
1990s, and the greater electoral competition that fostered the conditions for changing—
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even if temporarily—a similarly steady course of re-authoritarianization in Ukraine. 
These data suggest that, depending on the nature of deep historically forged societal 
structures, elites in new democracies will be more or less constrained in their ability to 
concentrate political power.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
The data used to assess the above hypotheses are based on a variety of sources, 
including electoral data from the Central Election Commissions of Russia and Ukraine, 
the 2001 All-Ukrainian National Census, the 2000 All-Russia National Census, and 
socioeconomic data from Derzhkomstat and Rosstat, the State Statistics Committees in 
Ukraine and Russia. The Ukrainian census reports the ethnicity as well as the primary 
language of the populations in each raion108 throughout the country, which makes it 
possible to address the issue of ethnicity versus language as primary factors of 
identification in Ukraine. For Russia, this distinction is based on the population of ethnic 
minorities compared to ethnic Russians in each raion. The 2001 Ukrainian census is the 
first and only census to be published since the country’s independence from the Soviet 
Union. Russia’s most recent census is from 2010, but this study uses the 2000 version 
because, it is closer in terms of time to the elections of interest.  
The socioeconomic data for both countries account for the percentage of the rural 
population in each raion, reported by their censuses, as well as regional measures of 
relative financial well-being. For the case of Russia, this latter measure accounts for the 
relative percentage of Gross Regional Product (GRP) each region contributes to the 
national GDP as reported on the Rosstat website.109 For the case of Ukraine, the analyses 
                                                 
108 Raions are roughly equal to the precinct-level in the U.S. context. 
109 http://www.gks.ru, accessed July 7, 2013. 
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use information about the average salary and wage arrears across Ukraine’s regions, as 
reported on the Derzhkomstat website110 to develop a measure of relative socioeconomic 
welfare in each oblast.111   
Electoral results from the following five presidential elections are included in the 
analyses: Ziuganov-Yeltsin in 1996, Ziuganov-Putin in 2000, Symonenko-Kuchma in 
1999, Yushchenko-Yanukovych in 2004, and Yanukovych-Tymoshenko in 2010. The 
first two pertain to the Russian case and comprise raion-level data. The observations for 
the Russian case, therefore, include 2,611 raions across two elections for a total of 5,222 
observations. The last three elections pertain to the Ukrainian case and comprise district-
level data. The level of the electoral district—at which the Ukrainian election results are 
reported—is a slightly higher level of aggregation than the level of the raion. Districts 
contain between one and nine raions with the majority containing no more than two or 
three raions. All analyses for the Ukrainian case are conducted at this level; the data 
comprise all of Ukraine’s 225 electoral districts for three election years for a total of 700 
observations.  
These analyses are based on all the data that I was able to gather. Ideally, the 
analyses would include the 1991 election in Russia and the 1991 and 1994 elections in 
Ukraine, but even without these election years, the five elections that are included 
provide a substantial amount of information for the study. A study of voter characteristics 
and vote choice would also preferably be based on individual-level data such as surveys 
                                                 
110 http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua, accessed July 7, 2013. 
111 Specifically, voters’ financial wellbeing across regions is a composite of the average wages earned in 
the region and the average wage arrears in the region (weighted equally). Due to inflation and other factors, 
the variables were transformed into a measure of relative financial wellbeing that ranges between 0 and 1 in 
the following manner: x-min(x)/[max(x)-min(x)] and then divided the cell values for the transformed 
income and (reversed) wage arrears variables in half in order to combine them into a single measure. 
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or exit polls. For Russia and Ukraine these types of data are not available, and therefore, 
aggregated data have to serve as the basis for the study. However, to compensate for the 
less-than-ideal structure of the data, I deal explicitly with the risk that can arise when 
making inferences about the behavior of individuals on the basis of aggregated data: that 
is, the risk of committing the ecological fallacy.  
This problem occurs when relationships observed at the aggregate level do not 
hold at the individual level. A commonly cited example of a study that risked committing 
this error is Durkheim’s inference that Protestantism must encourage suicide based on the 
fact that, in the nineteenth century, suicide rates were higher in predominantly Protestant 
countries (Durkheim 1881). This inference, in effect, could be correct, but there is no way 
of knowing for certain whether Protestants in particular were committing suicide at 
higher rates than members of other denominations in these countries. In the case of this 
chapter, if I failed to correct for this problem, I would only be able to show, for example, 
that heavily ethnic Russian districts in Ukraine lent greater support to pro-Russia 
candidates, but I would not be able to report with much certainty that this support came 
specifically from the ethnic Russians in the district. 
For this reason, I rely on King’s (1997) ecological inference solution to 
disentangle voting patterns across Russian and Ukrainian territorial units for different 
groups of voters. For the case of Russia these include: (1) ethnic minorities and ethnic 
Russians, (2) richer and poorer voters, and (3) rural and urban voters. The categories are 
similar for the case of Ukraine, with the exception that the distinction in the first category 
is between ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians; I have also added a category for 
distinguishing between Ukrainian speakers and Russophones. In addition to ecological 
inference models, I use multilevel models that can account for key contextual effects, 
while parsing out the predictors of voter support for presidential challengers that 
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represented socioeconomic interests distinctly different from the incumbents’—including 
Ziuganov in 1996 and 2000 and Symonenko in 1999—and for challengers representing 
regional and ethnic interests distinctly different from the incumbents’—including 
Yushchenko in 2004 and Yanukovych in 2010. 
 
ANALYZING VOTER CHARACTERISTICS AND VOTE CHOICE IN UKRAINE 
Before delving into the specific predictors of vote choice using the data described 
above for the 1999, 2004, and 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine, the maps in Figures 
10 and 11 offer a general regional overview of what the electoral landscape looked like in 
the preceding two presidential elections in the country.  
 
Figure 10: Support for Leonid Kravchuk (1991) 
 
Source: Andrew Wilson (1997b:73) 
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In the first election, social interests appeared rather less defined—at least 
regionally—as Leonid Kravchuk drew support across a rather undefined electoral 
landscape (see Figure 10).  The high level of support for Kravchuk compared to the more 
nationalist presidential candidates was quite uniform throughout the country, with the 
exception of the three Galician oblasts112 that primarily supported one of the candidates 
fielded by the “national democrats” (see Chapter 3), in particular Rukh Chairman 
Viacheslav Chornovil (Wilson 1997: 72-73). 
The stark orange-blue, west-east cleavage that separated support for Yuschchenko 
and Yanukovych roughly down the middle of the country in the 2004-2005 election cycle 
first started to take shape during the following (early) presidential election in 1994, 
portrayed by the map in Figure 11. As chapter 3 described, the dynamics of the campaign 
were interesting: neither candidate had particular appeal in the west; whereas Kuchma 
was an east-oriented Russophile, he also supported the neoliberal reforms popular among 
Ukrainians with a closer affinity with Western Europe; and whereas Kravchuk was a 
former communist and supported a much more gradual course of reform, he also had 
nationalist stripes that appealed to voters in the west. The decision to hold early elections 
was part of a compromise between then President Kravchuk and Prime Minister Kuchma 
designed to overcome intense conflict over their differences regarding the reform agenda. 
The broad support Kravchuk received in the west was likely motivated by anti-Kuchma 
regionalism.  
  
                                                 
112 The Galician region, comprised of the Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Ternopil oblasts, was incorporated 
into the Soviet Union after WWII and several decades later than other Ukrainian regions. Ukrainian 
nationalism is deeply rooted in this part of the country, where OUN-UPA separatists (Orhanizatsiya 
Ukrayinskykh Natsionalistiv-Ukrayinska Povstanska Armiya--Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and 
its militant wing) fought the Soviets during World War II and contemporary nationalist parties and 
movements took root shortly before and after the country’s independence. 
 139 
Figure 11: Support for Leonid Kuchma (Second Round, July 1994) 
 
Source: Andrew Wilson (1997b: 84) 
 
This pattern, however, was oddly different in the following election in 1999, 
when Kuchma faced a communist opponent in the second round of the elections, Petro 
Symonenko; the distinct patterns of regional support for the different candidates 
disappeared. The following analyses systematically demonstrate this shift; when the 
electoral contest between elites highlighted socioeconomic issues, neither candidate had 
clear bases of support among social groups; by contrast, when the contest between elites 
highlighted regional differences, their support from voters was clearly defined across 
social groups. Moreover, this pattern held even in the face of the severe economic crisis  
in the late 2000s, which had a particularly devastating effect on Ukraine and should have 
spurred more class-based voting. These patterns emerge vividly in the ecological 
inference estimates of voter support for each candidate in the 1999 “socioeconomic 
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plebiscite” election and the 2004 “regional and ethnic plebiscite” election across groups 
comprised of ethnic Russian compared to ethnic Ukrainian voters, Russian-speaking 
compared to Ukrainian-speaking voters, urban compared to rural voters, and relatively 
richer compared to relatively poorer voters. 
 
The Ecological Inference Solution 
King’s solution to the ecological inference problem described above estimates the 
values of the cells in a matrix for which only the row and column totals are known. It 
uses a random-coefficients approach that allows the parameters to vary randomly 
across—in the current case—Ukraine’s electoral districts to derive local parameter 
estimates (sub-i’s) for each district. Because the ecological inference solution is bivariate, 
I estimated a series of eight models for the four groups of voters in each of the three 
elections in order to tap the nature of voter support for the candidates. Specifically, in the 
first model the goal was to estimate the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians who supported 
Symonenko and, correspondingly, the proportion of ethnic Russians who supported 
Symonenko during the 1999 election. To this end, I used observed data, represented by 
iT  and iX  in Figure 12, to estimate these two unobserved i proportions, where iT  
reflects the observed proportion of votes for Symonenko in district i, and iX  reflects the 
observed proportion of the total population that is ethnic Ukrainian in district i.113 
 
  
                                                 
113 Ideally, these proportions would be based on voting age population (VAP) data, which I do not have. 
However, according to the census, the two ethnic groups have very similar demographic characteristics, 
and thus proportions based on the total population are likely to closely reflect proportions based on the 
VAP. 
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Figure 12: King’s Ecological Inference Solution Applied to Voter Ethnicity and 
Support for Symonenko in the 1999 Presidential Election 
iT  = Support for Symoneko in District i  
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The second model would then tap the differences among Ukrainian-speaking and 
Russian-speaking voters, and thus, in this case, iX would reflect the fraction of Ukrainian 
speakers in each district. Likewise, the
i ’s would be estimates of the proportions of 
Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking voters that contributed to Symoneko’s vote 
share in district i. In a similar fashion, I proceeded to estimate differences in patterns of 
voting for Symoneko in 1999 among poorer and richer voters, as well as among rural and 
urban voters. I then, in subsequent steps, repeated these analyses to derive ecological 
inference estimates for the four different voter groups (the iX ’s) that comprise the bases 
of support for the different candidates, but replaced the columns of iT ’s to reflect the 
extent of Kuchma’s electoral support in 1999. The whole process is repeated for each of 
the candidates in the subsequent elections in 2004 and 2010 (see Figure 13 for the general 
overview).114 
  
  
                                                 
114 The EI estimates were derived using Benoit and King’s EzI program for ecological inference, available 
at http://gking.harvard.edu/category/research-interests/methods/ecological-inference, accessed June 28, 
2013. 
iX
iX1
iT iT1
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Figure 13: King’s Ecological Inference Solution Applied to Voter Characteristics and 
Vote Choice in Ukrainian Electoral Districts 
iT  = Support for Candidate in Ukrainian District i  
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Table 16 includes the averages of the point estimates for each sub-group of voters 
for the candidates in the first election—Symonenko and Kuchma in 1999—and Figure 13 
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shows the proportion that the average EI point estimate from each category contributed to 
the total votes.  
 
Table 16: Ecological Inference Estimates of Voter Support for Kuchma Compared to 
Symonenko (1999) 
 1999: Support for Kuchma 1999: Support for Symonenko 
Ethnic Ukrainian 58% 35% 
Ethnic Russian 45% 49% 
Ukrainian speaking 58% 36% 
Russian speaking 48% 45% 
Worse-off Financially 37% 56% 
Better-off Financially 68% 27% 
Rural 40% 54% 
Urban 62% 32% 
N 225 225 
 
Figure 14:  Proportions of EI Averages of Voter Support for Symonenko Compared to 
Kuchma (1999) 
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discourse shifted from socioeconomic to regional issues. On their own, the 1999 
estimates show a slightly greater inclination toward class-based voting; richer regions 
supported Kuchma at higher levels than poorer regions and vice-versa. Similarly, urban 
regions supported Kuchma at higher levels than rural regions and vice-versa. There was a 
lesser but still perceptible amount of ethnic and language-based voting compared to class-
based voting, but these results are dwarfed in comparison to the change that occurred in 
the next election, when discourse shifted from the question of economic reform to the 
question of whether Ukraine should be more Russia-oriented or more west-oriented. 
Table 17 and Figure 14 include the results from the 2004-2005115 election.  
The extent of ethnic-based voting is striking, especially the extent to which ethnic 
Russians and Russian speakers voted against the west-oriented “Orange” candidate 
Yushchenko, at just 9 and 12 percent respectively. Equally striking are the relatively 
imperceptible effects from socioeconomic difference among voters. The dramatic effect 
of this clear-cut societal divide was the perhaps-not-surprising newly found effort among 
elites to change the constitution in a way that would ensure that whichever side won, 
neither side would be totally excluded from the policy-making process.  
 
  
                                                 
115 The (repeated) second round was held in January 2005, but because the election was first held in 2004, I 
refer to it as the “2004 election.” 
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Table 17: Ecological Inference Estimates of Voter Support for Yushchenko Compared 
to Yanukovych (2004) 
 2004: Support for Yanukovych 2004: Support for Yushchenko 
Ethnic Ukrainian 38% 58% 
Ethnic Russian 84% 9% 
Ukrainian speaking 32% 64% 
Russian speaking 81% 12% 
Worse-off Financially 47% 49% 
Better-off Financially 44% 52% 
Rural 41% 48% 
Urban 47% 51% 
N 225 225 
 
Figure 15: Proportions of EI Averages of Voter Support for Yushchenko Compared to 
Yanukovych (2004) 
 
  
 What may be even more striking is that as the country emerged from the shock of 
the 2008 economic crisis—when economic voting should be expected to dampen the 
effect of the ethnic and language cleavages—the gap in levels of support from ethnic 
Russians for the Russia-oriented candidate Yanukovych compared to his west-oriented 
opponent was even wider: an estimated 90 percent of ethnic Russians supported 
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Yanukovych compared to the estimated 6 percent who supported west-oriented 
Tymoshenko (see Table 18 and Figure 16). A parallel pattern of candidate support among 
Russian-speaking voters stands out. This sharp divide in candidate support was less 
pronounced among ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian speakers in 2010 than it was in 
2004, but it nonetheless continued to stand out as an especially strong indicator of vote 
choice, especially when viewed in contrast to the slight voting differences among 
socioeconomic groups. 
 
Table 18: Ecological Inference Estimates of Voter Support for Tymoshenko 
Compared to Yanukovych (2010) 
 2010: Support for Yanukovych 2010: Support for Tymoshenko 
Ethnic Ukrainian 42% 52% 
Ethnic Russian 90% 6% 
Ukrainian speaking 34% 59% 
Russian speaking 90% 5% 
Worse-off Financially 55% 41% 
Better-off Financially 43% 49% 
Rural 43% 52% 
Urban 54% 40% 
N 225 225 
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Figure 16: Proportions of EI Averages of Voter Support for Tymoshenko Compared to 
Yanukovych (2010) 
 
 
 
The EI estimates also indicate that Yanukovych, as the opposition candidate, 
received higher levels of support from all the voter groups, except for relatively better-off 
voters in 2010. At the same time, Tymoshenko received less support in 2010 than 
Yushchenko did in 2004 across nearly all the voter categories, including a 6 percent 
decline in support from ethnic Ukrainians, which could be an indication of economic 
voting among one of her primary constituencies. These changes indicate that in the post-
2008 crisis context “pocketbook” voting was occurring to a greater degree than in the 
previous election, but the extent to which it occurred remained nevertheless quite slight in 
comparison to the intensely sharp divide among ethno-linguistic groups. Thus, the data 
continue to emphasize that socioeconomic cleavages were relatively poor supporters of 
vote choice.  
To get a sense of regional variation, I divided the country into five sub-regions—
west, central, east, south, and Crimea116—and compared the results from the final two 
                                                 
116 The “west” comprised the oblasts of Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Ternopil, Volyn, Zarkapattya, Chernivetsk, 
Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Rivne, and Khmelnytskyi; the “center” included the oblasts of Kirovohrad, Sumy, 
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elections, where the national identity cleavage was so strongly pronounced. These 
analyses confirm that location, in addition to ethnicity and language, was a powerful 
predictor of vote choice in Ukraine, with an important caveat: it mattered substantially 
less for ethnic Russians and, to an extent, Russophones, than for ethnic Ukrainians and 
Ukrainian speakers. In other words, ethnic Russians and Russophones were more likely 
to vote along national identity lines regardless of the region in which they lived—a 
finding that corroborates the significance of the national identity cleavage for these 
minority groups in Ukraine. The results of the regional analyses are reported in Tables 19 
and 20. 
 
Table 19: EI Estimates of Regional Support for Yanukovych in 2004 Compared to 
2010 
 West Central East South Crimea 
 2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010 
Ethnic Ukrainian 9% 16% 18% 34% 79% 75% 59% 67% 52% 40% 
Ethnic Russian 69% 73% 45% 31% 88% 85% 71% 72% 93% 92% 
Ukrainian speaking 10% 17% 20% 31% 65% 72% 59% 68% 2% 7% 
Russian speaking 61% 67% 22% 29% 89% 82% 67% 66% 91% 87% 
Poorer 1% 8% 28% 42% 60% 90% 25% 39% 58% 83% 
Richer 23% 34% 17% 21% 87% 58% 87% 98% 99% 76% 
Rural 14% 25% 19% 35% 81% % 68% 78% 67% 63% 
Urban 10% 16% 21% 28% 78% 76% 59% 62% 91% 89% 
N 64 65 51 51 75 74 23 23 12 12 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Poltava, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Kyiv, as well as the city of Kyiv; the “east” consisted of Luhansk, 
Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Kharkiv oblasts; the “south” contained the oblasts of  Mikolayiv, 
Odessa, and Kherson; finally, “Crimea” includes the Crimean Autonomous Republic in addition to its 
major city Sevastopol, which I designated as a separate region because of its unique history and culture. It 
is particularly distinct from western Ukraine as it only became part of Ukraine in 1954, when Soviet 
authorities transferred the peninsula from the Russian to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. 
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Table 20: EI Estimates of Regional Support for Yushchenko (2004) Compared to 
Tymoshenko (2010) 
 West Central East South Crimea 
 2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010 
Ethnic Ukrainian 89% 79% 83% 70% 24% 23% 43% 32% 35% 44% 
Ethnic Russian 24% 14% 5% 1% 0% 1% 0% 4% 8% 7% 
Ukrainian speaking 88% 79% 79% 66% 38% 37% 40% 30% 91% 93% 
Russian speaking 25% 12% 47% 42% 2% 2% 18% 17% 6% 8% 
Worse-off Financially 69% 66% 66% 55% 1% 1% 74% 17% 1% 1% 
Better-off Financially 97% 83% 79% 69% 29% 40% 4% 30% 23% 34% 
Rural 87% 78% 79% 65% 16% 17% 37% 29% 26% 29% 
Urban 82% 70% 72% 61% 18% 17% 27% 21% 8% 9% 
N 64 65 51 51 75 74 23 23 12 12 
 
The differences in the relative importance of location for ethnic Ukrainians 
compared to ethnic Russians across Ukraine’s regions stand out substantially. Whereas in 
the west, for example, an estimated 89 percent of ethnic Ukrainians voted for 
Yushchenko in 2004 and an estimated 79 percent voted for Tymoshenko in 2010, the EI 
estimates of support for these candidates in the east (in both elections) among ethnic 
Ukrainians was at just 24 and 23 percent, respectively. In fact, ethnic Ukrainians in the 
eastern and southern regions were more likely to vote in step with ethnic Russians. On 
the other side of the coin, ethnic Russians and Russian speakers were more likely than 
ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian speakers to vote along ethnic-based lines regardless of 
region.117 While the minority ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking groups were slightly 
more inclined to vote for westward-oriented candidates in the western oblasts, the 
estimated support for such candidates among ethnic Russians approached zero percent in 
eastern and southern Ukraine. Therefore, according to the EI estimates of vote choice, 
                                                 
117 Russian speakers in central Ukraine are an exception, perhaps because many ethnic Ukrainians speak 
Russian in this part of the country. 
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location was important insofar as it affected voting among the majority ethnic Ukrainian 
and Ukrainian-speaking populations.  
The regional EI estimates also suggest that socioeconomic cleavages may have 
had greater influence in the post-crisis election in certain parts of the country. 
Specifically, support for Yanukovych among poorer voters increased by 30 percent in 
Crimea and 25 percent in the east. Conversely, voting patterns across urban and rural 
areas did not change much between the two elections in any region. In fact, they seemed 
to reflect rather closely ethno-linguistic voting patterns, with lower levels of support for 
Yanukovych from both rural and urban voters toward the western parts of the country and 
higher levels of support for this candidate from both rural and urban voters toward the 
eastern part of the country.118 
The analysis of voting patterns using models of ecological inference provides 
compelling evidence of the predominance of voting along national identity lines in 
Ukraine despite economic conditions that should have spurred greater economic-based 
voting. This is especially true for Ukrainians in the western and central parts of the 
country and for minority Russians and Russian speakers throughout the country as a 
whole. These analyses confront the potential risk of committing the ecological fallacy 
when making predictions about individual behavior on the basis of aggregated data, but 
because they are bivariate models, they do not “control for” economic versus ethnic and 
ethnic versus economic factors in their estimations. Therefore, the following section 
presents a series of multilevel models that comprehensively assess the relative 
importance of the different cleavages as predictors of vote choice within different 
regional contexts. These analyses begin with the 1999 election. 
                                                 
118 An interesting anomaly is the high level of support for Yushchenko among poorer voters in the south.  
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Multilevel Models of Candidate Support  
In this section, I use a series of multilevel models to consider the effects of 
districts’ varying proportions of ethnic and rural populations on the likelihood of support 
for the opposition candidate, in addition to the contextual influence of particular regional 
characteristics on these variables’ intercepts and slopes. The regions vary according to 
their relative wealth, whether they are in the east and southeast of the country, and 
whether they are in the western part of the country. The regional locations are based on 
the same specification used above (see footnote 10). The approach is most appropriate 
because of the nested structure of the data, whereby some of the data occur at the district 
level and some of the data occur at the regional level. Ignoring this nested structure could 
result in overestimating the strength of the effects for the variables at the regional levels 
and underestimating their respective standard errors, thereby causing them to be 
“significant” when they are not.  The multilevel approach is a useful way to test the direct 
effects of variables at each of the two levels of analysis in addition to the cross-level 
interactions among variables at the different levels. A particular advantage of the 
multilevel approach, compared to standard regression analysis, is that the differences in 
intercepts and slopes for the variables at the second regional level can vary randomly 
across regions.  
As with the above EI analyses the goal is to disentangle the predictors of vote 
choice when the contests were about economic issues, which in the Ukrainian case was 
the 1999 election, when the communist party leader challenged the reformist Kuchma, 
and when the contests were primarily about national identity issues, as they were in the 
following two elections. The goal is to grapple with the structural underpinnings of elite 
competition: under what conditions do voters shape the balance of power among elite 
forces, creating greater or lesser incentives to choose inclusive institutions? The EI 
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analysis confirms that the real crisp shift in voter support for or against incumbents was 
the activation of the “national identity” cleavage in the 2004 election, when opposing 
candidates were not defined by traditional left-right, nonreformist-reformist lines, but 
rather by appeals to well-defined social groups that when activated, because of the nature 
of the presidential campaigns would, in fact, upset the incentive for incumbents to 
maintain a super-presidential regime.  
For the first level of analysis the equation is 
ijijjijjjij rY  ruralminority 210   
where 
ijY  reflects the vote share for the incumbent challenger in district i  in region j. j0  
is the constant term and 
j1  and j2  are the region (or “j”)-specific effects on a one-
percent increase in support for the challenger in response to a one-percent increase in 
districts’ Russian minority and rural populations, respectively. 
ijr  is the level-one error 
term, which is assumed to be distributed normally with a mean of zero and variance 2 . 
Adding region level variables re-specifies the level-one intercept 
j0  
and slope 
coefficients 
j1  and j2  as 
jjj u001000 region    
jjj u111101 region    
jjj u221202 region    
where 01 and 11
 are the region’s (either wealthier, east-southeast, or west, depending on 
the model) respective direct and interactive effects on the challenger’s vote shares. The 
level-two residuals ( ju ’s) reflect the effect on support for the challenger from districts 
located in region j. The other parameters are the region-level intercepts. Combining the 
above system of equations produces the following, more compact “mixed-effects” model 
showing the fixed effects (the gammas) in the first set of brackets and the random 
components in the second set of brackets (the ju ’s and the ijr ) (see Luke 2004:10) 
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ijjijjijY minority*regionminorityregion[ 11100100    
ijjij rural*regionrural 2120   ] 
]rruralminority[ 210 ijijjijjj uuu   
Table 21 contains the results of the first set of models assessing support for the 
incumbent Kuchma’s challenger Symonenko in 1999. Model 1 in the first column 
includes only the level-one variables—percent ethnic Russian and percent rural, the first 
of which is an ethnic-based predictor of vote choice and the second of which is a 
socioeconomic-based indicator of vote choice. Models 2-4 incorporate the various 
regional effects.  
When controlling for the ethnic component, the “percent rural” variable remains 
statistically significant—the socioeconomic status of vote choice was, in fact, a better 
predictor of vote choice in an election with candidates representing piecemeal 
conservative economic reform and a stronger social protection agenda and, on the other 
hand, a much more rapid reform program. Whereas voters’ location in the east and 
southeast had neither a direct nor an interactive effect on either of the level-one variables, 
voters’ location in the west had a significant negative direct effect on support for 
Symonenko, in addition to an effect on the slope of “percent rural.” A similar moderating 
effect on the slope of “percent Russian” was not present. In other words, although poorer 
rural voters in the country as a whole supported the leftist challenger at a higher rate than 
their urban counterparts, poorer rural voters in the west were less likely to exhibit similar 
voting behavior. The regional cleavage is apparent even when the electoral contest was 
defined along more traditional ideological lines. Finally, when accounting for the relative 
income levels of the region, “percent rural” as a predictor of support for the leftist 
challenger vanishes; in relatively better-off regions, districts with lower levels of 
urbanization were not associated with higher levels of support for Symonenko. 
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Table 21: Multilevel Analysis of Voter Support for Incumbent Opponent (Symonenko 
1999) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Intercept .3329 (.0353)*** .3192(.0394) *** .4211(.0327)*** .4573 (.1868)** 
Raion-level:     
   Percent Russian -.0001(.0005) -.0010( .0013) -.0006(.0005) -.0017(.0018) 
   Percent rural .1111( .0181)*** .0896(.0274)*** .1667(.0211)*** -.0895(.1143) 
Region-level intercept effects: 
  East-south region  .0682(.0472)   
  Western  region   -.2063(.0551)***  
  Wealthier region    -.2138(.3110) 
Region-level slope effects: 
   Percent Russian     
      *East-south region  .0009(.0014)   
      *Western region   .0016(.0016)  
      *Wealthier region      .0029(.0033) 
   Percent rural     
      *East-south region  .0297(.0369)   
      *Western  region   -.1463(.0386)***  
      *Wealthier region    .3488(.1967) 
Model fit:119     
   Df 5 8 8 8 
   AIC -473 -471 -504 -471 
   BIC -456 -444 -477 -443 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA using full maximum likelihood; the dependent 
variable is the votes share of the challenger (Symonenko) to the incumbent (Kuchma); level-1 n=250, level-
2 n=27; ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
 
The predictors of voter support for Victor Yushchenko, who challenged Victor 
Yanukovych—Kuchma’s chosen successor—in the following election were dramatically 
different (see Table 22). Both candidates were pro-reform, but they reflected radically 
                                                 
119The deviance-based measures of model fit—the Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian (BIC) Information 
Criteria—indicate a relatively closer fit between the data and their respective models when their values on 
models with additional parameters are smaller than their values on the least constrained (in this case, first) 
model. 
 155 
different visions of Ukrainian “national identity” as closer to Russia or closer to the West. 
In the absence of level-two regional variables, ethnic Russians were substantially less 
inclined to vote for the west-oriented challenger. The socioeconomic predictor “percent 
rural,” moreover, was statistically insignificant; indications of economic voting were 
nonexistent. When accounting for geographic differences, these effects are dramatically 
enhanced. Voters in the east and southeast were far less likely overall to have supported 
Yushchenko (see Model 2 in Table 22). However, ethnic Russians in the region were 
more likely than in other regions to have supported the challenger than in other parts of 
the country, based on the effect the east-south variable had on the slope of “percent 
Russian.” This finding is consistent with the regional variation of the EI estimates 
presented in Tables 20 and 21: the location in which ethnic Russians live mattered less as 
a predictor of vote choice than it did for ethnic Ukrainians. Minority ethnic Russians 
were more likely than their ethnic Ukrainian counterparts to be affected by region. 
However, the results show that ethnic Russians living in the west were less inclined than 
their counterparts elsewhere in the country to support the challenger (see Model 3 in 
Table 22). Interestingly, when western oblasts were taken into account, rural voters were 
less inclined to vote for the west-oriented challenger. Finally, the negative sign on the 
coefficient for “percent Russian” still held when wealthier regions were taken into 
account. The negative sign on the interactions between wealthier regions and “percent 
rural” is an indication that rural voters were more likely to support the east-oriented 
candidate in poorer regions than in wealthier regions. A modest sign of class-based 
voting showed up in this model, but it was overwhelmed by the relatively massive effects 
of ethnic-based voting. 
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Table 22: Multilevel Analysis of Voter Support for Incumbent (Successor) Opponent 
(Yushchenko 2004) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Intercept 61.90(5.513)***    87.36 (3.006)*** 56.15(5.101)***     71.08(6.629)***     
Raion-level:     
   Percent Russian -.2232(.0762)***    -1.201(.1381)*** -.3068( .0797)***     -.6082(.2024)***     
   Percent rural -.0083(.0218) -.0276(.0251)    -.0593(.0275)**     .0632(.0385)    
Region-level intercept effects: 
  East-south region  -52.38(5.114)***   
  Western  region   29.99(9.911)***      
  Wealthier region    -.3336(.2423) 
Region-level slope effects: 
   Percent Russian     
      *East-south region  .8917(.1574)***     
      *Western region   -1.424(.6012)**      
      *Wealthier region      .0073(.0064)  
   Percent rural     
      *East-south region  -.0921(.0387)**       
      *Western  region   -.0307(.0680)  
      *Wealthier region    -.0064(.0018)***     
Model fit:     
   Df 5 8 8 8 
   AIC 1570 1468 1557 1550 
   BIC 1587 1496 1584 1578 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA using full maximum likelihood; the dependent 
variable is the votes share of the challenger to the incumbent (or the incumbent’s successor); level-1 n=250, 
level-2 n=27; ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
 
In the final model for the case of Ukraine, the challenger in 2010 was the east-
oriented loser in the 2004-2005 “Orange Revolution” election, Victor Yanukovych, who 
ran against Yushchenko’s Orange coalition ally, Yuliia Tymoshenko, in the second round 
of the 2010 election. The signs on the “percent Russian” minority variable are, therefore, 
expectedly reversed in the four models presented in Table 23 compared to Table 22. The 
estimated coefficients are also consistently statistically significant. During this election, 
however, the “percent rural” socioeconomic predictor also retained a significant and 
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positive effect, with the exception of the fourth model that accounts for wealthier regions. 
Geography was a particularly strong predictor of vote choice in Models 2 and 3. Voters in 
oblasts in the east and southeast were dramatically more likely to support Yanukovych; 
and voters in oblasts in western regions were dramatically less likely to support 
Yanukovych. The effects on the rate of support among minority ethnic Russians were 
also significant in the expected direction depending on the region. Rather surprisingly, 
moreover, voters in the rural districts in the western part of the country were more likely 
to support the challenger to west-oriented Tymoshenko. This is another indication of the 
politics of class in fact mattering, but it is overwhelmed by the saliency of ethnic-based 
cleavages. Lastly, there is a very slight indication of greater voter support for the 
challenger in wealthier regions. Whereas the finding of higher rates of support among 
rural than urban voters in the west was an indication of economic voting (see Model 3), 
given that the economic crisis should have spurred anti-incumbent120 voting, especially 
among poorer voters, the effect appears somewhat muted by the fact that voters in 
regions with higher income levels were more likely to lend support to the challenger. Yet 
again, ethnicity appeared to trump class as a vastly more powerful predictor of vote 
choice.  
 
  
                                                 
120 Tymoshenko had been prime minister during that period. 
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Table 23:  Multilevel Analysis of Voter Support for Incumbent (Successor) Opponent 
(Yanukovych 2010) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Intercept 35.16(4.556)***      14.62(2.8357)***      46.70(4.7461)*** 31.88(4.934)***      
Raion-level:     
   Percent Russian .4110(.0864)***      1.057(.1304)***    .3333(.0811)***      .7222(.2230)***     
   Percent rural .0809(.0258)**      .0945(.0263)***      .0952(.0284)***      .0004(.0446)    
Region-level intercept effects: 
   East-south region  51.75(4.482)***   
   Western  region   -50.35(8.095)***  
   Wealthier region    .0330(.1063) 
Region-level slope effects: 
   Percent minority     
      * East-south region  -.8017(.1502)***       
      *Western region    3.009( .4292)***       
      *Wealthier region      -.0058(.0071)   
   Percent rural     
      *East-south region  .0171(.0404)      
      *Western  region   .2037(.0583)***       
      *Wealthier region    .0068(.0020)***      
Model fit:     
   Df 5 8 8 8 
   AIC 1635 1492 1577 1618 
   BIC 1652 1519 1605 1646 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA using full maximum likelihood; the dependent 
variable is the votes share of the challenger to the incumbent (or the incumbent’s successor); level-1 n=250, 
level-2 n=27; ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
  
 
 In sum, the three Ukrainian elections analyzed in this section represent different 
types of electoral contests. The first is closest to the first of the two elections assessed in 
the following section on Russia; it was a contest between platforms representing the 
leftist position of gradual, piecemeal economic reform and the neoliberal position of 
rapid, radical economic reform. The second reflected a complete shift in the nature of the 
campaign; it was no longer about reform—both candidates were on the same page in that 
respect—it was about the country’s national identity with issues that appealed to very 
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fundamental aspects of voters’ identities, especially their ethnicity and primary language. 
The third is perhaps closer to the second of the two elections assessed in the following 
section on Russia; it was a test of the relative power of “pocketbook” voting—that is, 
anti-incumbent voting in the face of severe economic crisis. All three elections in the 
Ukrainian case indicated an existing but quite muted effect of voters’ socioeconomic 
characteristics, especially when contrasted with the dramatic effect from introducing a 
“national identity” component to the election. There is very little doubt that the nature of 
the Ukrainian political cleavage structure—as well-defined, coherent, dichotomous, and 
ethno-linguistic—created a powerful balancing effect on elite politics. It was in the wake 
of the uncertain outcome from the 2004-2005 election that the Kuchma/Yanukovych 
camp dramatically reversed their preference for concentrated political authority. This 
effect was sustained during the 2010 election, where its “uncertain” nature produced a 
victory for the east-oriented camp, which has since, much like the Putin administration, 
taken steps to undermine the democratic component of elections in order to preempt 
similar uncertainty in the future (see Chapter 3). 
 
ANALYZING VOTER CHARACTERISTICS AND VOTE CHOICE IN RUSSIA 
This section uses the same strategy as the previous section to grapple with the 
reasons Russian political competition continued to favor the radical reformist incumbent 
in spite of the hardships voters faced as a result of the shocks from the economic 
transition. This went against expectations based on the literature regarding the 
relationship between economic hard times and electoral outcomes. The goal is to 
determine which voter characteristics served as better predictors of vote choice in order 
to get a sense of the structural underpinnings of elite competition. In the Russian case this 
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would reflect the reasons political elites remained quite insulated from society even as 
elections were introduced as the basis for selecting the country’s leaders and 
policymakers. I begin by applying King’s (1997) ecological inference solution to 
aggregated percentages of minority and rural populations across  raions in relation to the 
vote share received by each of the candidates in the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections. 
 
The Ecological Inference Solution 
In this case, I estimated three bivariate models for each of the candidates in each 
of the elections for a total of twelve models. The first model estimated the proportion of 
ethnic minorities who supported Ziuganov and, correspondingly, the proportion of ethnic 
Russians who supported Ziuganov in raions during the 1996 election. Thus, in Figure 17, 
iT  is the observed proportion of votes for Ziuganov in raion i and iX  is the observed 
proportion of the total population that is ethnic minority in district i. The 
i ’s (beta sub-
i's) for this particular model are, therefore, estimates of the proportions of ethnic minority 
voters and ethnic Russian voters that contributed to Ziuganov’s vote share in raion i.  
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Figure 17: King’s Ecological Inference Solution Applied to Voter Ethnicity and 
Support for Ziuganov in the 1996 Presidential Election 
iT  = Support for Ziuganov in District i  
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Correspondingly, the subsequent model assessed the differences among voters in 
regions with lower contributions to the country’s GDP, and so in this case, iX reflects the 
fraction of voters from poorer regions in each raion. The 
i ’s (beta sub-i's) for this 
second model are therefore estimates of the proportions of poorer and richer voters that 
contributed to Ziuganov’s vote share in raion i; and so forth for rural and urban voters 
and across the various categories and for each candidate in turn (see Figure 18). 
 
  
iX
iX1
iT iT1
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Figure 18: King’s Ecological Inference Solution Applied to Voter Characteristics and 
Vote Choice in Russian Raions 
iT  = Support for Candidate in Russian Raion i 
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The IE estimates from the 1996 election show that class-based voting was 
certainly occurring (see Table 24 and Figure 18). The estimates indicate a dramatic 
difference in support for the leftist challenger compared to Yeltsin among voters in 
regions with the lowest contributions to the country’s overall GDP. The rural-urban 
divide is also quite distinct, where Zuiganov not surprisingly had substantially greater 
support from rural as opposed to urban voters, at 48 compared to 27 percent respectively. 
This trend was reversed for Yelstin; an estimated 38 percent of urban voters supported 
Yeltsin compared to an estimated 25 percent of rural voters. Regarding the ethnic 
iX
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iT iT1
iX
iX1
iT iT1
iX
iX1
iT iT1
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component of vote choice, the differences were not especially pronounced, although 
minorities appear to have supported the leftist challenger at a slightly higher rate than 
they did Yeltsin.  
 
Table 24: Ecological Inference Estimates of Voter Support for Yeltsin Compared to 
Ziuganov (1996) 
 
 1996: Support for Yeltsin 1996: Support for Ziuganov 
Ethnic Minority 34% 43% 
Ethnic Russian 31% 36% 
Worse-off Financially 31% 38% 
Better-off Financially 98% 1% 
Rural 25% 48% 
Urban 38% 27% 
N 2611 2611 
 
Figure 19: EI Estimates of Voter Support for Yeltsin Compared to Ziuganov (1996) 
 
 
  
In the following election, where Ziuganov challenged Yeltsin’s chosen successor 
Vladimir Putin, the results were similarly indicative of class-based voting. However, this 
finding only concerned the relative wealth of the region; the urban-rural divide appears to 
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have weakened significantly (see Table 25 and Figure 18). The ethnic component of vote 
choice moreover differed from the previous election; in 2000 minority voters were more 
likely to support Putin than Ziuganov.  
 
Table 25: Ecological Inference Estimates of Voter Support for Putin Compared to 
Ziuganov (2000) 
 
 2000: Support for Putin 2000: Support for Ziuganov 
Ethnic Minority 64% 26% 
Ethnic Russian 52% 33% 
Worse-off Financially 55% 32% 
Better-off Financially 24% 1% 
Rural 57% 36% 
Urban 53% 27% 
N 2611 2611 
 
Figure 20: EI Estimates of Voter Support for Putin Compared to Ziuganov (2000) 
 
 
 
A potential cause of this surprising reversal is that this election marked the start of 
pervasive electoral fraud that would come to characterize Russian elections in the 2000s. 
Indeed, electoral fraud in Russia has been more prevalent in areas with denser ethnic 
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minority populations compared to Russian populations (Goodnow, et al. 2012). Arguably, 
this observed pattern resulted from efforts to preempt the regions from presenting a 
counter-balance to the concentration of power at the Kremlin center that arose with key 
challengers to Yeltsin (such as Primakov and Lushkov) in the late 1990s, whose bastion 
of support came from left-leaning regional leaders (see Chapter 4). It moreover occurred 
in tandem with the concerted effort by the Putin administration to “rein in” the regions; 
the policy of “vertical power structure” (Smith 2003) was designed to eliminate the 
remaining layer of checks and balances on executive authority produced by the country’s 
federal structure. The potential fraud that emerged in the ethnic federal regions, in 
addition to the subjugation of the regions in the power structure, began almost as soon as 
Putin took office and was arguably a means for ensuring that democratic forces would not 
even out the relative strength of incumbent and opposition elites in a manner resembling 
what took place in Ukraine shortly thereafter. The results of the multilevel analyses that 
follow reveal this shifting nature of support for the challenger in the country’s ethnic 
federal regions between the 1996 and 2000 elections. 
 
Multilevel Models of Candidate Support  
This section uses models similar to those applied to Ukraine to consider the 
influence of different voter characteristics on vote choice with appropriate contextual 
“controls.” The general equations presented earlier in this chapter for the Ukrainian case 
are identical for the Russian case. There are, however, a few differences to note for the 
current case: the first level of analysis is at the raion rather than the district level; 
additionally, whereas “percent minority” accounted for the population of the ethnic 
Russian minority in Ukraine, “percent minority” accounts for the non-Russian population 
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in Russian raions; finally, the region-level effects considered in the Russian case include 
the relative wealth of the region, which is measured as the percentage of the regional 
contribution to the country’s GDP, and whether or not the raion is located within an 
ethnic republic or autonomous orkrug instead of a non-ethnic oblast or krai.  
 
Table 26: Multilevel Analysis of Voter Support for Incumbent Opponent (Ziuganov 
1996 and 2000) 
 Zuiganov 
1996a 
Zuiganov 
1996b 
Ziuganov 
1996b 
Ziuganov 
2000a 
Zuiganov 
2000b 
Ziuganov 
2000c 
  Intercept 27.85 
(1.48)*** 
27.87 
(1.77)*** 
29.19 
(1.64)*** 
28.29 
(1.06)*** 
28.30 
(1.25)*** 
28.45 
(1.18)*** 
Raion-level:       
   Percent 
minority 
.0185 
(.0128) 
.0376 
(.0184)** 
.0036 
(.0195) 
-.0006   
(.0107) 
.0422 
(.0153)*** 
.0122 
(.0161) 
   Percent rural .1483 
(.0046)*** 
.1582    
(.0051)*** 
.1565   
(.0077)*** 
.04684 
(.0038)*** 
.0588 
(.0043)*** 
.0610   
(.0065)*** 
  Ethnic region 
 
-.1148   
(3.246) 
  
.1822   
(2.338)   
 
  Wealthier 
region 
  
-1.140  
(.5954)* 
  
-.3304    
(.4296) 
Region-level intercept effects 
   Percent 
minority 
      
      *Ethnic 
region 
 
-.0030   
(.0271) 
  
-.0400   
(.0226)* 
 
      *Wealthier 
region   
  
.0107   
(.0118) 
  -.0129  (.0098) 
Region-level slope effects  
   Percent rural       
      *Ethnic 
region  
 
-.0479   
(.0116) 
  
-.0558 
(.0097)*** 
 
      *Wealthier 
region 
  
-.0064  
(.0048) 
  
-.0115   
(.0040)*** 
Model fit:       
   Df 5 8 8 5 8 8 
   AIC 18738 18724 18739 17797 17752 17790 
   BIC 18767 18771 18786 17826 17799 17837 
Notes: The reported coefficients were estimated in STATA using full maximum likelihood; the dependent variable is 
the votes share of the challenger (Ziuganov) to the incumbent (Yeltsin in 1996 and Putin in 2000); level-1 n=2611, 
level-2 n=87; ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Table 26 contains the results of three multilevel models pertaining to the 1996 
election and the three multilevel models pertaining to the 2000 election. Voters living in 
more rural areas—a characteristic that overlaps to a good extent with their relative 
poverty—were consistently more likely to support the leftist challenger than voters living 
in more urban areas. What’s more, in 1996 the relative wealth of the region had a 
negative direct effect on the intercept, but no perceivable influence on the relative rate at 
which rural and minority voters lent support to the challenger. In 2000, however, rural 
voters in wealthier regions supported Ziuganov at a lower rate than in poorer regions. 
Controlling for regions’ ethnic federal status indicated that minorities were on average 
more inclined to vote for the challenger in 1996 if they resided in the non-ethnic regions. 
But the direct and slope effects of such regions were nonetheless nil in the first election. 
However, minority as well as rural voters were less likely to support the challenger in 
such regions in 2000. As indicated above, this may have a basis in the relatively higher 
occurrence of electoral fraud, but the overall expectation is that the absence of a clear 
“periphery” effect made electoral challenges to the incumbent very difficult. These 
results greatly resemble the dynamics of the 1999 leftist-reformist electoral contest that 
occurred in Ukraine (see Table 21); the rural cleavage was certainly apparent, but it was 
vastly overwhelmed by the power of the ethnic and regional cleavage that had been 
activated by the time of the next Ukrainian election. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE STRUCTURE BEHIND CONCENTRATED VERSUS SHARED POLITICAL 
POWER IN ETHNICALLY HETEROGENEOUS STATES 
This was where the paths toward concentrated political authority diverged in the 
two cases. Opposition groups in Ukraine subsequently actively mobilized the “national 
identity” cleavage in order to challenge the incumbent east-oriented regime. Opposition 
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groups in Russia never achieved a similar momentum. Therefore, even though both 
incumbent regimes were actively trying to undermine the ability for “peripheral” forces 
to challenge their dominance via electoral fraud and other methods, such efforts were 
thwarted in only one of the cases. The strength of the east-west cleavage in Ukraine 
presented itself with vast levels of societal mobilization for both sides. The ambiguity 
over which side would win promoted a constitutional compromise for greater inclusivity. 
The parties in this case had actively mobilized these fundamental underlying 
cleavages, which created far greater political competition than the previous efforts to 
activate the “economic vote” on the part of the leftist Symonenko. Whereas the 
incumbents Kuchma and Yeltsin managed to stay in power despite the dire economic 
hardship voters were experiencing, an incumbent’s chosen successor, Yanukovych, was 
successfully challenged by a society that had mobilized along ethnic and regional lines. 
This subsequently became the primary basis of electoral competition in the country. 
Although economic divides remained perceptible, their effects on vote choice were vastly 
overshadowed by the far more substantial effects from ethno-linguistic divides. The 
nature of the country’s cleavage structure was more conducive for the mobilization of 
voters; and when the more easily mobilized cleavages were activated, the decision to 
reduce the powers of the president and increase the powers of the legislature became an 
imperative for all elite parties in competition for political power.  
The devastating effects of the economic transition on Russian and Ukrainian 
voters during the 1990s should have strengthened socioeconomic cleavages. Yet the 
socioeconomic foundations of vote choice proved to be far weaker than ethnic and 
regional components of voters’ identification. These findings offer a piece of the puzzle 
about why elected leaders of some new democracies are more liable to adopt the 
inclusive institutions that are the hallmarks of liberal democracy, while others would 
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choose to consolidate power at the expense of other societal interests. In some cases the 
inclusive choice is reflected in the first constitutional bargain, and in other cases it is 
reflected in amendments to the constitution at a later point in time. This difference 
depends on societal levels of mobilization at the time of the initial constitutional choice. 
Whether underlying structures begin to matter at a later point in time, as the result of 
newfound voter mobilization, initially exclusive constitutions can, in fact, change over 
time in ways that are more or less conducive for the consolidation of democracy.  
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Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
 
In her book, Understanding Institutional Diversity, Elinor Ostrom (2005) 
presented a multi-layered model of institutional change. It is based on choices made by 
actors within “action arenas” in which they face a set of variables affecting their preferred 
institutional outcomes and the strategies for achieving their goals. These individual-level 
variables are nested within broader institutional and structural layers that moderate their 
effects; therefore, whenever the higher-level contextual parameters change, actors within 
the action arenas will reassess the costs and benefits associated with a particular 
institutional choice. Constitutional choice is especially fundamental, because it becomes 
the broader institutional framework within which lower institutional levels are nested.  
The choice of this higher layer of rules in a newly democratizing state is also more likely 
to be affected by the extent to which the basic societal context can, in fact, shape the 
variables affecting the constitutional action arena, because the institutional constraints 
that govern the process of constitutional creation—at the “meta-constitutional” level (see 
Figure 5 in Chapter 2)—are often ambiguous and subject to frequent and arbitrary 
change. This was the case in the constitutional processes in Russia and Ukraine, where 
intense conflict surrounded the “meta-constitutional” rules by which the new 
constitutions would be ratified.   
Within this framework of institutional change, elites are expected to act 
strategically: to maximize their personal political and/or economic gains at minimum 
cost. Therefore, variables such as values, ideology, and culture are not expected to have a 
significant effect. Indeed, in the Russian and Ukrainian cases, actors with diverse 
political persuasions adjusted their preferences for a more or less inclusive constitutional 
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outcome whenever changes in the electoral environment changed the composition of the 
parliament and, in turn, changed actors’ perceptions of the costs and benefits associated 
with their preferences. That fact underscores the relative importance of strategic-based 
explanations of institutional choice. If choices are based primarily on rational self-
interest, where any normative commitments to liberal democratic principles among the 
key actors pale by comparison, the goal then becomes to uncover the conditions under 
which inclusive constitutional outcomes would, in fact, maximize the “utility” of the key 
actors. Such conditions—this dissertation argues—are based on the relative balance of 
power among the different elite factions; when it is more balanced there will be greater 
uncertainty over which faction will control the presidency, and so it makes the most 
rational sense to adopt a constitution that can include a greater diversity of interests in 
government; by contrast, if the balance of power overwhelmingly favors one interest or 
elite group, the choice to concentrate power in a singular presidency reflects the most 
powerful group’s “maximized utility.” 
The balance of power among elite factions is, therefore, the key individual-level 
“action arena” variable in this study. Furthermore, the external conditions that determine 
the balance of power are critical for understanding new constitutional outcomes in 
addition to the reasons constitutions can later change in ways that are more or less 
conducive to democracy (see Chapter 2). If action arenas can be more or less constrained 
by external conditions, questions about when, how, and why “structure” begins to matter 
become equally important in an explanation of constitutional choice, durability, and 
change. In other words, when do insulated elite-led transitions toward democracy turn 
into “democratized” reflections of the major issues that separate voters in the country? 
The contextual effect of “structure” only matters, however, if voters can overcome the 
collective action dilemma and make their voices heard in the governing of their country. 
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The groups most affected by economic hardship in the two cases evaluated in this study 
were arguably too diverse and dispersed to act collectively. Moreover, ethnic and 
regional groups only managed to overcome the problems associated with acting 
collectively in the case of Ukraine, because the “orange” and “blue” voter groups 
represented very cohesive and unified voices. In the case of Russia, even though the 
regions were arguably among the most important counter-balances to the centralization of 
power in the Kremlin, they reflected a very diverse range of nationalities and economic 
interests that were far less inclined to mobilize around a single important issue. 
Therefore, elites at the helm of Russia’s political transition have remained insulated from 
societal interests, which has resulted in the continual concentration of political power to 
the point that the regime is no longer a super-presidential semi-democracy, but is now at 
best a competitive authoritarian regime. Ultimately, with the demobilization of the 
“orange” forces in Ukraine, beginning with the dissolution of the Yuschenko-
Tymoshenko Orange Coalition and the pervasive disappointment with the Yushchenko 
administration (see Chapter 3), Ukraine has reverted toward the centralization and 
consolidation of political power in the hands of a small group of elites. However, due to 
the quite balanced and coherent underlying structure of the ethno-linguistic pro-versus-
anti-Russian cleavage, the current Yanukovych administration may not be able to 
maintain power as easily. At the least, attempts to falsify presidential election results in 
the future may well be met by a reaction similar to the events surrounding the “Orange 
Revolution,” characterized by mass mobilization and the newfound incentive for the 
different elite factions to compromise.  
The reasons that a particular newly democratized state creates an inclusive system 
of government and another one chooses to concentrate political power are, therefore, 
arguably highly dependent on the particular social structural context in the country. 
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Broadly speaking, societies in which groups of voters can more easily transcend the 
collective action problem at the ballot box are more likely to produce a balance of power 
among elite factions that more accurately reflects diverse societal interests. This 
inclusivity will then likely be institutionalized in the new constitutions. More specifically 
speaking, Ukraine had a very distinct dichotomous and balanced ethno-linguistic 
cleavage structure, which may seldom occur in other places. This explained the 
challenges to super-presidentialism for this particular case and cannot easily be applied 
elsewhere. The part of the argument that can extend to other cases, however, is the actor-
centered first level of analysis, in which the key variable in whether or not elites will 
make the choice to adopt a more or less inclusive constitution is the relative balance of 
power among the different ideological factions. How that balance is achieved—that is, 
how elite-led transitions themselves become democratized—is a crucial part of any one 
country’s story of transition. But looking at the balance of power itself is a step toward a 
basic general understanding of the vital process of institution-building in new 
democracies. 
It is a conventional notion that a balance of power among elites fosters “pact-
making” and power-sharing arrangements that can result in democratization (O’Donnel 
and Schmitter 1986). It challenges the general perception that only “democratic” interests 
should direct the process of transition from authoritarian rule (McFaul 2004). Similarly, it 
challenges the inverse of this perception that implies that “non-democratic” or old regime 
elites are more liable to concentrate political authority wherever they have a 
disproportionate amount of power (Easter 1996). According to the argument in this 
dissertation, values and ideology are secondary at best for determining the preferences of 
elites. “Democrats” are not expected to have a normative bias toward inclusivity any 
more than “non-democrats” are expected to necessarily have a preference for exclusivity; 
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elite actors in general are expected to act in their self-interest regardless of their 
ideology.121 
This was the case across numerous junctures in the stories of constitutional 
creation in Ukraine (Chapter 3) and in Russia (Chapter 4). The trail of events in both of 
the cases revealed continuously changing preferences, including some rather dramatic 
“flip-flops,” on the part of both “democrats” and “non-democrats,” depending on their 
assessments of the costs and benefits associated with a particular constitutional outcome 
at a given moment in time. What about other countries in the post-communist region? 
Are inclusive constitutions associated with the representation of a greater diversity of 
interests in government at the time of their adoption? The following section assesses how 
well the basic “balance of power” component of the argument in this dissertation fares in 
countries throughout the post-communist region. 
  
POLITICAL COMPETITION AND CONSTITUTIONAL OUTCOMES IN THE POST-
COMMUNIST REGION 
 A comparison of the composition of post-communist parliaments and the extent 
of legislative compared to executive strength institutionalized in their new constitutions 
indicates that a balance of ideological differences certainly matters. The data for the latter 
include Fish and Kroenig’s (2009) measure of legislature powers—the “parliamentary 
powers index” (PPI)122—and the data for the former are based on the ideological coding 
assigned to the members of the legislatures in all twenty-eight post-communist countries 
                                                 
121 With the exception perhaps of the quite rare Vaclav Havels and Nelson Mandelas of the world.  
122 The index ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 is the lowest level of parliamentary power and 1 is the highest 
level of parliamentary power. Instances with the highest concentrations of presidential power are therefore 
closer to 0.  
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in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union at the time the respective 
constitutions were adopted (Armingeon and Careja 2004).  
 
 Figure 21: Balance of Power in Post-Communist Legislatures at Time Constitutions 
were Adopted123 
 
                                                 
123 Source: Klaus Armingeon and Romana Careja, Comparative Data Set for 28 Post-Communist 
Countries, 1989-2004, Institute of Political Science, University of Berne, 2004, 
http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_eng.html, 
accessed July 4, 2013. 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Belarus (1996*)
Tajikistan (1994)
Kazakhstan (1995)
Azerbaijan (1995)
Russia (1993*)
Kyrgyzstan (1993)
Ukraine (1996)
Armenia (1995)
Georgia (2004)
Ukraine (2004)
Georgia (1995)
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1994)
Poland (1992)
Moldova (1994)
Croatia (1990)
Romania (1991)
Slovakia (1992)
Albania (1998)
Estonia (1993)
Moldova (2000)
Poland (1997)
Slovenia (1991)
Bulgaria (1991)
Croatia (2000)
Latvia (1993*)
Lithuania (1992)
Czech Rebublic (1993)
Macedonia (1991)
Mongolia (1992)
"Leftists"
"Centrists"
"Rightist"
independents
 176 
Figure 21 ranks the countries from weakest legislature to strongest, indicating the 
year of adoption of the constitution in parentheses, and the proportion of “leftists,” 
“centrists,” “rightists,” as well as independents in countries’ respective parliaments at the 
time of the adoption of their respective constitutions. What immediately stands out in this 
chart is that, in the countries in which the constitutions concentrated power in the 
executive and provided scant power for the parliament, the composition of the 
legislatures consisted of substantial contingents of “independent” deputies (indicated by 
purple in the chart).124 Indeed, in the case of Ukraine, the contingent of independents in 
the parliament was mostly comprised of pragmatic rather than programmatic-oriented 
deputies who tended to back the president in exchange for patronage (see Chapter 3). 
This may also have been the case in Belarus, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and the other cases that similarly had large numbers of independents and 
similarly adopted exclusive constitutions, although further research into the specific cases 
would be needed to confirm this. Regardless, it is striking that diverse balances of 
ideological interests are associated with more inclusive constitutional outcomes. The 
exceptions are Moldova and Mongolia, which were overwhelmingly dominated by leftist 
forces but adopted stronger legislatures; the Mongolian legislature is actually the 
strongest in the post-communist region. In the other cases, sometimes the majority tended 
toward the left, in others toward the right, and in others toward the center, but the fact 
that these groups were representative of societal interests—unlike the general pragmatism 
associated with independents—appears to have promoted the choice for more 
representative and inclusive constitutions.  
                                                 
124 The Russian case, marked with an asterisk, does not fit well with the other cases because the legislature 
was elected the same day as the adoption of the constitution, after the traumatic events that followed the 
dissolution of the parliament in the autumn of that year. 
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 For example, the factions in the Polish Sejm at the time it reached an interim 
agreement on the balance of power between the president and the parliament in 1992—its 
“Little Constitution”—were distributed quite equally across the ideological spectrum, 
with 36.9 percent on the left, 34.5 percent in the center, 24.5 percent on the right, and just 
3.9 percent of deputies remaining unaffiliated. That initial interim constitutional bargain 
resulted in a quite balanced division of powers between the executive and legislative 
branches. Its parliamentary powers score was .65, which, for comparative purposes, was 
more inclusive than the bargain reached in Ukraine in 2004, which strengthened 
legislative powers to a PPI of .59 compared to the original Ukrainian PPI of .5 associated 
with the 1996 constitution. Furthermore, the final version of the constitution ultimately 
agreed on in the Polish Sejm on April 2, 1997, was even more inclusive—a semi-
presidential system with a PPI of .75. At that time the distribution of power among 
factions was more dichotomized with fewer centrists, who held 13.5 percent of the seats, 
and stronger contingents of leftists at 41.5 percent and rightists at 45 percent. What’s 
more, at that point every deputy in the Polish Sejm was affiliated with a faction. 
Likewise, in Lithuania, the constitution adopted by national referendum on the same day 
of the elections to its new parliament—the Seimas—reflected a very balanced cleavage 
comprised on the one hand of leftists and on the other of nationalists; 57.5 percent of the 
deputies elected that day were members of the successor party to the Communist Party of 
Lithuania—the Democratic Labor Party of Lithuania—and 41 percent of the elected 
deputies belonged to President Vytautas Landsbergis’s nationalist Sajudis party; not one 
of the deputies belonged to a centrist faction and fewer than 1 percent of the deputies 
were unaffiliated. Under these quite ideologically balanced conditions, the country 
adopted a semi-presidential constitution with a PPI score of .78—one of the strongest 
parliaments in the post-communist region. The other cases present a similar picture: The 
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key to more inclusive constitutional outcomes was some variant of ideological 
competition among factions in government.  
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW DEMOCRACIES WORLDWIDE 
The fact that very diverse constitutions emerged across the countries attempting to 
democratize in the wake of the demise of communism raises some fundamental questions 
connected to the literature on the relationship between constitutional design and 
democracy. First, if parliamentarism according to Linz (1990), or more broadly stronger 
legislatures according to Fish (2006), will help facilitate the process of democratization, 
then what explains the initial decision to adopt a more or less inclusive constitutional 
framework? Second, if initial constitutional choices are not the most conducive to 
democratic prospects, then what explains the potential for them to change at later points 
during the transition before the regime can re-consolidate as authoritarian? By then the 
constitution will be more likely to “stick” over the long term.  What changes in the 
circumstances of a transition will cause elites to want to renegotiate their initial 
constitutional bargain? These questions get at the heart of the basic objective of this 
dissertation: to understand the conditions that facilitated the concentration of political 
power in Russia compared to the conditions that created interruptions to similar 
tendencies in Ukraine. 
The argument is conceptualized within a general framework for understanding 
both questions about the origins of constitutions and the prospects for constitutional 
change over time. The transition from communism included the enfranchisement of 
voters; the introduction of elections gave voters the prerogative to determine who would 
run the country during the transition period. While some of these fledgling democracies 
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had cohesive mobilized social groups from the beginning of the transition, including the 
former soviet countries with strong grass-roots independence movements such as in the 
Baltic states, others were primarily directed by elites with minimal linkages with voters, 
in spite of the fact that they were in their positions of power as a result of electoral 
processes. In this way, depending on the level of social mobilization, some of the 
transitions were democratized from the start. In some other cases, however, it took time 
for salient political issues to begin to mobilize voters in a way that would cause the 
balance of power to be more equally distributed among the different elite factions; or at 
the least, more accurately reflect the distribution of societal interests. In some cases, such 
as in Russia, this never occurred and elites in control of very centralized institutions of 
power managed to steer the political process away from democracy to completely 
minimize any future risk of being removed from power. In other cases, such as in 
Ukraine, the balance of power has changed over time, depending on levels of societal 
mobilization and the cohesiveness of the opposition. At the time of this writing, as 
supporters and opponents of President Yanukovych hold large demonstrations, the west-
oriented opposition in the Rada is attempting to build an electoral coalition similar to the 
Yushchenko-Tymoshenko “Orange Coalition” that successfully challenged the 
dominance of the east-oriented regime in 2004.125 Whether super-presidentialism will 
persist over the long term in Ukraine remains an open question, but the structure of its 
deep historically forged divisions will arguably present a permanent challenge to attempts 
to consolidate power within a small group of elites. 
Addressing the question of whether constitutions can change in ways that are 
more or less democratic introduces a new component to the extensive debate over the 
                                                 
125 “Protesters Square Off In Kyiv; Opposition Joins Forces,”  RFE/RL, July 15, 2013, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-protests-politics/24990148.html, accessed July 15, 2013. 
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most appropriate and conducive constitutions for democratic consolidation. An 
institutionalist paradigm implies that constitutions matter for the consolidation of 
democracy. Indeed, the case of Russia demonstrated how the “super-presidential” upper 
hand of the president was a key reason significant challenges to the president’s authority 
were unsuccessful (see Chapter 4). Yeltsin used his power over the nomination and 
dismissal of the prime minister to regain the upper hand, and ultimately install Putin as 
his successor and successfully marginalize key opposition figures. In the absence of a real 
threat to his ability to control the presidency, neither he nor his successor ever faced the 
incentive to disperse some of the power of the executive to the legislature and/or the 
regions. In fact, quite the opposite occurred and the country’s nascent democracy 
ultimately fizzled out. However, the broader question of why the country’s failure to 
democratize is linked to the question of why the incentive never arose to change the 
constitution in a way that would incorporate a wider range of interests in the governing of 
the country. New constitutions are usually adopted after dramatic “exogenous shocks,” 
such as the collapse of the Soviet Union or the regimes ousted by mass uprisings during 
the “Arab Spring”. These constitutions, however, are not always durable. More exclusive 
constitutions can later become more inclusive, as occurred in Ukraine, and more inclusive 
constitutions can later become more exclusive, as occurred in Georgia.  
The framework for understanding constitutional origins is essentially the same for 
understanding constitutional change; actors will assess and reassess the costs and benefits 
associated with a constitutional choice as external circumstances shift. These shifts are 
not always sudden, as with the collapse of the previous regime, but also gradual as civil 
society grows and voters begin to mobilize and, in turn, present a challenge to elites’ 
incentives to maintain the status quo. The more competitive elections the more untenable 
it will be for elites to maintain a super-presidentialism system, because it comes with the 
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risk of losing power completely—at least for a time—if opposing interests were to win 
the presidency. 
The current transitions in the “Arab Spring” countries may reflect a similar 
dynamic. Egypt and Tunisia, for example, have had very different recent constitutional 
processes. In the case of the former, initial elections created a balance of power in 
government that overwhelmingly favored the Islamist camp. During the January 2012 
parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice party and a 
conservative Salafi coalition won 70 percent of the seats between them.126 Although the 
courts later dissolved that parliament, the constitutional assembly it created to draft the 
country’s new constitution was overwhelmingly one-sided. What’s more, in November of 
2012, President Morsi issued a series of Yeltsinesque constitutional declarations that 
were designed to further concentrate power in his office. However, the budding super-
presidentialism in Egypt has been at least temporarily thwarted by mass mobilization and 
the resulting suspension of the constitution and ouster of the president by the “poder 
moderador” of the military (see Linz 1990: 54). In Tunisia, by contrast, although the 
Islamist Ennahda Party won a substantial 41 percent plurality of seats during the October 
2011 parliamentary election, they entered into a coalition with two center-left parties to 
form a majority coalition. The greater balancing effect in this case appears to have shaped 
elites’ constitutional preferences in a dramatically different fashion from that in Egypt. 
The process of constitutional bargaining in Tunisia has been characterized by 
considerable compromise, and the country’s nearly complete constitutional draft at the 
time of this writing reflects a very high degree of inclusivity. The different conditions and 
                                                 
126 The two parties are not necessarily cohesive ideologically—the latter is particularly conservative—but 
the counterbalance represented by the secular groups came in at a considerable distance from the two 
frontrunners;  the frontrunners won 47.2 and 24.3 percent of the seats, in contrast to the secular party that 
came in third with just 7.6 percent of the seats.  
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different outcomes in these two cases are consistent with the argument presented in this 
dissertation: initial elections in one of the cases resulted in a better reflection of societal 
interests in government and a constitutional process that promoted a more inclusive 
constitutional outcome; initial elections in the other case appear to have been biased in 
favor of the most organized political forces which would have excluded the interests of 
the secular opposition to a disproportionate degree and resulted in a more exclusive 
constitutional outcome. Although the outcome of the current Egyptian crisis is impossible 
to predict, recent events reflect a similar balancing of political forces that occurred with 
the mass mobilization of voters in Ukraine that at least temporarily mediated attempts to 
concentrate political authority to the extent observed in the case of Russia. The relatively 
consistent pattern of events in an environment radically different from the post-
communist context helps support the basic premises of the argument presented in this 
dissertation. 
A takeaway point for policymakers and ongoing forecasts about the democratic 
prospects of transitional regimes is that elites’ values and ideology will likely play a 
secondary role to their utility-maximizing objectives. When creating new institutions, 
elites of any political stripe would be more likely to want to adopt a framework that 
represents the interests of diverse societal interests if the bargaining conditions mimicked 
a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, rather than on the basis of normative commitment to 
democracy. Accordingly, the level of competition among diverse ideological interests 
will likely prove to be more important than whether reformist, communist, secularist, 
Islamist, or whatever forces are in power during regime transitions.  
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Appendix A:  Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
 
REFERENCES FOR ARCHIVAL MATERIALS 
 
F. (number); Op. (number); D. (number); L. (number) – Fond; Opis’; Delo; List (Russian: 
Collection; Register; Folder; Sheet) 
 
F. (number); Op. (number); Sp. (number); Ark. (number) – Fond; Opys; Sprava; Arkush 
(Ukrainian: Collection; Register; Folder; Sheet) 
 
 
ARCHIVES 
 
AVR Ukrainy – Arkhiv Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy (Archive of the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine) 
 
GARF – Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (State Archive of the Russian 
Federation) 
 
TsDAHO Ukrainy – Tsentral’nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads’kykh obiednan’ Ukrainy 
(Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine) 
 
TsDAVO Ukrainy – Tsentral’nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh organiv vlady ta 
upravlinnia Ukrainy (Central State Archive of the Higher Organs of Power and 
Government of Ukraine) 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONS, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND FACTIONS 
 
BYuT – Bloc of Yuliia Tymoshenko (Ukraine) 
 
Congress – Congress of National Democrats (Ukraine) 
 
CPSU – Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
 
CPU – Communist Party of Ukraine 
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CPRF – Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
 
LDPR – Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (Zhirinovskii) 
 
Rukh – Narodniy Rukh Ukrainy (People’s Movement of Ukraine) 
 
SPU – Socialist Party of Ukraine 
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Appendix B:  Transliteration and Translation 
 
TRANSLITERATIONS 
 
All Russian words are transliterated using the American Library Association and Library 
of Congress (ALA-LC) Russian Romanization Tables available online at 
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/romanization/russian.pdf, accessed July 12, 2013. 
Exceptions:  
(1) Three “soft” vowels я, е, and ю are transliterated as ya, ye, and yu, when they 
appear as the first letter in the word. All other cases follow the ALA-LC 
transliteration standard ia, e, iu.  E.g., Yeltsin instead of Eltsin.  
(2) The apostrophe sign ’ to represent the soft sign ь is omitted in proper names with 
widely accepted English language spellings. E.g., Yeltsin instead of Yel’tsin.  
 
All Ukrainian words are transliterated using the standard for Ukrainian Romanization 
adopted by Resolution No. 55 of The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers on January 27, 
2010, available online at http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/55-2010-%D0%BF, 
accessed July 12, 2013. 
 
TRANSLATIONS 
All translations are the author’s, with the exception of direct quotations of translated text 
in secondary English-language sources. 
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